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1INTRODUCTION
Anglo-Free State relations between the wars stil awaits a
comprehensive study ... This is in par a reflection of the larger failure
of British historians to work on Anglo- Irish history '" the Right has
been il at ease deaing with Britan's greatest failure, whilst the Left
has found tropical climes more suited for the cultivation of its moral
superiority. i
When R.F.Holland made this apposite comment, just over a decade ago, he may have
been adding to the very problems he identified. Writing within the context of the
'Commonweath Alliance', he was joining a distinguished list of British and Irish
historians who have sought to fiter inter-war Anglo-Free State relations through the
mesh of Empire-Commonweath development. Beginning with A. Berredale Keith
in the 1920s, this usage continued in either direct or indirect form (by way of
paricular institutions of Commonweath) from the 1930s to the 1970s through the
works of W.K. Hancock, Nicholas Mansergh and D.W. Harkness, and was stil
finding favour with Brendan Sexton's study of the Irish Governor-Generalship system
in the late 1980s.2 But herein a contradiction has developed: cumulative study of the
unnatural origins and performance of the Free State as a Dominion has moved beyond
questions of function to ask whether the Free State was in fact ever a Dominion at
alL. 3 As such, there seems ever more need to step back from inter-Commonwealth
study and refocus on the precise nature of the Free State's central relationship with
Britan in this period.
2It is of course acknowledged that outwith the established zones of internal Irish and
Empire-Imperial study there is no home or forum for one of the most enduring
quandares of modern Europea history. Even if it is accepted that 'pure' Anglo-Irish
history did not end in 1922, the weight of research based on the ten yeas prior, as
against the ten yeas subsequent, suggests an easy acceptance, on both sides of the
Irish Sea, and Atlantic, of the absolute value changes in that relationship. Studies
covering the transition to independence, such as those of Joseph M. CUITan and Sheila
Lawlot, have taen only tentative steps beyond 1922, and may indeed have
epitomised an approach that subsequent Irish studies have done little to dispel; in the
1980s, major overviews by RF. Foster and J.J. Le have been notably reluctat to
evaluate the quality of that new found freedom with continuing reference to Ireland's
giant neighbour. Though Foster, and others, have noted that the main aim of the
Free State in the 1920s was 'self-definition against Britan', the point is the extent to
which Britan was wiling to allow the same. 5
There has then been little impetus for direct Anglo-Free State inter-war study, and
although the tide has begun to turn since the mid-1980's, notably through the
achievements of Paul Canning, Deidre McMahon and, shortly before his death,
Nicholas Mansergh6, it is probable that we are stil a long way short of being able to
produce a comprehensive and coherent review of the period. Apar from the crucial
Anglo/Irish-Anglo/Commonwealth dichotomy, there remains the political chasm
dividing the Cosgrave years of the 1920s from those of de Valera's 1930s; indeed the
overwhelming preoccupation with post-1931 confrontations has often, as in the case
of McMahon's fine study, taen as its contrasting staing point the supposedly
3compliant 'pro-Treaty' years of 1922-31. It is hard to bridge this gulf when the little
direct work on these earlier years, mostly concentrating on the two fundamenta issues
of Boundar and financial settlement, has tended not to question this divide. Although
Irish historians have turned an increasingly sympathetic eye on the internal politics
and problems of these early yeas, the apathetic external image, in contrast to the
later period, has been persistent.
Nowhere has this negativity been more apparent than on the, also vita, topic of
defence relations. For a subject that has been given more than adequate attention in
terms of the 1921 Treaty negotiations and the Treaty Ports issue of the 1930s, the
period in between has had little intensive coverage. In this regard the negative
response of W.K.Hancock in 1937, stating that Cosgrave did not bother to question
British defence imperatives, was stil being held some fifty yeas later by Paul
Canning.7 Thus an enduring and importt image has emerged of defence relations
re-enforcing the above divide, an image that has had to stand for the lack of new
reseach. This does not mea that the image is necessarly an entirely false one, but
it does mean that many of the supposed novelties of the de Valera yeas have been
built on largely unknown foundations.
The Treaty Ports issue is also vita to this thesis, but then so are other defence related
matters which had an impact specific to the 1920s. In other words, the human and
political context of how both countries, but the Irish government in paricular, coped
with the immediate legacy of centuries of armed occupation, with the recent 1916-21
conflct, and with the smaller scale continuity of British occupation, was bound to cast
4old shadows over a new relationship. But how big were these shadows? It was on the
basis of placing some detaled flesh on the skeleton of known (and unknown) policies
and events that this thesis took shape. Frustrations and resentments could tae
necessarily quieter forms than those which characterised the 1930s, and in the end be
no less significant.
If the first objective is then to make solid the continuity of defence affairs, it is
appropriate to begin with a brief evaluation of the Treaty defence negotiations before
tang a close look at British operations in the South in 1922 - the year when a
reluctat Cosgrave was to inherit a situation where British forces were close to the
development of civil war. Despite our growing knowledge of Britan's part in the
progress of that war, there is stil a general perception that its forces became
peripheral to events after the Truce of July 1921, and that its Army was, and had
been, the only British Service involved in the struggle against armed republicanism.
This is simply not the case, and it is to be wondered whether the proper absorption
of Irish historians with the internal dynamics of the period, together with the
authoritative quality of Charles Townshend's history of the 1919-21 British campaign,
have not produced inhibitions to wider inquiry. 8 In any event, as the Admiralty was
to play a central par in later defence relations it seems right to introduce, for the first
time, the Royal Navy's importt role in the events of 1922. The point here is to
establish that the actions and perceptions of both Services were to have repercussions
for later attitudes.
5After these chapters, the following two aim to look at the cumulative legacy of British
involvement and how both countries adjusted to the many unresolved questions
thrown up by the Treaty and the unplanned contingencies of 1922. Retaining the
theme that neither country could escape the past, nor trust to the future, chapter six
returns to the physical and political impact made by the continuing presence of British
forces in and around the three Treaty Ports, and along and across the Border. The
final two chapters explore how all these factors helped determine the conditions for,
and consequences of, one of the most damaging episodes of the later 1920s - the
complete failure of the joint coasta defence review scheduled for December 1926.
In all, the cumulative emphasis on the politics of defence may ilustrate what it was
to be a small aspiring country that had little choice but to accept Britan's version of
what was an inevitably close relationship, and to endure what Britan claimed as the
benign strategic necessity of continued occupation.
As such, this study may also be taen as an example of the contentious subject of
British inter-war Imperialism, and of the 'imperial mind'; a collective condition of
unthinking superiority, often described if not so named. 9 Given the traditional
tensions between the two countries, it follows that this study wil challenge the
sometimes awkward acceptace that the Free State did enjoy full Dominion status and
practice, excepting the matter of defence: defence is not an abstract or marginal issue;
it lies at the core of any aspiring country's identity and perception of freedom. By
the same token this challenge is extended to the alternative idea that, having been
granted disguised republican discretions, the Free State was tied to Imperial demands
in name only. 10 Looking at the 1920s, at a time when the Empire did not have
6constitutional definition, the question of status, as posed by defence relations, wil,
in final discussion, be traced back to where this thesis begins - at the nature of the
Treaty itself. This is especially relevant if it can be shown, in a way that Ireland's
disjointed and disputed Commonwealth participation history cannot, that there was a
direct bond of dissent and 'external association' grievance linking the Cosgrave and
de Valera yeas.
While this is far from being a comprehensive review of the inter-war period, nor yet
a complete review of the neglected Cosgrave years, it does go to the hea of
Anglo- Free State relations and may help towards makng such a comprehensive study
a feasible proposition. It is not suggested that the inter-Commonweath perspective
can be dispensed with, only that we need first to find out far more about that unique
and basic association. It has been a stimulating challenge to try to view this, where
possible, through Irish eyes, but it is hoped that a balanced and empathic view of
conflcting Imperial concerns has also been achieved; the one is so often reflected in
the other.
Finally, the conscious omissions in this study have to be declared. It is fully reaised
that while there was a general cross-pary unity on Irish policy in Britan, the views
of Sinn Fein, Fianna Fail and other republican bodies would offer a different slant to
this largely inter-governmenta study. It may be significant that little organised
republican comment on British defence measures has been found for this period, but
the point has anyway been to discover just how far the Cosgrave governments did
abandon their earlier roots. Even then it has been difficult to trace archive defence
7material specific to the 1929-31 period, a situation which can be explained parly in
terms of the terminal events of the crucial 1924-28 period (detaled here), and partly
in terms of the known lack of defence initiatives by the Labour and National
governments of 1929-31.
And yet, while these might be seen as self-evident omissions, that of the Ulster
dimension certnly nees explanation, if not excuse. On one level the Free State
could hardly ignore the position of the North, and it is hoped that some new and
intriguing insights into cross-Border defence relations have been touched on. On
another level, however, an emphatic point is that a re-emergent nation could have
more than enough British related defence problems to contend with in the South,
without continuous reference to a distinct Northern situation it could do little,
directly, to affect. Contentious though the politics may have been, the Free State was
an entity in itself. It is quite certan that Northern Ireland archives could shed further
light on several aspects of this thesis, but that is for future study and consideration;
in the interim enough challenges are contaned in this study of a much neglected
period and topic.
8CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUN - DEFENCE AN THE TRATY
As in the case of the Dominions in 1914, our peril wil be her danger,
our feas wil be her anxieties, our victories wil be her joy.
Lloyd George on the Treaty - House
of Commons, 14th December 1921. i
The London negotiations which led to the signing of the December 1921 Treaty (more
properly the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty) between 'Great Britan and Ireland'
formed one of the great political dramas of the twentieth century. The subject of
defence, however, though looked at in some detal, has been held by most historians
to have played only a minor par in that two month drama. In comparson with
passions aroused by the abstract concepts of the Crown and 'essential unity' of
Ireland, it has even been held that the Irish conceded Britan's strategic wants
'without much argument' or rea concern2; a reflection, no doubt, on the Irish having
to pay hee to Britan's ealy warning that this question was beyond negotiation3.
According to Lord Longford's (then Frank Pakenham) classic account of the taks,
this paricular issue was so basic and one-sided that within a couple of weeks of their
arval in London the Irish delegates had surrendered the argument; by the end of
October: 'Britan had won on Defence'.4 In all, it seems that little had changed from
the position of July 1921, when London had first informed Sinn Fein of its basic
proposals for peace negotiations; these had included (beside the implied removal of
all armed troops from the South - at that time amounting to over 50,000 men) the
Admiralty's continuing control of all coasta and naval defence.s
9But within this framework of events lies a more intricate story, and one which
ilustrates, as perhaps no other Treaty topic could, just how far the Irish were forced
to march between expectation and achievement. No matter how self-evident it might
seem that Britan's defence proposals did not imply deliberate subjection and
exclusion from Dominion practice, the fact remains that the Irish delegates arrved
in London knowing that if they accepted them they would lose even the pretence of
a desired 'external association'. 6 According to Nicholas Mansergh, it was tellng that
at the beginning of the taks the Irish were arguing generally within the scope of
British proposals, rather than their own counter-points, and that by time they had
formulated coherent 'external association' responses the British could claim that it was
too late to backtrack. Arguably, however, defence was the one vita exception to this
rule, vita in the sense that the force of Irish visions on neutrality contaned its own
clarty, and may have forewarned the British side of what to expect of later
discussions.7
That the Irish should claim that an international and/or Commonweath guarantee of
neutrality or 'integrity' would meet British requirements, and preclude the nee for
bases and coasta control, did indee indicate that what was being sought was a
'republic within the Empire' - to Britan a totaly unacceptable concept. 8 But to
Irish eyes, and paricularly to those of the much maligned Erskine Childers, there was
much to defend in this stance: if, as he believed, simple geographic distance and
historical sentiment would make it difficult for Britan to respect Dominion
independence, then it was logical to assume that the granting of harbours and coasta
waters would epitomise and enlarge the problem. Nor was it the case that the
10
supposedly 'fanatical' Childers held only the tentative support of his more moderate
colleagues; to begin with he was more than ably supported on the question of
neutrality by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collns, and the sequence of events in
London suggests that it was only the agreement to remove defence matters to a
sub-conference committee that prevented an early breakdown on principle. In this
committee it was notable that Collns supported Childers to the extent that Churchil
and Lord Beatty were soon forced to direct taks back to the main conference; by
mid-October Churchil believed that the joint Irish stace comprised a direct rejection
of Imperial defence interests. 
9
This position could not, of course, last. Britan's dominance in negotiation could not
be denied, paricularly when her demands had domestic and international credibilty
and Ireland's own wider security was at stae. And yet the received idea of Irish
indifference probably stems more from the spee of their about-turn than the position
finally agree. It is true that in less than two weeks the Irish moved from a position
of almost tota obstruction to one of almost complete capitulation, but in the interim
they did offer some coherent and consistent resistace. By the end of October they
had prepared a fallback solution, by which the British could have 'under licence' from
the Irish government all coasta facilties 'agree to be necessar', this pending the
Free State's abilty to take responsibilty for the same. It seems that Childers
supported this compromise, and in essence it did stil protect the principle of external
association by claiming, at least, ultimate control over British naval and milta
activities. It also provided a reaistic framework for further negotiation, in that it
observed Dominion practice and answered Britan's technical demands.lO
11
The essential point, however, was that this offer could not meet Britain's political
demands, and in the final days of October the full weight of Imperial divide-and-rule
experience was brought to bear on defence.ll As in other areas of the taks, the
breakthrough came when Griffith was consulted in private (in this instace by Lloyd
George himselt), and where Griffith led the other principal and moderate, Collns,
soon followed. It was during this period that Childers began to despair that the two
senior men were conceding unconditional control, a defiance that then left him
isolated and which has produced little subsequent sympathy from historians. 
12 But
a question that has never been raised of this time is the extent to which the other
delegates, and even de Valera himself, ever fully appreciated Britan's clinical
separation of coasta defence from coast defences - the one to be covered by Article
6 of the proposed Treaty, the other by Article 7 (see Appendix 1). Even as late as the
3rd December, when the full Dail Cabinet met to consider its final position, it was
thought that the latter could also be brought within a comprehensive five yea
transfer, instead of the simple ten year 'review' of the former that was actually on
offer. As the only miltay and strategic expert on the Irish side, Childers must have
known that this was a forlorn task and that the damage was already done.13
And so it proved: on their return to London, for what was to be the final session of
taks, the Irish team did attempt to rescue some partial claim to sovereignty from the
defence measures, but in the event Britain would grant only detals. It was significant
that Collns, in private session with Lloyd George, indicated that agreement could be
reached if Britain conceded that all coasta defence would be transferred in the stated
ten years. The latter dismissed this, although it is again far from clea that Collns
12
accepted that the proposed Articles 6 and 7 were not just sub-divisions of a negotiable
whole. His official report on this private discussion notes that he moved on to insist
on a definition of 'care and maintenance paries' (to be retaned at named harbour
defences), but Collns does not specify that with this the two had moved to a separate
subject entirely. Nevertheless, the urgency with which Lloyd George pursued
Collns's demand for tighter definitions suggests that the British side stil feared that
their counterparts might rebel on both Articles. 
14
Indee, given the intensity of the 5th December, when so many last minute dramas
were played out over the status of the North and the Oath of Allegiance, the time
devoted to re-arguing defence issues was both remarkable and tellng. According to
the Irish records, both sides 'argued at great length' over Irish concerns (which were
strangely prophetic) that as the terms stood the promised coasta defence review
'might never be held if the British did not wish to consider the subject.' At this the
two sides 'went over all the arguments again', with Churchil expressing the blunt
opinion that the Irish would never be allowed a navy. All this referred to Article 6,
but once again the key question is whether, in the heat of argument, the British made
clear, or the Irish understood, that Article 7 did not overlap. It seems not: the Irish
records state that when the British finally conceded a five yea review (instead of
ten), Churchil refused to extend this to the facilities required in warime; in other
words, it was believed that in accepting this amended coasta review date the named
peacetime defences in the first par of Article 7 might be included. 
15
13
That final argument did range over both Articles, and British peacetime requirements,
is known; Churchil and Lord Beatty had never tned to explain, at least to the
satisfaction of Childers and Collns, why the Admiralty neeed to hold both
Queenstown and Berehaven in the south west, but a last plea that the former be
removed from the Treaty list was refused.16 Irish objection was rational, given that
Haulbowline naval dockyard at Queenstown had already been declared redundant, but
perhaps the real point is that too much emphasis can be placed on the strategic
objectivity of British defence demands. It would not have been lost on either side that
Queenstown formed the impressive gateway to the South's second city, and that it was
the first sighting that many international visitors and tourists beheld of Ireland. As
such, it might have been that the rea argument revolved around whether it was to
remain a prestige symbol of Empire, or an equally imposing symbol of Irish
independence. 
17
In all, by the time the Irish delegates had signed the Treaty, in the ealy hours of 6th
December, the defence arangements must have been a bitter, if not in themselves
politically fata, pil to swallow. From a staing point where it was thought that a
guarantee neutrality was feasible, it ended with Britan retaining, in large measure,
the status quo. Ranged against some of the most skilled and experienced political
tacticians in modern Imperial history, the outcome was never really in doubt;
Birkenhead had long warned the Irish side that his country would not concede that an
independent Ireland could escape an Imperial war, and the Treaty had to reflect this
concern. 
18 In the circumstaces, it is interesting that some recent historians, notably
Paul Canning, should hold that Irish indifference led to better terms being
14
overlooked. 
19 This implies a level of British flexibility and Irish resignation that is
hard to detect, either before, during, or after the negotiations. During the Dail
Treaty debates in December 1921, even the most ardent pro-Treaty supporters
doubted the defence terms, as was made plain when Kevin O'Higgins was attacked
by Childers: the former could only beseeh Childers to remember that even he, as a
milta expert, had been unable to advise on how to 'break' the British miltary
might that bound them. Interestingly, whereas the Pro-Treaty camp alone accepted,
albeit reluctatly, the potential longer-term benefits of the general agreement, on
defence there appears to have been an embarassed consensus that the argument with
Britan had been merely deferred. Childers, with his extreme 'logical correctitude',
alone refused to believe that this was the case, but it remained to be seen whether the
man who best understood the imperial mind was in fact correct. 20
In Britan generally, the signing of the Treaty was greeted with a relief bordering on
euphoria; it was seen that Lloyd George, the 'Welsh Wizard', had pulled off his
greatest feat so far - peace with country stil loyal to Crown and Empire, and with
the essential security of Britan and Northern Ireland preserved. Only Whitehall
knew what a frenetic thing it had been at the last, and that 'peace' had been obtaned
only by an ultimatum of immediate war. In these circumstances, it was not surprising
that a show of good faith was urgently required, and when General Macready,
G.O.C. in C. Ireland, returned to London on the 6th December he found the subject
of troop withdrawals already under discussion. 
21 Churchil, in paricular, wanted
15
all the troops home 'as quickly as convenient', noting: 'We should even make a
parade of this, and in particular remove all troops from Dublin at the earliesti2.
Doubtless it was going to be quite a show, and, even as these words were written,
moves were afoot to give them effect; by mid-Januar the battaions were leaving the
South as fast as transport and home reception depots could be aranged. 
23
But there was something missing in the daily press reports on troop departures;
instead of pomp and celebration there was more a sense of haste and tribulation. By
the beginning of Februar there were those in London who, having trusted the
celebration of settlement, began to ask why the rush of returning troops were being
greeted 'without one word of recognition of their services' .24 It was tellng that such
a question could be asked at a time when the political news from Dublin could no
longer be disguised, but the reality was that display was a provocative luxury when
the Treaty had, almost from the moment of signing, threatened to split Sinn Fein and
the LR.A. down the middle. It was perhaps implicit in London's reactions, and in
Churchill's above words, that a rapid troop evacuation might be the best way to 'buy'
complete acceptace of the Treaty in Dublin, but by the beginning of February it was
clear that the gamble had failed. There was as yet no indication that the milta
truce of July 1921 was about to be broken, and yet by the same token the hopeless
division of both the Dail and Dail Cabinet promised a political fragmentation that
made further troop withdrawals a liabilty. 25
That liability was only furthered by the associated post-Treaty violence that had
erupted in Belfast and on the Border. With pressure being applied by the Irish
16
Unionist Allance, Bonar Law and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.),
Sir Henry Wilson, it seemed that the situation in the North was beginning to dictate
a mood that evacuation had gone too far too soon. But serious though this situation
was, it can be argued that concern for the North was to be a deciding factor only
insofar as it reflected on the loyalty and stabilty of the newly formed Provisional
Government; the Treaty was all, and its fate lay in Dublin, not Belfast. If removing
the troops could not buy trust and stabilty, then they would have to stay put and help
enforce the Treaty. 26
Thus by the beginning of February the basic tenet of the Treaty's defence terms was
being undermined by force of circumstace. There was already enough evidence to
suggest that while the Treaty might define the future relationship between Britan and
Ireland, it would not necessarly define the future of Ireland itself; in other words,
and despite possible British delusions to the contrar, the much disputed aricles and
clauses could not in themselves create a Dominion. This was especially so when a
vita element of the Treaty - defence - had set out to preclude that status and obscure
one of the first expressions of sovereignty that any newly independent country seeks.
The coming months and years were going to test whether this was a tenable position.
17
CHAPTER 2 : THE BRITISH AR IN THE SOUTH - 1922
1. Macroom and the Road to Dubli.
Then what are our troops in the 26 counties for? Are they there at the
request of Mr Collns? If so wil the Government say so? Wil Mr.
Collns say so? If they are not, why are they there?
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson:
Commons debate, May 1922.1
When troop withdrawals from the South were suspended, in mid-Februar, the 'sole'
reason, as given by Churchil, was the deteriorating situation on the Border.2
Certanly there was merit to this claim, although by this time no amount of specific
justification was going to hide the fact that the real problem was the Imperial
government's all too eager faith in the Treaty itself. Only days before the suspension
was announced, Lord Cecil had led a commanding Commons attack against the
received idea that the newly nominated Provisional Government in Dublin had been
invested with true authority; he appreciated that the increasing strife was makng the
Provisional Government's position 'almost intolerable', but the point was made that
it was 'in law, nothing but a series of private individuals who were carying out
perfectly un sanctioned acts.' The game was up: forced into helpless agreement with
this argument, Churchil had then to demonstrate that he stil accepted full Imperial
responsibilty for the South. It seemed that until the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act
was ratified the troops were going to have to stay, regardless of the situation in the
North. Furthermore, events were to show that Churchil was under no ilusion that
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this might be just a temporar halt. 3
The actual level of trust that the Imperial government stil placed in its own creation
can be judged by the Provisional Government's complaint that it was not notified of
the evacuation halt until '24 hours after it was a fait accompli.' British Army G.H.Q.
in Dublin was left in no doubt that the Irish believed the suspension to be 'the biggest
blow struck at their prestige', and yet it was notable that Michael Collns, much to
London's surprise, did not make an official protest.4 There was, however, good
reason to be cautious: the pro-Treaty Dublin establishment had become alarmed at the
pace of the evacuation, and the political imperative for the British to go was creating
added social and economic distress in many areas. In mid-Januar, for example, a
petition had been received which detaled the future plight of an estimated 3,000
people in the area of the Curragh (garsoned since 1855) whose livelihoods were
dependent upon the garrison. 
5
It seemed, however, that the good people of the Curragh were due a reprieve. The
timing of the evacuation suspension had also to tae account of the disposition of
General Macready's (G.O.C.in C.) forces in the South: when announced, Stage 1 of
the two par evacuation plan - withdrawal from outlying areas to the main miltay
centres of Cork, the Curragh and Dublin - was neang completion, and consolidation
would present few problems. That consolidation at these three strategic centres was
the immediate object, was made clear at a meeting of the Provisional Government of
Ireland Committee (P.G.I.- Cabinet Sub-Committee) at the end of Februar, when
Churchil overruled General Macready's appeal that the planned Easter taget for
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complete withdrawal be kept on line. It was agree that any further movement would
depend on Michael Collns' s personal assurances in interview with ChurchilL. 6
This meeting was not about to take place, even though it was to become obvious that
the more Collns lost control of events, the more he would have to identify with
Churchil's own doubts. In the early spring of 1922 it was the pivota importce of
Limerick that threatened to lock pro and anti-Treaty forces in immediate civil war,
and when Macready pulled out his remaining 'two weak battaions' from there, at the
end of March, he was to incur the wrath of both men for destabilsing the position.
It was no secret that Macready and the War Office resented the open ended nature of
the suspension order, but the abilty of politicians to bend their own directives now
threatened a serious row. Indee, had Churchil not refrained from sending a
prepared letter to Macready, in which he noted that 'the wish of the Provisional
Government to delay the evacuation of Limerick should have been brought to the
notice of the Cabinet before it was decisively over-ruled', then a confrontation may
have been inevitable. 
7
Apart from having nothing to gain by undermining Macready's position, the reason
why Churchil had to tread carefully can be understood in terms of the resources
actually available to the former. There were only 15 battaions left in the South - 4
based at the Curragh, 6 at Dublin and 5 at Cork - and of these several, since the
Truce of July 1921, had been reduced to less than 50 per cent of establishment
strength because of detachments to other theatres of Empire security. In short,
Macready could afford to consolidate, but otherwise had no room to manoeuvre. 
8
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Since the evacuation suspension, the concern for Northern Ireland's security had seen
General Cameron (G.O.C.- Northern Ireland) increase his forces from 13 to 16
battaions (and shortly to a tota of 23), but while Macready retaned a nominal policy
control over these forces, they were of little immediate benefit to his predicament in
the South. 
9 The essential point, however, was that in extricating the last two isolated
battaions from Limerick, Stage 1 of the overall withdrawal plan was at last complete,
as per the stading P. G.L Committee directive, and a coherent and defensible
deployment attaned.
As such, when on the 4th April Macready confronted Collns and General Eoin
O'Duffy, then Deputy Chief of Staff, with the news that British troops were likely
to stay put, he could do so with relative confidence. Already alarmed at the number
of evacuated barracks in the hands of anti-Treaty forces, British suspicions could only
have been strengthened as Collns again took a defensive posture, admitting that he
did not yet have the capacity to tae over the Cork baracks; it was noted, in
particular, that the evacuation of the main Cork barrack at Ballincollg might have to
wait until after the promised general election. 
10 But unknown to Collns, events in
London were about to overte even his own concerns: dating also from early April
was the first meeting of the newly formed Irish Sub-Committee of the C.LD., whose
task was to detal economic and milta contingencies should Collns falter and a
Republic be declared. The central theme was to occupy and secure the principal ports
of the South and create an economic stranglehold, and in this regard Dublin and Cork
would have held priority.11 Clealy then, the short term coherence of staying put in
Cork, the Curragh and Dublin, was being enhanced by a middle to, perhaps, long
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term strategic aim.
Everything was pointing in one direction, and it was with an air of finality that
Churchil, on the 17th April, advised Alfred 'Andy' Cope, the British Assistat
Under-Secreta in Dublin: 'We shall certnly not be able to withdraw our troops
from their present positions unti we know that the Irish people are going to stad by
the Treaty' .12 As late as the 10th May, Austen Chamberlain, as Leder of the House
(and acting P.M.), was claiming it was 'desirable' that troops should stay in Cork and
Dublin, and the informed Sir Henry Wilson was baiting the government front bench
to admit the strategic reasons for holding these ports.13 And yet, within a week of
Chamberlain's remark, the British had cleared out of Cork, were packing up at the
Curragh, and beginning to concentrate all remaining troops behind the 'Pale' in
Dublin; the articulate planning of many weeks had been overturned in just a few
days.
Previously, the cause and significance of this sudden policy change has been
subsumed within an understading that the direction of troop withdrawals was
somehow progressive and inevitable, given that the British were genuinely looking
for the opportunity to leave. But as has been seen, there was nothing inevitable about
the decision to quit Cork, and no strategic logic had been applied to the securing of
Dublin alone. Nor was it the case that by mid-May London was placing more trust
in the endeavour of the Provisional Government; on the contrar, at the time when
Churchil gave the order to leave Cork he had just been given advance waring that
the Irish 'Unity' talks in Dublin might result in a Collns-de Valera election pact.
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There was then never more reason to stay put and await events. 
14
To pinpoint a single factor in any major political decision, especially in the
circumstaces of Ireland in 1922, is probably unwise, and yet the evidence that a
single incident led directly to what was a crucial and far-reaching decision is
overwhelming. This neglected incident occurred on the 27th April when three British
officers and their milta driver were 'kidnapped' (and later executed) by anti-Treaty
LR.A. forces nea the vilage of Macroom in west Cork. The loss of four men, albeit
that it was the worst set-back since the Anglo-Irish War, did not, in itself, account
for the strength of the storm that followed. Rather, it was the timing and particular
circumstances of the incident that was to send shockwaves through government,
parliament and even the British milta. 15
News of the kidnappings seeped into the public domain, it was not announced. After
two weeks, when the lack of further news indicated that the fate of the victims could
be guessed at, the storm which finally broke in the Commons led to an adjournment
debate and a division on the government's Irish policy. 16 Central to the attack on the
government was the self-evident fact that small detachments of British soldiers were
stil touring around the 'wilds' of Ireland, this when parliament had been given the
solemn understading that all remaining troops were secure in the main miltay
centres. This led, inexorably, to questions about the government's rea intentions in
the South, and to the purpose of retaning the troops. In defence of the adjournment
debate, Chamberlain, as acting Prime Minister, had litte room to manoeuvre; to have
admitted the scale of the government's own pessimism would, at this point, have
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fataly undermined the Treaty's, (and with it the government's) credibilty. All he
could do was to press the point that the passions which the incident had aroused could
lead to 'blunders of statecraft and policy that might prejudice all issues which lie
between Ireland and this country'. As for the nee for troops to stay in Cork and
Dublin, Chamberlain would venture only his 'personal' view that 'those positions
should not be wholly left, and that we should stil have some British troops in that
part of Ireland' . He assured the House that British troops were not put in danger,
and that at the time of this particular incident the officers in question had not been on
duty, nor been in uniform, and had simply been visiting friends. 
17
The government easily survived the division, and its cause was no doubt served by
the description of the dead officers as the purely innocent victims of a random attack.
The truth, however, was somewhat different: the only reason why the men had not
been in uniform was because they were plain clothes Intellgence officers, and as such
were always on duty. If a subsequent press campaign by a parent is to be believed,
at the time of their disappearance the officers 'were acting under imperative orders
which left them no discretion. '18
Abiding with this knowledge, Chamberlain was simply not prepared to tolerate the
possibilty that this LR.A. attack was fortuitous. The day after his mauling in the
adjournment debate, he wrote to Churchil with a warning that it was now an open
secret that the officers had been in 'out of bounds' territory: 'This seems to me', he
continued, 'very much like the laxity which permitted of the Dublin officers sle~ping
unprotected in scattered hotels and led up to the murders which so profoundly
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shocked us.' In other words, the spectre of 'Bloody Sunday' (November 1920), when
Michael Collns's 'Squad' had gunned down 14 British Intellgence officers, was
again let loose. Chamberlain had had enough, and in case Churchil stil wished to
pursue the present strategy he made the latter aware that it was not just the House that
was 'paricularly' nervous about the continuing occupation of Cork. The letter
continued: 'I think you should know how strong was the feeling on this subject, all
the more so as you wil find that Cavan (the C.I.G.S.) fully shares it. '19
A problem for Churchil, and, for that matter, General Macready, was that neither
man was in a position to dismiss Chamberlain's analogy with 'Bloody Sunday'. We
do not know what, if anything, British Intellgence was up to in west Cork, but what
is certn is that having successfully regrouped, British forces were makng safe for
a long hauL. This much is confirmed in Macready's own memoir, and it is possibly
tellng that he should recall the, concurrent, republican seizure of a club in Dublin,
where one of the British officers held was the 'Director of the now defunct Milita
Intellgence Deparment, but who was working hard to prepare it for rebirth should
hostilities recommence. '20 Tim Pat Coogan, the most recent of Collns's
biographers, may well be correct in suggesting that if there was a hidden motive
behind the series of Dublin raids on establishment premises in April, then it was
simply 'sectaan', and yet the irony was that without reliable intellgence the British
were left guessing. 
21 The very thought that the LR.A. was once again a step ahead
of Intellgence was a chiling one, the more so because a purge would have been in
the likely interests of both pro and anti-Treaty camps; the British, after all, would not
have discriminated had hostilities resumed. In short, in the same way that the British
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suspected Collns's current and direct involvement in the joint I.R.A. 'Offensive' in
the North,22 they could not ignore the possibilty of his interest in the Macroom
affair. This is not mere conjecture: more than two years later, in the Summer of
1924, Churchil recalled his feas concerning Macroom and its aftermath in a letter
to his friend and former Colonial Office confidant, Lionel Curtis. Even with this
lapse in time, Churchil was stil neeing reassurance that Collns was not personally
involved, and that his, Churchill's, decision not to take action over the incident had
been for the best. Curtis gave what comfort he could, and suggested that Collns's
only crime was that 'his own hands were so red with blood that he could not bring
himself to tae the murder of British soldiers very seriously' .23
What evidence there is suggests that Collns was indee more concerned for the
consequences of British occupation as a whole, rather than in any paricular part.
Insofar as the British were welcome at all, he seems to have been entirely consistent
in his handling of the Cork occupation; his apparent indifference over the Macroom
killngs may have stemmed from the fact that he had wared Macready that he could
not offer protection if British forces stayed put.24 Internal documents show that in
the wake of Macroom the Provisional Government's general concern was for the
safety of British troops if, and when, the current Irish Army truce taks broke down;
Collns's chief Liaison/Evacuation Officer, Emmet Dalton, wrote to the Minister of
Defence, General Mulcahy, on the 10th May, worred that the republicans were about
to issue an ultimatum to the British 'to leave the country in seventy two hours.'
Dalton wanted to know if it would be possible 'to prolong the truce negotiations until
the 19th inst, by which time I believe I could have the British cleaed out of the
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Curragh, Cork and part of Dublin.' Writing this on the same day that Chamberlain
was trying to defend these occupations in the Commons, Dalton must have known
that British resolve had been dented; he believed that he now had agreement that
troops would clear the Curragh on the 16th May, and that he could get Cork
evacuated on any date he cared to nominate. 
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Dalton's forecast proved uncannily accurate, and one suspects that Lord Cavan and
Macready had already taken matters in hand by the time Chamberlain wrote the above
letter to Churchil on the 11th. Given that Chamberlain's deep mistrust of Irish
intentions was well known, it may not have been the case, as he reported to
Churchil, that his hand was being forced by the Army. Cavan's waring that any
reinforcements for Dublin would have to come from Cork, because he was 'afraid'
of a home rebellon against Irish service, should perhaps be seen as a ploy rather than
a threat. Chamberlain would have been a wiling ally, and he no doubt used this
warning to see off, finally, Churchill's determination to hold Cork. Throughout April,
Cavan and Macready had wared Cabinet that it might tae 100,000 men to hold
down the main occupied centres, should fighting resume, and the aftermath of
Macroom now provided the means to defeat Churchil's grand plan.26
The fea that British forces might face concerted attack, once the Irish Army truce
broke, was real enough, and yet did Churchil suspect that his obligatory decision to
quit Cork (taen on the 12th May) would also lead to his having to fight to retan
Dublin? If the fear of imminent embroilment meant that it was unwise to stay in
Cork, then by the same token it would be no safer to stay in Dublin; this, at least,
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appears to have been the logic employed by some senior officials, namely Tom Jones
and Lionel Curtis, prior to the Cabinet meeting of 16th May. It is significant that the
objective training of the Civil Service lent no intrinsic worth to the retention of
Dublin alone; either there was a viable strategic policy or there was not, and in this
regard, as wil be seen, these officials shared the same basic values as the milta. 27
The irony of course was that Churchil too had appreciated these values prior to the
politics of Macroom, but at the said Cabinet meeting on the 16th he countered
Chamberlain's doubts by exchanging old values for new. It was not difficult to
impress on political colleagues the fact that Dublin was intrinsically unique, and that
the likelihood of a Republic being declared there was now far more importt than
happenings elsewhere in the provinces. The psychology Churchil used to embellsh
this point was impressive; for the first time since the Treaty negotiations he was again
promoting Dublin as the 'English Capital of Ireland', arguing: 'If Ireland fell into a
state of anarchy we should have to re-establish a pale again around Dublin prior to
reconquest. '28 Symbolism won the day, though it should not be thought that
Churchil was completely taen in by his own eloquence; it wil be seen in the next
chapter, concerning the Royal Navy, that he had no intention of abandoning Cork and
the Treaty Port defences to their fate. In the meatime, however, it was going to be
left to General Macready to translate the symbolism of the 'pale' into something not
only workable, but endurable.
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2. Back Behind the Pale.
As regards Dublin, the situation was almost normal, except that firing
took place every night.
Report of General Macready to the
P.G.I. Committee: August 1922.29
If, in the 'retreat' to Dublin, it can be said that Churchil had been forced to turn
necessity into a virtue, then it was a virtue little appreciated by the milta.
Macready and Sir Henry Wilson, the former C.I.G.S., had already agree that 'to
lock up a small force in Dublin would be fata', and as late as July 1922 Macready
was stil arguing that his forces did in fact, 'tie the hands' of the General Staff should
it be necessary to re-occupy Ireland.3D Allowing for the fact that the War Office was
plying its own propaganda, in order to be rid of Irish service, there was stil method
in this argument, and the Army did not welcome having to police the overt politics
of what Churchil referred to as a 'watching brief' .31
Of prime concern was the quality, rather than the quantity, of troops available to
Macready. He was to retan at least 13 battalions - some 10,000 men (see Appendix
3) - but more to the point he had continually to struggle in order to keep '5,500
fighting men'. To make up the leeway in battaion strengths, recruit training had
already been reduced from 20 to 12 weeks, and the War Office had admitted that this
would 'affect the efficiency of the individual and the battaion as a whole for some
time to come. '32 The War Office was also wont to tae large detachments of
Macready's most seasoned troops for other Empire emergencies, replacing them with
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completely raw recruits, this despite having leart from experience that Irish service
required up to six months' special training. 
33 Nevertheless, risks were no doubt
thought affordable given the low-key operational duties involved; even internal War
Office documents attested to the well publicised notion that British forces were kept
within a strategic 'Protected Zone' of barracks around the western arc of Dublin, a
'well defined enceinte', as Macready himself was later to express it.34
The reality, however, was somewhat different - as an exasperated Provisional
Government was to find out. It was of course impossible to hide away 10,000 men,
and any map of Dublin wil demonstrate the practical difficulties faced by Macready.
The western arc of key baracks neeed provisioning from the eastern docks, and
therefore control, and constant patrol, of the main thoroughfares across the city was
essential. This, together with the strategic nee to protect outlying areas, such as the
aerodrome and small R.A.F. unit at Collnstown, meant that Dublin itself was the real
'Protected Zone'. 35
This much was to become obvious. Churchil never found it necessar, for public
consumption, to define the term 'watching brief'- it was understood that its meaning
would become all too clear should the Provisional Government falter and a coup be
attempted - but he did find it necessar to explain it to the milta. It is of interest
that Macready had to press for an acceptable military interpretation of 'watching
brief', and of further note that he was allowed to assume that the Army's role was
to '" continue the motion" they had been practising since the truce of J ul Y 1921'. In
other words, there was little new thinking involved, despite the pressure to bring a
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Free State into being. Having been denied the right to hold both Dublin and Cork,
and thereby keep a psychological grip on all Ireland, Churchil was not going to deny
British forces the necessary freeom of the 'English Capita'. Anyone in Dublin, pro
. or anti-Treaty, who witnessed the traditional June parading of the entire British
garson in Phoenix Park (in celebration of the King's Birthday), might have been
forgiven for thinking that the imperial mind had not truly grasped the changes since
July 1921.36
The effect of the British Army's presence, and attitudes, on the Provisional
Government is central here, but in turn it is first necessar to show the consequences,
to the British Army itself, of Churchil's designs. The difference, on the ground,
between July 1921 and the late spring of 1922, was that in Dublin the disciplined and
even popular 'Tommy' was now the only front line British taget for LR.A.
aggression. It does not seem that this point was ever properly evaluated; as late as
November, Macready was insisting that his Army's losses stemmed from it being an
'Aunt Sally', caught in the middle of someone else's war. Thus, although his troops
were trained for major actions, they were hardly prepared for the level of guerilla
warfare that would be directed towards them following the National Army's first
assault of the Four Courts on the 28th June and the beginning of civil war.37
The British government had become increasingly agitated with the Provisional
Government's tolerance of the LR.A.'s symbolic occupation of the Courts, and
following the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson it was only a last-minute hesitation
by Macready that prevented a British assault plan going ahead. 38 In the event, at the
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height of the shellng on the 29th, little attention was given to the LR.A. Executive's
last proclamation from within the Courts. If the British were not going to provide
the means of once again uniting the LR.A., then Rory O'Connor could at least
identify them as a priority taget. The proclamation began: 'Citizens defend your
Republic. The enemy is the old enemy ENGLAND', and went on to berate Churchil
as the instigator of the Four Courts attack.39 Bombast aside, the message to
republican forces in Dublin was clea: the truce of July 1921 was formally 
ended.
Though much is now known of the attack on the Courts, at least in terms of the
intense political pressure applied by London, and of the high level of material
assistace given, little has been recorded of general British activities during these
critical few days.40 In this regard, the frequent British Army G.H.Q. 'situation
reports' are iluminating: on the 28th, the first day of the attack, no British casualties
or related incidents were reported, and the only note of caution was that 'officers
living out are also being brought into the Protected Zone to which all troops are at
present confined.' Whether this was meat simply to reassure a nervous London is
not known, but as has already been stated, the spatial demands of British security,
outwith the immediate need to supply the attacking National forces, meant that this
report had only parial validity.41
On the 29th, however, British forces did come under fire, and it became clear that
there was a sudden and general escalation of the fighting in Dublin: Macready was
later to record that even his personal entourage came under sniper attack on this
date. 
42 The first British casualties were noted on the morning of the 30th, and by
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3 p.m. it was evident that British G.H.Q. was losing track of the number of serious
incidents involving British forces. This later report recorded the surrender of the
Four Courts, and merely added: 'British escorts and paries proceeding on duty in
different pars of the city have been fired on. During the day 9 British soldiers
wounded.' It should be stressed that this statistic was negligible in comparson to the
losses sustaned by National and republican forces on this day, and yet the point is
that although the British had but a supporting role (there is no evidence of
independent offensive action against fixed republican positions), for a brief spell they
suffered an attrition rate as high as at any time during the 1919-21 campaign.
Moreover, later G.H.Q. reports indicate that these casualties occurred not in the
confusion of the Four Courts area, but in attacks on milta and mail convoys
between Kingstown and Dublin, and from the North Wall quays via the North
Circular Road. In short, the attacks on British units were specific, and unrelated to
the movement of National forces. 
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The general escalation of attacks on British and National forces also came as a
surprise to a Dublin correspondent of The Times, who remarked: 'During the course
of the day the rebels have extended the scope of their activities in a remarkably
enterprising ... manner' , and further noted 'the development of guerilla street warfare
on lines similar to that directed at the British forces in the days before the Treaty.'
A day later, the same correspondent observed the problems being caused by the
ubiquity and prominence of the British presence:
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the rollng by of an obviously (his itaics) British motor lorry
occasionally excites the comment of the passers-by. The anti-Treaty
party, it is plain, are trying to exploit this circumstance ... The plain
fact is that these lorries are merely engaged in the carriage of mails
and supplies. 
44
It proved difficult for British observers to accept that the veracity, or otherwise, of
this last comment might be of complete irrelevance to republican forces and
sympathisers. Indeed, the British Army itself spent a dea of time, between June and
December, trying to account for its rising incident and casualty rate, and G.H.Q.
reports were not above trying to explain some attacks in terms of mistaken identity
(for National forces).45 Army Intellgence, or what remained of it, also struggled
with the problem, and by October it had decided on the following:
Several cases have occurred of attacks on British Troops (sic) in the
City. There is no evidence of the rebels having specially prepared an
ambush for our troops, but take the opportunity of firing on the first
hostie taget that presented itself whether P.G. or British.46
But only a month ealier, Intellgence had reported that the republicans had
acknowledged their 'operations' against British forces, and had concluded: 'This is
likely to have the effect of encouraging their men to attack British Troops. '47 In
fact, there was more than enough evidence to confirm that the British were both a
general and specific taget, and Macready himself knew of this: at the same time as
he was complaining to London of his Army being an 'Aunt Sally' , he was also noting
that the nee to hold Collnstown aerodrome - a purely British security concern - had
led to a 'constant assault' on his patrols.48
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Unlike the British, even the establishment Irish press found little problem in
identifying that British forces, whether they liked it or not, were integral to the
Dublin fighting. On one occasion the Irish Times not only separated the detals of
overnight attacks on National and British forces, but went as far as to explain that the
reason for an attack at a certn private property was because it was owned by the
War Office and housed British units. This same bomb and gun attack was listed in
British Army situation reports, as was a similar event during the evacuations of
mid-December, but the overall picture given by them is one of random anarchy rather
than method. 
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Clealy, the accepted term 'Dublin Fighting', as applied to the National forces
operations against fixed republican positions, is somewhat misleading. There was a
constant guerila campaign, before and after the surrender of fixed positions in July,
and British evidence alone can point to the sheer tenacity of that resistace. 
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Perhaps one reason why the extent of that resistace has never been fully
acknowledged, is because the British themselves refused to admit the consequences
of it. That the British government may have deceived, in order to flatter the politics
of its position, can be demonstrated, and again it was the Irish press that proved
unhelpful to its wishes. When British troops finally pulled out, in December, the
Irish Times reported the first deparure in some detail, noting that 'about 65 wounded
British soldiers were removed', of whom thirty were stretcher cases. 
51 The point
here is not the morbidity of this statistic, but rather the politics of it: the numbers
involved would not have been a surprise to the informed in Dublin, but they would
have been to the uninformed in London. Officially, at least, these casualties simply
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did not exist. When, in the Commons, a junior:War Office minister was challenged
over the report, he denied that there were any casualties, this despite the fact that
Army reports do confirm that the first shipments conveyed both sick and wounded.52
It should also be noted that the Dublin press proved to be unerringly accurate in
every other detal of the final evacuation plan, so much so, that British officials
became alarmed for their own security. In the end it was thought that shipping
companies were probably responsible for the embarrassing leas. 
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It was not the case that the post-October Bonar Law government was less forthcoming
than its predecessor. Reflecting expectations that the cost to the British Army of the
'watching brief' would be minimal, ministers had tended to hold to unavoidable
statements concerning actual fataities. Put simply, Churchil stood to be hoisted with
his own petad: his 'watching brief' in Dublin had been accepted with such reluctace
by his peers that it was then politically impossible to post casualty lists that bore any
comparison to the 'official' policing campaign of 1919-21.54 Few neeed reminding
that, in contrast to 1919-21, the constitutional certnties that had sustaned British
forces were now suspect, and that as a result the Army might be in No-Mans-Land.
To have claimed that the Army was stil supporting the civil authority would have
raised the unwanted question as to who, or what, constituted the civil authority in the
twenty six counties at any given period in 1922. It could hardly be said that the
troops were there at the invitation of the Provisional Government, and besides, as the
historian John McColgan has demonstrated, the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act
conferred only qualified administrative power.55 That General Macready was a
representative of the sovereign Imperial power is not in doubt, yet the rump of his
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Army in Dublin could best be described as a tactical, rather than strategic, safeguard
with no secure operational function. Thus, the British government was served in its
purpose by no longer having to digest the official weekly 'Statistics of Outrages',
which up to 1922 had marked the cost of policy.56
The actual relationship between the British Army in Dublin and the Provisional
Government reflects almost every ambiguity that has so far been discussed. From
late spring that relationship was bound to tae on an unrea quality. On the one hand,
Collns needed the security of British forces, and even on his own, optimistic,
assessment, June would have been the earliest feasible date for a tota evacuation; on
the other, retention of British troops was politically unacceptable, and could only
hinder his priority search for an understading with his anti-Treaty opponents.
Collns's awareness of what Churchil and Macready might intend, should he disown
the Treaty, was matched only by Macready's constant suspicion that British supplied
arms might suddenly be turned against him by a united enemy.
To help smooth the way, Andy Cope, using his close contacts with the Dublin
government, attempted to set some ground rules for the continuing occupation. In
late April he requested whether, in order to avoid 'unfortunate incidents' between
National and British troops, the Provisional Government could issue an order that the
former must not 'stop or interfere in any way' with British forces. The British
believed that this measure was essential while the Civic Guard was not yet
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operational, and suggested that an incident report, submitted to the nearest British
miltary unit, would be enough to cover any situation. 
57 The convoluted way in
which Cope approached the subject suggests that he knew it to be delicate, and indeed
it seems that while Collns was alive his government had no intention of complying
with the request. Significantly, it was not unti the very end of August, when
Macready intervened personally, that the Irish Home Affairs deparment finally
acceded to British pressure. The issue, of course, was not a minor one, and went to
the hea of 'civil authority' jurisdiction. 
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By the late spring of 1922, Collns and Macready were well versed in mutual
brinkmanship, an abilty which, in par, had been honed on the former's refusal to
take action against the republican occupations in Dublin. While events subsequent
to Sir Henry Wilson's assassination, in June, are now well known, it may be litte
reaised that Macready had been threatening action against the Four Courts since the
day after the occupation began. On the 15th April he had sent Collns a 'personal'
warning that the essential British communication route along the Quays had been
compromised, and that action had to be taen: 'If not', he continued, 'I should be
obliged to tae drastic action against such garrison in order to protect the men for
whom I am responsible. ,59
Even at this early juncture, it is not clea that Collns had the right to assume that the
British would hold off. In response, however, all Collns did was to issue an internal
instruction (probably never forwarded) stating: 'If his men (Macready's) are attacked
they should reply to the fire and leave it at that. ,60 Nevertheless, Macready was
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back in early May, this time noting the increasing number of hijacked British Service
vehicles that had subsequently been spotted within the Four Courts. Turning the
screw, he asked if Collns would object 'to my tang steps to recover them, which
I am quite prepared to do. Of course if resistace is offered there may be trouble'.
Again Collns appeas to have been personally unmoved, but this time the pressure
was enough to send two of his senior milta colleagues, Richard Mulcahy and
Emmet Dalton, into urgent consultation with Macready and Collns's own Finance
Deparment; this on the basis that the only alternative to themselves or Macready
taking 'politically inadvisable' action would be to discuss compensation.61
In the event, just a month after Collns had been forced to launch an assault against
the Courts, he was presented with the almost bizare reaity of a bil for over £7,000,
this being the value of the 30 War Office vehicles which the British claimed to have
been destroyed in the offensive.62 In this case, one is left to ponder to whom the
War Office might have sent this bil had the British assault, planned for the 25th
June, not been cancelled at the last minute. Either way, the continuing debate as to
why Collns suddenly relented, and decided to attack, should not lose sight of the
cumulative psychological pressure that Macready had applied.
The War Office and Macready did not believe in rationing this form of pressure. In
May, with the situation in Dublin daily deteriorating, the British made it quite clear
that they would also hold the Provisional Government entirely responsible for the
safety of British officers.63 Evidently this attitude helped demarcate the political
position of the British Army, as non-involved observers, but it hardly acknowledged
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the established fact that the British were at perfect liberty to protect themselves;
Churchil had repeatedly assured the Commons that troops could, and would, return
fire at wil, and - as was seen over the Four Courts scare - this edict had the
Provisional Government's blessing. 64
But if, during most of the May-June period, it was convenient for the British Army
to assert that it was the victim of common lawlessness, then it is difficult to see how
it could hold this line after the stat of the civil war and the serious Dublin fighting.
That it intended to do so was made plain to the Provisional Government, and yet for
most of July and August Macready tended to keep a personal distace, content to
keep Collns regularly informed on the number and nature of attacks on British
troops, and resisting added comment. Where comment was made, however, it was
intended for a purpose: singling out a determined ambush on a troop transport,
Macready noted that a passer-by had been hit during the full-scale exchange of fire
which followed the attack. The British Army, he insisted, would not 'assume any
financial responsibilty' for those caught in British cross-fire. In turn, the Irish
decided that they too could not be held responsible in such cases.65
But within days of Collns's death, it was notable that British G.H.Q. returned to the
attack on the supposed obligations of the Provisional Government. In a broadside to
Wiliam Cosgrave, the new acting Chairman, Macready made reference to the recent
killng of a British officer and blamed the Irish for not using 'the machinery of an
organised government now at your disposal'. In highlighting the rising number of
attacks on British troops, Macready came to his main point, leaving Cosgrave with
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the blunt reminder that'...in none of those cases has anyone been apprehended. '66
In truth, the timing of this barrage had probably more to do with Macready's general
despondency, rather than in any conviction that firm law-and-order was possible
during a sustaned guerilla war; at the beginning of September, British Intellgence
in Dublin had noted that National troops faced an enemy 'which day by day becomes
more effective. ,67 It is known that with Collns's death coming so shortly after that
of Arthur Griffith, few on the British side believed that the pro-Treaty Irish would
have the stamina, or wil, to pursue the civil war to a conclusion. As such, little
could be lost by Macready exerting immediate pressure on the unknown and
inexperienced Cosgrave.68
Unknown to Macready, this new attack hit home: whereas Collns had known the
British milta only too well, and had, on occasion, leant to call their bluff,
Cosgrave could yet see only the power behind the warning. Writing to his own Army
Chief, Mulcahy, he commented:
I don't know anything about Macready but am certn he is totting up
all these cases and may some day say he wil have to tae action on
his own. This would I believe be not countenanced by Churchil but
once action was taen might involve difficult if not serious
consequences. 
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What Cosgrave could possibly do about the situation was not made known, but in any
case Mulcahy made it clear in his reply that Cosgrave should stad firm, arguing:
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There is nothing that we can do, more than we are doing to help these
people, and I think they ought clearly to understad this. They ought
to clearly understad that while circumstaces here are as they are
attacks like these are likely to be made, and if they wish to help us
they wil keep out of places where they feel there is any danger of
such attacks.70
Quite clealy, Mulcahy was giving vent to several months of frustration in this reply;
the high profie of British troops in Dublin, in total contrast to the received idea, was,
on this evidence, simply helping to fuel the guerila war and widen the gulf in
understading. As if to echo Mulcahy's thoughts, the Dublin Metropolita Police (or
what remained of it) was also quick to deflate British pressure: in response to an
attack on British troops on O'Connell Bridge, in mid-September, it could point only
to the realities of war, in that 'shots are now of such frequent occurrence that unless
actual injury is caused people tae no notice and do not report such to (the) police. m
Rather than insisting that normality was simply a matter of effort, the British Army
might have assisted the Provisional Government more by learning from its own past
experience in Ireland. In paricular, this government was not served by the British
inabilty to guard its own intellgence, and the fact that at some time in 1922
republican agents infiltrated British Army G.H.Q. Stolen Intellgence reports were
used as propaganda against the Provisional Government, and when Cosgrave managed
finally to retrieve a batch of these reports, covering the August-September period, the
makngs of a diplomatic row were at hand.72 The truth or not, Cosgrave did not
want to read that the British too believed his government had ordered assassinations,
in reprisal for Collns's death, and did not want to read that the British Army thought
of him as not a 'sufficiently strong man to carr through the programme. m
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Enclosing copies, Cosgrave wrote directly to Churchil:
The thing is an affront and a challenge in almost every line ... If the
British Government is to be represented in Ireland by people like this
and if reports by them are to be animated by a spirit such as
exemplified in this document, then one must indeed feel very little
hope of reconciliation between the nations.74
When Cosgrave wrote this he had been in power for only a month, and although
London may have believed he would not stay the course, they should have noted that
he was going to be no fawn to Imperial interests. Churchill's reply was hardly
calculated to improve relations; in time honoured political fashion he apologised for
his Army having been caught out, but not for the deed itself. Nor did Churchil
comment on a related charge that the British Army was stil using titles such as
'Commanding Dublin District', when, by implication, these were the rightful reserve
of National forces.75 Had Churchil actually read these Intellgence copies, he would
have found that for the most par they were hardly worth the compilng; the Army
had been reduced to relying on second hand gossip and speculation, most of which
could have been gleaned direct from the Dublin press. The point, however, is that
regardless of the level that Intellgence was working at, the LR.A. was determined
to stay one step ahead, and could only benefit from these frictions.
But behind the force of Cosgrave's attack on Churchil can be detected the support
of colleagues who were equally aggrieved at the actions of the British Army.
Mulcahy, as seen, had to dea with the day-to-day consequences of its endeavour, but
it fell to Hugh Kennedy, Legal Adviser to the Provisional Government (and soon to
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be Attorney General in the Free State), to handle the finer points of the continuing
occupation. As if the general tensions in Dublin that September were not high
enough, Kennedy had to read an alarmist report in the Irish Independent that the
British were landing fresh troops at the docks. He wrote to Cosgrave, explaining in
forceful terms the results of an earlier London meeting, at which he attended. He
concluded:
I need hardly say how serious the effect of this may be. It is in my
opinion a breach of the arrangements come to with Mr. Collns and
Mr. Griffith. I understood that there was a distinct arrangement that
evacuation would procee as far as possible .,. but that on no account
should fresh troops be sent to Ireland ... Yet now, apparently, without
any by-your-leave, fresh troops appea to be landing in Dublin. Is this
because Mr. Collns is gone? It certanly has all the appeaance of a
hostile act and may be fruitful of great trouble.76
Such comment spoke volumes for the level of trust and communication on both sides,
but if the Irish feared that aditional troops were being landed they were almost
certanly mistaen. What had probably been witnessed was the landing of recruits in
direct replacement of experienced troops; it was earlier mentioned that the War
Office, under pressure of other Empire emergencies, was wanting to do this, and it
seems that Macready's fight to avert a War Office plan - to take 2,000 such men
between September and December - had been lost.77 The pressures, moreover, on
troop placements in the South had all been one way, and it was not until the end of
September that Churchil finally vetoed contingency plans to mobilse one or two
Divisions in Ireland in response to the growing Chanak crisis in the Mediterranean.78
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On a more prosaic level, there was simply no room in Dublin for additional British
troops, and the attempts to accommodate those already there was creating more than
enough friction. Since handing over Portobello and Wellngton barracks in ealy
Summer, six British battaions had had to be put under canvas in Phoenix Park, and
the highly visible presence of this encampment was proving to be a thorn in the
Provisional Government's side. The fear that the British intended to make this a
permanent feature was rea; in August, Collns had extracted a promise from
Churchil that not more than one battaion of this encampment would be placed in
proper hutments.79 This might seem a trivial point, and yet this encampment was
becoming as much a symbol of Irish determination to be rid of the British Army, as
it was of Churchil's to stay put.
Churchil was well aware that Macready faced the prospect of having almost half his
Army under canvas that winter, and when Worthington Evans, the Secretary for War,
tried to intercede, Churchil told him bluntly that in this instace, and until such time
as the Treaty was fulfilled, there would be no option but 'to keep the men in
discomfort,.80 The response of British G.H.Q. in Dublin was hardly calculated to
ease the problem: arguing, somewhat incredibly, that the War Office had no spare
hutting in England, the Irish were asked to send huts from the vacated Curragh and
given a heavy reminder that they had only 'custody' of this camp. Perhaps not
surprisingly, Mulcahy gave a point blank refusal to this 'request'. 81 As far as the War
Office was concerned, the rea issue here was probably the cost of quartering all Irish
based troops over winter; in July this had been estimated as being anything up to
£540,000.82
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In any event, by October, Phoenix Park had become a focus for friction between
British G.H.Q. and the National Army. Following an incident in the Park, involving
a National Army patrol, the British requested that all such night actions in the area
be stopped in order to avoid clashes with necessar British patrols. At this, Dan
Hogan, Acting G.O.C. National Army Eastern Command, rejoined: 'I must say that
it is necessar for us to have occasional patrols in the Park, while I cannot see any
necessity for the British to have out Patrols seeing they are never interfered with in
any way by the Irregulars.' This last point was somewhat spurious as Hogan would
have been well aware that sniping attacks within the very hea of British defences
were not unknown. And yet on a point of principle it was made clea that Irish
forces were not going to be excluded from any par of their own city. This row went
as far as Cosgrave, but apar from agreeing to reduce the number of patrols, he
appears to have supported his Army on the essentials. 
83 A hidden issue here may
have been the British insistence on their patrols maintaning the right to
stop-and-search the public; when they did finally evacuate there was some press
celebration at the ending of this 'humilation' .84
By the end of October, then, relations between the British Army and the Provisional
Government had reached a dangerous staemate. Macready appeas to have given up
hope that attacks on his troops might be prevented, and instead was content to send
Cosgrave a list of ten such recent incidents, with the terse remark: 'You wil note that
these outrages are on the increase. ,85 In truth, apar from more concerted republican
attacks against fixed British positions, it is difficult to detect any real 'increase' in
attacks between June and October; from British reports there appeas to have been
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a consistent level of attrition consonant with the high profie that the British continued
to maintan. 86
Meanwhile, Macready's more general (and often justified) criticisms of the
competence of the National Army, in pursuance of the wider civil war, have to be
tempered by the observations of Andy Cope. It is well known that Cope was often
considered too eager to take the Irish side, and that he was no friend of Macready or
the War Office, and yet one paricular episode at this time was to demonstrate his
concern that War Office attitudes were tripping over into sheer bloody-mindedness.
Fearing that the latter was, to cover its own doubts, quoting prohibitive prices for
badly needed armoured cars, Cope went straight to Masterton-Smith, as Permanent
Under-Secreta to the Colonial Office, and appealed for sanity, arguing: 'We are
simply hanging them up and not giving them full facilties for smashing up the
rebellon if we make trouble over a few cars'. Intervention at this level worked, and
the Irish got their cars at market value. 
87 This case only went to ilustrate that to
some extent the Provisional Government and its army were prisoners to the War
Office, and that the financial credit being given on arms did not extend to the heavy
equipment necessary to help shorten the war. Once again, the fea of treachery that
lay behind most of the War Office's actions, may have been prolonging the British
Army's frustrations in Dublin.
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3. The Leaving.
The position of the garson in Dublin is and has been for some
months invidious.
General Macready to the War office:
November 1922.88
What might have happened to the British garrison in Dublin, had Lloyd George's
coalition government not fallen in mid-October, must remain a matter of speculation.
The formal establishing of the Irish Free State may have run more smoothly, and
certanly there would have been fewer technical complications in ratifying the
Constitution,89 and yet there is no evidence that Churchil was considering a tota
evacuation in recognition of these occasions. On the contrar, at the end of
September, Churchil had spoken with an air of finality when informing the milta
that on 'political grounds' he would refuse any further weaening of the Irish
garisons. At best, it seems that the coming of the Free State would have witnessed
only a piecemea withdrawal, dependent on the Irish political/miltary situation
continuing to improve. 
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But it is hardly speculation to judge that Macready and the War Office would try to
seize the opportunity to be free of Churchil's grip. On the very day of the British
general election, the 4th November, Macready forwarded a memorandum to the War
Office, which, although ostensibly addressed to his peers, was clealy intended for
a wider audience. Macready reiterated his thoughts on the Dublin garrison serving no
useful tactical or strategic function, and went as far as to say that only 'commercial
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circles' stood to be impressed by British security; at 'any moment' Insh treachery
could result 'in loss of life to the troops without any compensating advantage.' The
only solution, he argued, was a tota evacuation as soon as the Free State was
established, and in case a piecemeal answer was sought he wanted it known that 'I
should be unable to accept further responsibilty for the safety of British troops or
stores' . Macready then pressed the legal position of the troops should evacuation not
tae place. Convinced that any Free State judiciar would be full of former LR.A.
men seeking revenge, he noted: 'It is my full intention to resist any effort to hail an
officer or soldier before an Irish court on any serious charge, by force of arms if
necessary'. To this end, Macready insisted that the relevant sections of the 1920
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (R.O.LA.) be maintaned.91
That this memorandum was crafted to be alarming is not in doubt, but the problem
it presented for any incoming minister was to judge whether it was a thinly veiled
ultimatum. Not surprisingly, the War Office began to play up Macready's fears the
moment Devonshire took over from Churchil at the Colonial Office. On the
assumption that the troops would be staying for 'some little time' after December, the
War Office assailed Devonshire on the urgent need for Cabinet directions, this
because of the possibility that the Free State might table legislation (feasible under the
new Constitution) to counter the R.O.LA., itself maintanable only by virtue of the
flmsy 'catch-all' Article 73 of that same Constitution (see Appendix 2). While it was
appreciated that the new Free State might be too dependent on Britain to risk hostile
legislation, the War Office insisted that if Irish goodwil was to be their only
protection then new Cabinet instructions should be issued to the miltary. Devonshire
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was also acquainted with Macready's warning on resisting arrests with force, and
with the War Office opinion that it was'. ..difficult not to sympathise with him.,92
While the above concerns were, no doubt, genuinely held, it is difficult not to
conclude that their premeditated object was to coerce Bonar Law's government to quit
Dublin immediately. That decision was taken a few days later, on the 22nd
November, and the Cabinet's reasoning beas all the hallmarks of a desire not to
confront obstacles that could as easily be avoided. There seems to have been little
Cabinet contradiction to the General Staff's verdict that the original aims of
occupation - viz: 1) to have a footing in the capital in case of a republican coup, 2)
to give 'moral' support to the Provisional Government, and 3) to faciltate a tota
re-occupation if necessary - were 'no longer urgent or have been fulfilled to best
purpose. '93 As the original, and later, decisions to stay in Dublin had been based on
Churchil's political insistence, rather than on military nees or advice, then it seems
that the General Staff's purpose in this was to provide a tactful meas to a desired
end.
It is true that by November there was greater optimism in Westminster and Whitehall,
as evidenced by the Provisional Government's willngness to execute republican
leaders, but even if only a fraction of Macready's fears for the future had substace
then there were few grounds for real confidence. It was certnly the case that Lord
Derby, the new Secreta for War, shared the Army's unease; his desire to quit
Dublin appears to have been based more on concerns for the Army's morale and the
prospect of further republican attacks, than on any perception that objectives had been
50
achieved. 
94 In any event, the Cabinet decided that the Army would leave 'as
unostentatiously as possible', and that Cosgrave be informed confidentially. This was
all a far cry from the position of almost a year before, when the British had fooled
themselves into believing that the Irish would lea to love the Treaty, and when
Churchil had wanted to 'make a parade' of the British deparure. This time round,
Cosgrave agree to keep all arrangements 'strictly confidential', and was all too quick
to note that the evacuation was 'very satisfactory' to his government. ,95
It wil be seen in the following chapters that British politicians and officials were only
too aware that the physical removal of the troops left many technical and legal matters
unresolved, and that in some ways the problems of Anglo-Irish defence relations
might actually intensify. While the British Army had continued to occupy the main
Irish centres there had been a certn pattern of consistency, and yet as they fell back,
throughout 1922, patent anomalies (at least to Irish eyes) began to emerge. One such
had already surfaced in August, during the National Army's sea landing operations
at Cork. 96 Collns had not wanted his forces compromised by the presence of the
Treaty Port garson at Queenstown, and had almost begged Churchil to hand over
one or more of the British forts in order to bolster his, and his government's,
prestige. Churchil chose to be obtuse, suggesting that the arilery at the forts 'was
of no practical use to the Irish as it pointed in the wrong direction', but when pressed
to consider the 'moral' component he appears to have been only too keen to pass
Collns's envoy, Timothy Heay, on to Lloyd George personally.97 The point here
is that Churchil probably took some satisfaction from this situation: if the British had
stil held Cork, as he personally had wished, then it would have been futie for
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Collns to have even imagined this request. As it was, these bastions of Imperial
defence, comprising a few hundred men of the Royal Garrison Artilery, now looked
rather isolated and vulnerable, and in the future were going to provide a constat
reminder to the Irish that evacuation would never be total, or that freeom under the
Treaty would ever be complete. 
98 The May evacuation of the infantry from Cork
had begun this process, and though Churchil made the most of holding Dublin alone,
the psychological strength of the British miltay position had already begun to
disintegrate.
General Macready would have neeed no reminding of this, and the position of his
garrison in Dublin was, and is, probably without parallel in modern British milta
history - it truly was 'invidious'. On one level, Macready's task was carried out
effectively; he did manage, in a word, to intimidate both the Provisional Government
and its republican opponents without the use of overt force, and to have managed this
in the face of violent republican aggression, and Churchil's occasional impetuosity,
required great bearing and discipline. On another level, however, Macready's task
was entirely counter-productive, insofar as the British were stil there and seen to be
not only presiding over the civil war deaths of Irishmen, but to be integral to the
structure of that war. The fact that Andy Cope, as late as October, was stil
exhorting Churchil to recharge the propaganda war and to proclaim that 'in this
struggle the British Army has stood apart and completely inactive' i went only to
demonstrate that many people, and not necessarly avid republicans, stil believed the
British Army to have blood on its hands.99
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It has been seen that the lack of offensive action did not mea that the British garison
had either 'stood back', or been 'completely inactive', and that even in its more
private dealings with the Provisional Government it did not exactly exude
concessions. The intimidating attempts to discipline the Provisional Government into
accepting responsibilty for both British Service property and personnel were without
credible foundation, but then it has also been seen that British incident and casualty
statistics had to be the fault of the Provisional Government, if only because it was
politically unacceptable for the British government to admit full constitutional liability
for the Dublin garrison. This form of escapism had filtered down through the Army
itself, to the point where even situation reports debated the hope that attacks were the
result of mistaen identity. When, moreover, retaiation was not an option, any
measure that might help to deny the extent of republican provocation was useful to
morale.
The Provisional Government, under both Collns and Cosgrave, had tolerated the
British Army's intimidation only to the extent that little could be done to prevent it.
Preoccupied with the condition of their own country, the Irish leaders had somehow
managed to walk the tightrope between fearful respect and contempt. With this in
mind, it is hoped that this chapter can add some hard edges to the accepted view, as
typified by John McColgan, that the British government and its officials maintaned
a 'kid-glove attitude' towards the Provisional Government. While this conclusion
may be justified in terms of pure administrative/policy history, it very much needs
to be balanced against the fact that the British had 10,000 armed troops sitting on the
Provisional Government's shoulder. ioo Of course it was the case that Macready too
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showed a marked restraint, as part of an overall policy, but the point remains that at
the shar end of Imperialist policy relations were rough and often tough, and did little
to better any future understading between the two countries.
Even as the last British battaions marched to the North Quays, and home, between
14-17th of December, relations remained acrimonious. On the face it, some of the
departures were splendid occasions, marked by bands and cheering crowds, but
behind the scenes the detals of the final handover, to the now Free State government,
did not go smoothly. Having at last gained access to the remaining British barracks,
it seems the Irish were in no mood for formal handover ceremonies, and the National
Army was either deliberately late, or missing, at the appointed hours for transfer.
Realising what was happening, the British decided they would not disrupt their own
timetable, even at the cost of leaving barracks, and in paricular, the Magazine Fort
at Phoenix Park, temporarly abandoned. 
101 The British Dublin command had also
to explain to the War Office that in order to preserve a semblance of harmony the
departing troops would not, as planned, have their flanks protected by their own
armoured car columns. Finding this idea provocative, the Irish Army command had
insisted that Free State troops would perform this service. 
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Even at the last there was no meeting of minds, nor mutual understading that a new
relationship had come into existence. As Macready sailed, for the last time, from the
capita of the now Free State he left behind a divided country at war - a country that
had been at war when he first took command some three yeas previously. It may
have been a different war, but had the continued presence of the Imperial Army
helped bring about a different country?
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CHAPlER 3 : THE ROYAL NAVY AN THE CIVIL WAR
1: Ahead Full Steam
Ships are occasionally fired on with rifle fire. One's orders are to
reply heavily with every available gun, but as in these cases the sniper
is probably behind a bush and the only apparent taget is a cottage,
some children and cows, it is a little hard.
Situation Report. Commander,
H.M.Destroyer Vanity, August 1922.1
By 1922 the mighty Royal Navy had been hobbled to the extent that even its more
arduous domestic duties threatened embarrassment. From tang 25 per cent of tota
government expenditure before 1914, and stil being allocated £56 milions in
1918-19, the Navy was, by 1922, reduced to an allocation of around 6 per cent, or
just £6 millons. 
2 In terms of its continuing global commitment, Ireland was just a
minor irrtat that the Admiralty could well have done without, and yet its role there,
before and during the civil war, provides a good ilustration of a greater malaise. At
the same time, that role gives an importt insight into the breadth and complexity
of British forces' involvement in the events of 1922, an involvement which has
previously been described largely in terms of Irish milita conflct and British
milta withdrawal.
The Admiralty appeas to have taen the signing of the December 1921 Treaty, and
the promise of peace, at face value, and saw the opportunity of reducing its resources
and expenditure in Irish waters to a minimum. Its immediate aims were clearly set
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out in a memorandum, 'Points of Naval Interest for Settlement with the Temporary
Provisional Government', which was put before the Provisional Government of
Ireland Cabinet Sub-Committee (P.G.!.) at the end of Januar 1922.3 Subject to
purchase negotiations, the Admiralty confirmed that it wanted rid of its principal
dockyard at Haulbowline (nea Queenstown - for locations see Appendix 7), of all its
coastguard stations, and was even prepared to be flexible on the future holding
arangements for the War Signal and WIT stations that were subject to Treaty
obligations (Treaty Annex, Para 2 - see Appendix 1). But more importtly for the
subject of this chapter, the Admiralty did not at this point see a future nee for
permanent naval forces in Irish waters; it was suggested that 'ultimately' these would
be reduced to two Fishery Protection vessels, for which no special facilities would be
required. Provided that such arrangements did not preclude H.M.Ships from visiting
Irish Ports, and strategic safeguards for Berehaven continued to be met, the Admiralty
made it quite clear that it did not want to be troubled with Ireland in the future.
Equally clealy, the other Treaty Ports of Queenstown and Lough Swily had already
been relegated to an afterthought. Subject to Irish guarantees on Signal and WIT
stations, the Technical Sub-Committee of the P.G.!. Committee approved these
measures in March 1922.4
To a certn extent, the wishes of the Admiralty and the P.G.I. Committee were
forced by the political realities of the hoped-for peace. It would no longer be either
necessary or advisable to try and keep the two Flag Officer commands in Southern
Ireland, and early in 1922 it seems that a decision had already been made to bring all
Irish water operations under the eventual command of C.in C. Devonport. As such,
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the C.in C. Western Approaches command at Buncrana (Lough Swily) would be the
first to go, followed by the C.O. Kingstown (Dun Laoghaire) command under Rear
Admiral Fox. Indeed, it appeas that the Buncrana post had been redundant since
1918, and the Admiralty remarked, when notifying of immediate termination in May
1922, on the 'virtual reduction' of the command to a sloop and shore establishment.s
The corollary to all these changes was that there was no longer a place for the
stadard Irish Patrol of three destroyers, usually based at Queenstown and Berehaven,
and it is far from clea that the Admiralty intended to continue to support the Royal
Garison Artllery (at the Treaty Ports) in any capacity other than occasional
provisioning. The projected loss of dockyard facilties caused little concern as it was
intended to upgrade Pembroke Dock and use it as a permanent destroyer base.6 Thus
the stage was set for the War Office to bear practically all the costs of maintaning
Imperial defences in the coming Free State, a factor which was to prove a bone of
contention between it and the Admiralty throughout the 1920s and beyond.?
The best laid Admiralty plans were soon, however, to be badly shaken. The Royal
Navy was about to experience the same preparations for the renewal of war that
General Macready had had to contemplate since troop evacuation had been halted in
February. Confirmation that the Navy would once again have to enforce a rigorous
gun-running patrol came at the end of March when the supply vessel Upnor was
intercepted off Cork by the anti-Treaty LR.A., with the loss of large quantities of
arms and ammunition. The apparent ease with which this operation was caried out
gave rise, then and since, to the suspicion that diehard elements within the Navy
'allowed' it to happen, in the hope that both the Provisional Government and the
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Treaty would falL. But whatever the speculation (and no substatial evidence has been
found to support it), the above account of the serious and consistent plans to reduce
costs, and tae advantage of the Treaty, may help to show that at senior level, at
least, the Admiralty had neither the time nor inclination for conspiracies. The episode
did nothing, however, to further the Provisional Government's faith in the integrity
of British forces. 
8
After this incident, the spotlight was very much on the Navy to prove itself, and an
indication of its effort, and of the general deterioration of the Irish settlement, can be
gained from the following statistics: at the beginning of April the tota of H.M.Ships
in Irish waters (apart from the stadard Irish Patrol of 3 destroyers) was 1 sloop, 6
trawlers and 2 drifters; in tota these comprised what C.in C. Devonport referred to,
for want of an operational term, as the 'local Defence Organisation'. By the end of
April, however, C.in C. Western Approaches was requesting, as a minimum 'for
protective services' , 2 destroyers at both Queenstown and Kingstown, 1 destroyer and
2 armed launches at Carlingford Lough and single destroyers at Buncrana (Lough
Swily) and Berehaven. It was understood that 5 destroyers of the 1st Flotila,
Atlantic Fleet, were already on their way to Ireland, and the C.in C. made it known
that their arrival might be none to soon, believing that 'in view of what looks like the
beginnings of a Pogrom against the Protestats in the South, it may become necessar
to send Ships to evacuate Protestat Loyalists from Southern sea ports,.9 What
evidence there was to support this paricular comment was not made clea, 10 although
there was plenty of evidence to suggest that the Admiralty was tang the general
situation more than seriously; by July, a month after the civil war began, the tota
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number of ships on Irish station comprised: 2 light cruisers (plus 1 reserve), 11
destroyers and 9 minesweepers and auxilary vessels (see Appendix 4).11
Obviously, such statistics cannot provide more than snapshots of naval deployments
in a situation which, the Admiralty was to admit, 'changes from day to day, even at
times hourly' .12 Even so, and allowing for flotila rotations, the last does represent
the maximum number of ships that would be provided in the post-Treaty era, and at
that it wil be shown to be a commitment that was barely adequate to the demands
placed upon it. From May onwards, with the final British troop withdrawal to
Dublin, it would be the Royal Navy alone that had the task of providing an immediate
lifeline to that garson, and to those at the Treaty Port defences, as well as providing
support for what were often il-prepared advances by National troops in the republican
held areas of the west and south-west. In a war where the main anti-Treaty tactic was
the dislocation of communication routes and systems, seaborne intervention and
intellgence would be a major factor. So much indee was this factor a part of British
calculations, that for nearly three years, from 1921 to the beginning of 1924, the
government would insist on a destroyer being on permanent stadby at Birkenhead
Dock in order to ferr its instructions (via plane from London to Army Western
Command, Chester) in case of tota communication breakdown.13
But in the period immediately preceding the civil war, the Navy had yet a more
urgent task: with the increased availabilty of ships, a priority was the evacuation of
vulnerable coastguard personnel and stores from around the Southern Irish coast. In
the north and west, from Connemara to Sligo and beyond, the evacuations went
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smoothly, with the commander of H.M.S. Warwick reporting that the local attitude
to the Navy 'was all that could be desired.' The same was not true, however, in the
south and south-east: stealth was needed to evacuate Carnsore WIT station (Co.
Wexford), as the commander ofH.M.S. Watchman noted that the nearby coastguard
buildings 'were occupied by 15 LR.A. and preparations were made to land all
available armed men, and guns were cleaed away ready for use. '14 But if the
Admiralty was willng to encourage such escapades in known hostile areas, it was
doubtfully as sanguine over similar reports from Buncrana, the principal coastguard
and naval depot on the shores of Lough Swily. When H.M.S. Dauntless arrived
there, in late May, the fact that there were National troops stationed nearby, waiting
to tae transfer possession, seems to have made less impression than a rumour of a
pre-emptive attack by republican forces from Donegal, and the knowledge that the
few coastguards had only revolvers to protect a large depot with no landward
defences. Agreeing, reluctatly, with the local C.O. that in the event of a sudden
attack Dauntless would have to shell the station and its barracks, her commander
reported that an immediate transfer to National forces was neeed in order to prevent
the Navy becoming embroiled. 
15
In fact, there is no evidence that such a republican strike was even planned, 
16 yet the
naval situation reports in this May-June period clearly ilustrate the growing unease
and chaos that was the prelude to civil war. Indeed, had LR.A. intellgence but
known it, there was a far more valuable and tempting taget in Lough Swily than the
Buncrana naval depot. Throughout the summer months of 1922 the salvage vessel
Racer was engaged in retrieving large amounts of gold bullon from the wreck of a
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former warship; so sensitive was the government to the worsening political situation
that Racer had orders that no gold was to be landed in Irish territory, North or South,
and instead had to be taen to waiting escorts at Stranraer. As if naval patrols were
not hard pressed enough, Racer had also to be given permanent destroyer protection. 17
Notably absent from naval reports in the Lough Swily area was any mention of
contact with, or the pre-war preparations of, the British garrison at Dunree and Lenan
forts, both at the remote northern end of the Lough. Unlike Buncrana, these bases
were protected on the landward side by ditches and wire, but Lenan was overlooked
by a high hil and was vulnerable to attack. Of the other Treaty Port areas, the
Berehaven forces and those at Spike Island (Queenstown-Cobh) had natural
protection, but those forts on either side of the entrance to Cork Harbour, Camden,
Templebreey and Carlisle, presented tempting landward tagets (again, for locations
see Appendix 7),1 When, at the beginning of June, S.N.O. Queenstown19 received
reports from Dublin of a planned LR.A. attack at 'one of the forts at Queenstown',
he was alarmed enough to request that a cruiser supplement the destroyers already on
station; his paricular worry was Templebreey fort, which had only barbed wire
protection on its landward side. The cruiser Danae duly arved, and was to remain
in 'a thorough state of defence at all times', with her commander reporting that
ammunition was ready at all six inch guns.20 These ships were not play acting: on
the night of 8th June it seems that most of the people of Queenstown were awoken
from their beds when Danae fired across the bows of a steamer that had refused to
stop and be searched.21
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Such action might seem heavy handed, until it is realised that once a vessel was
allowed to dock, or proceed up-river to Cork, it entered republican terrtory - the
self-declared 'Republic of Munster'. Since April and the previously mentioned
Macroom killngs, the British government had been well aware that the Provisional
Government's hold on this area was practically non-existent, and it gave one cruiser's
captain little pleasure to report that at Queenstown itself 'A republican general lives
in Admiralty House over which fly the republican colours. m As such, the Navy and
the surrounding garrison had to become increasingly self contaned; the cruiser
Dunedin had to arive with £5,000 in cash, as the Queenstown branch of the Bank of
Ireland could not keep large deposits 'on account of gunmen.' When the cruiser
. Danae left Queenstown, at the beginning of the civil war, it was noted that the
situation on shore was 'very bad' and had been too dangerous to allow any shore
leave in the previous fortnight. This sense of isolation was only added to by the
suspicion of Provisional Government treachery; S.N.O. Queenstown directed that all
written naval reports should go by ship to Belfast as he believed such mail was 'liable
to be censored by the Free State Authorities. ,23
There was some irony in this general position. While the situation on shore
descended into chaos during May and June, the Royal Navy could only look on, a
prisoner of its own element. Churchill's 'Sentinel Towers', conceived and maintaned
to protect these same sea approaches, were now vulnerable to rea and perceived
enemies which were at their backs. While the attentions of most historians of this
period have focused on the centrality of Dublin, and the crucial operations against the
Four Courts occupation, none has considered the position of the British government,
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or the fate of the Treaty, had just one of these coast defences been successfully
overrn.
At the time, however, the Admiralty and War Office had to be only too sensitive to
this possibilty: Appendix 5 shows the co-ordinated 'Defence Orders' for Queenstown
in the case of attack, and it wil be seen that in the first instace the plan of battle
relied heavily on naval units coming to the assistance of the shore forts, an operation
which would have demanded accurate co-ordination and communication between the
milta and Navy. Had such an attack taen place it would have been a severe test
of the traditional British belief, alone among the Europea powers, that coasta
defence positions were best directed by the miltay rather than co-ordinated naval
forces. 
24 Again, the irony was that no one had foreseen, given the planning for
conventional big power war, that the Navy might have to range in to protect the
Army, rather than Army guns ranging out to assist the Navy. During much of this
May-June period the destroyer Watchman was anchored in the Outer Roads of Cork
Harbour with that sole duty. 25
The only British insurance was the overwhelming firepower that the Navy could
direct on any coasta position, and the knowledge that ships were invulnerable to the
small calibre weapons available to anti-Treaty forces.26 Nevertheless, and despite
the fact that both the British and Provisional Governments consistently overrated the
organisational abilty of the republican war effort, it was surprising that so little
public and official attention was drawn to the role of the Navy at this crucial time.
Considering that at the onset of civil war there were almost daily parliamentay
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questions on the fate of the British Army in Dublin and on the Border, one has to
search hard for any official reference to the Navy. Nor, it seems, were such
questions encouraged: when Viscount Curzon alone expressed concern for naval
detachments, after the British Army 'retreat' from Cork, he was advised to direct his
questions to the Admiralty itself. 
27 It was of course possible for both the
governments concerned to suppress unhelpful scare stories or wider enquiry; the
Morning Post, for example, took a dim view when in August one of its
correspondents was refused entry to Southern Ireland by milta censors. 
28
The suggestion here is that to an extent the British government wanted to play down
the contingency role of the Navy, and thus further the notion that events were solely
in the control of the Provisional Government; this role would have to expand in direct
proportion to the diminished abilty of the British Army to affect matters outwith the
area of Dublin.29 General Macready and Rear Admiral Fox, C.O. Kingstown, were
in a poor position to second guess events in the south and west of the country, and
much of this responsibility was to fall on a mere Captan - Hugh Somervile R.N.,
S.N.O. Queenstown. Senior rank though this was, it barely acknowledged the
diversity and truly onerous burden of his coming duties, comprising as they did the
direction of all southern fort defences (otherwise under War Office control through
Western Command, Chester), day-to-day direction of all H.M. ships in Southern Irish
waters, and liaison with front line National forces so as to co-ordinate Irish milta
- Royal Navy strategy.
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This position was not arved at by accident. When Vice Admiral Gaunt, C. in C.
Western Approaches, was informed of his imminent withdrawal, he was also notified
that henceforth Captan Somervile would share command and liaison duty with Vice
Admiral Fox. On paper this appeaed credible, but when it is considered that all
evidence points to the Kingstown post being largely ceremonial, then it is plain that
in reaity executive command had passed to a junior rank; a sleight of hand that was
going to tae some explaining to the informed hierarchy of the Navy.30 As has been
mentioned, under normal circumstances the duties of the Buncrana Flag station would
have passed directly to the area responsibilty of C.in C. Devonport, and yet he was
informed only that this 'general arrangement' had been postponed because of the
'exceptional situation' that had arsen over the delayed transfer of Haulbowline
dockyard. 
31 This curious reasoning may have bought a temporar silence from Flag
Officers, but as the Irish crisis lurched into full civil war it became evident that
neither he nor, more importtly, Admiral Sir John de Robeck, C. in C. Atlantic
Fleet - whose ships were bearing the brunt of Irish patrols - was prepared to accept
the irregular command structure that the Admiralty was imposing. By the end of
August it seems that the Admiralty was forced to explain to de Robeck the politics
as well as logistics of its decision, and in so doing the scope of its contingency
planning was reveaed:
It was found quite impracticable for any Authority who was not in
close touch with the Colonial Office to give any orders, and the only
authority who could do this was the Admiralty. The situation is of a
peculiar nature and changes from day to day, even at times hourly, and
the only people who can deal with it are those on the spot ...
you wil reaise, therefore, that only the Admiralty could give
instructions to these S.N.O. 's. (Queenstown and Belfast). Frequent
requests are received from the Colonial Office (Irish Committee) and
the Northern Government, and you may be aware that a Committee
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sits once or twice a week at which C.N.S. (Chief of Naval StaffJ and
C.I.G.S. are present and the actions on decisions arved at can only
be issued from the Admiralty.
The C.I.G.S specially asked that the S.N.O.'s should be given
discretion to act at once, if necessar, without referring to the
Admiralty: this they have done with the approval and support of the
Admiralty in all cases.32
In this same disclosure de Robeck was advised of what he probably already knew, in
that C.in C. Devonport had spoken previously to the First Sea Lord and informed him
that in this situation he was not prepared to tae 'any responsibilty in connection with
Irish matters'. But what was good for one Flag Officer was good for another:
isolated with the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet at Invergorden, de Robeck was deeply
unimpressed with this Admiralty strategy. He now knew for certan that the Navy's
contingency role in Ireland was planned to be anything but peripheral, and if things
went wrong then someone, and it would not be the humble S.N.O., might have to
pick up the pieces. In reply to the Admiralty he made it known that he too wanted
no responsibilty for ships, or their actions, in Irish waters, and pointed out that the
task of the commanders of these same ships 'is one of more than ordinar difficulty.'
Somewhat predictably, his offered solution was that there had to be a Flag Officer on
board a cruiser in order to give effective. command and boost morale. 
33 This, of
course, was exactly the type of profile the government was trying to avoid.
It has been suggested before that in comparson with the blundering inattentions of
the British government during the 1916-21 period, the Irish policy of 1922 was
conducted with a general prescience and firmness that bordered on the remarkable.
It has been seen that this was not always the case with Army movements, but
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nowhere was this new understading better displayed than in naval operations. For
the Admiralty of 1922, a break with tradition and ranking protocol was no easy
matter, yet it was the very seriousness of the situation, and the increased significance
of the Navy's role in Ireland, that dictated an acceptance of change. It was not just
a question of communication and flexibilty: a sea based admiral with his 'Fleet'
would have given a weight and political profie to naval actions which was simply
unacceptable, not least to a nervous Provisional Government. The beauty of the
planned arrangement was that the British government could enhance the ilusion of
paternal non-involvement in Provisional Government affairs, and also make the Navy,
apart from its expected role of gun-running prevention, almost 'invisible' to outside
scrutiny. While the Irish, both Treaty and anti-Treaty, had to make sudden and
reluctant preparations for war beyond Dublin, the British were already in place and
waiting.
British warships in the war zone were well aware of the S.N.a.'s authority, 'under
whose orders come the patrols extending along the south and west coast ... as far
north as Lough Swily', and of their 'principal duties'. These were:
1. To stop importtion of arms - by stopping and searching fishing boats and
shadowing suspicious vessels.
2. To prevent transport of armed Republicans by water.
3. Assist Free State Troops in any way they wil accept help, Searchlight or
Bombardment.
4. Protection of residents and private or public property from outrage.
5. Transport of G.P.O. mails (all railways being out of action).34
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Apar from the assertive use of 'Bombardment', this list holds few surprises, and was
obviously intended to allow for discretion. The question it raises, however, is to
what extent the Dublin government and its National Army was going to be involved
in its implementation? It was not, in fact, until Februar 1923, towards the close of
the war, that Richard Mulcahy, as C.in C. National forces, first approached External
Affairs on the subject of naval contact in order 'to have a definite routine established
by which such communications would be transmitted in an agree and expeditious
way.' The timing of this request is importt, as it coincided almost exactly with his
having to inform the Irish Army Council (Mulcahy was also the defence minister) that
his government was not prepared to legislate for 'extended powers' for the Royal
Navy, and also with the Admiralty's formal notification of S.N.O. Queenstown's final
withdrawal in March. The implication here is that previously Mulcahy had enjoyed
direct and satisfactory, if informal, contact with the Navy without having first to go
through British miltay G.H.Q. It would seem that officially, at least, that contact
had to be with Vice Admiral Fox, as it was not unti December 1922, on the eve of
Fox's deparure, that the Provisional Government was informed that the S.N.O.
would be assuming command. 
35
The question of involvement and protocol in Dublin is not of minor interest. On the
one hand no evidence has been found that would confirm Irish Army - Royal Navy
communication at any level in the capita itself, but on the other, there is much
evidence of direct, and at times intimate, contact between National Army commanders
in the field and naval H.Q. at Queenstown. In short, it may well have been that
Dublin simply did not want to acknowledge, for obvious reasons, the extent of that
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association.
In the south and west that association was indee considerable. Instaces were
numerous, and often related to Britan's wider security interests, a factor which led
to what can be described as a 'war within a war' in the Valencia area. From the stat
Churchil had taken a personal interest in the fate of the vita WIT station at Valencia,
the island of which was under republican control until August, when Commandant
Tom O'Connor, after tang Kenmare by a sea landing, sent a detachment of National
troops to hold Valencia and the land approach at Cahirciveen. Evidence that
Churchil pressured Michae1 Collns into ordering this dangerous manoeuvre is
circumstatial, but what is certan is that this detachment could not have held out
without assistace from the Navy.36 At the beginning of September, petrol and
ammunition had to be supplied by warship to the C.O. at Valencia after his 'urgent
request' for help to S.N.O. Queenstown. These British supplies were neeed:
between 22-24th of the same month Cahirciveen came under heavy night attack, and
this time the destroyer Seawolf gave sta shell and seachlight protection as well as
providing machine-guns and further ammunition - assistace that rendered
'satisfactory results' Y After another night attack on the 7th October, which saw
H.M.S. Vivacious intervene with sta shells and small arms supplies, the S.N.O.
informed the Admiralty that a warship would be kept permanently on watch in
Valencia harbour until National troop reinforcements arved. The local
commandant's reported remark, that these services 'have been of the greatest
assistace, and have considerably stiffened the morale of the troops', was probably
something of an understatement. 38
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A similar story was repeated at Bantry at the end of August when National forces
came under heavy attack and the destroyer Vanity had to assist with ammunition and
searchlights; Vanity actually made ready to bombard republican positions, although
her captan understood that he could open fire only 'at the urgent request of the F.S.
Commandant. '39 Here was a dilemma that was common to several naval situation
reports: front line commandants often wanted, and neeed, naval assistace, but at
what point did they dare risk surrendering their war to the British? It was perhaps
the actions of ex-British officers, as in the example of General W.R.E. Murphy's
planned drive to clea the Dingle peninsular, that best typified this quandar.
Knowing the risks involved in this operation, Murphy sent a staff officer on board the
destroyer Wryneck, moored at Tralee, to discuss naval co-operation; this he wanted,
and yet it was made quite clea 'that for "political reasons", the assistace of
H.M.Ships cannot be OFFICIALLY requested, but that he wil be very glad if any
H.M.Ships are in the vicinity at the time.' As a compromise measure, Murphy was
given a radio code so as to inform when this late October drive was to commence;
it was planned that destroyers would be stationed on each side of the peninsula to help
in emergency and cary communications.40
In this context, when all normal communication channels had been disrupted, the
Navy had often to be the eyes and ears of isolated National forces, this despite the
fact that it was a two-way process, with field commandants passing intellgence on
republican movements to the S.N.O. whenever possible.41 In September, after the
LR.A. had retreated from fixed positions, S.N.O. Queenstown had to inform the
Admiralty . that the ordinar difficulties of civil war were being intensified 'by
70
apparent entire lack of communication and intellgence service.' Valencia WIT
station had been ordered to pass urgent messages through any British warship as
'. ..all other communication is by motor boat or bicycle, both of which stad every
chance of being stopped by rebel fire.' As such, much neeed patrol ships were
sometimes reduced to static duty, as when a sloop was forced to remain at
Castletownbere, at the direct request of National forces, to act as a WIT guard ship
for forces operating in the Skibbereen area of west Cork. 42
When all else failed, the Navy had also to provide a ferry and landing service: at one
point, during a cleang operation in west Cork, a destroyer had to be called in to lift
troops from Bantry to Whiddy Island, some five miles distat.43 Indee, it seems
that the Navy kept a close, if not actually overseeing, eye on most landing operations,
paricularly the major sea landings on the south coast. This could lead to friction:
one of the repercussions of Churchill's refusal to hand over any of the Queenstown
forts (discussed in the previous chapter), was that Michael Collns became silent on
the detals for a Cork landing. British milta G.H.Q. in Dublin had to cipher the
War Office that General Dalton, of Eastern Command, and formerly the Chief
Liaison Officer, had 'hinted that Collns would give no plan for occupation of Cork
via Queenstown if loan of fort was refused. Shortge of mechanical transport was
reason for their objection to land at Kinsale or elsewhere in the vicinity of harbour.'44
Evidently the British were none too pleased at the thought of a direct assault via their
port, but in this event their interest in the landing would have become sharper stil.
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Although both Michael Hopkinson's and Calton Younger's histories of the civil war
acknowledge that General Dalton made contact with the Navy, we are led to believe,
at least from Younger's account (based on Dalton's own recollections), that the Navy
was taen by surprise when he sailed into Cork Harbour with two ferr loads of
troops on the night of 7th August. Given the general level of co-operation in this war
zone, it is difficult to appreciate that Dalton undertook one of the most darng
ventures of the whole war without proper consultation, and yet the point is that this
was a Dublin planned operation and Collns was plainly humilated by the unmoving
British presence in Cork. Once arved at Queenstown, Dalton did tae landing
advice from the S.N.O., but here there does seem to have been a prior intention to
surprise and confuse the British as well as the republicans. Already, Britan's defence
rights under the Treaty were presenting both countries with problems.45
But any co-operation, wiling or otherwise, was not going to deceive republican
forces. By their every action the republicans demonstrated who they believed was
ultimately responsible for the war, and in the coasta regions of the war zone the
Royal Navy was met with a hostility that complemented the British Army's treatment
in Dublin. Indee, a captured republican document was alleged to have contaned
instructions that 'Enemy boats approaching the coasts are to be fired on by us as soon
as they come within range. ,46 Direct, if hopelessly one sided, confrontations
between shore based units and inlet patrolling ships were a frequent feature of the war
in its early months; between August and November notable sniping incidents were
reported off Kells and Dingle Bay in Kerr, and off Y oughal to the east of Cork.
Such attacks were invarably silenced by heavy return fire. 
47
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The most serious of these reported attacks occurred in the Kenmare River in July
when the minesweeper Badminton became involved in what can only be described as
a running batte. Her captan reported 'several hundred rounds' being fired at the
ship, with a tota of 63 rifle bullet scars on the hull and superstructure; one rating
was wounded. The engagement finally ended off Lackeen with Badminton largely
destroying the republican held coastguard station with 4 inch and 12 pounder
shellfire. Even the Admiralty appeas to have queried this perhaps over enthusiastic
response, and the captan was called to account for his actions.48 Deciding that the
risks in this part of the country were becoming too great, the S.N.O. actually ordered
a cessation of inlet patrols and port visits, only to have General Macready, in one of
his rare interventions into naval affairs, overrule the order. Macready insisted that
the 'moral effect' of such patrols outweighed the risks, although, once again, there
is no evidence that the Provisional Government had been consulted on either
decision. 
49 In any event, when Badminton withdrew from the Kenmare River, her
destroyer relief was told to try and avoid further encounters. 
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A notable feature of such naval engagements was that the Admiralty did not attempt
to shield the detals from Colonial Office eyes, even though it must have been known
that senior administrators might tae a jaundiced view of the scale of naval
involvement. With Churchil being allowed by Lloyd Goorge to run the show as he
saw fit, his lesser officials could only watch and await events: the newly arrived Mark
Antrobus, whom Tom Jones records as being the 'nucleus' of the reshaped Colonial
Office, and heir apparent to all Irish Office functions, 
51 was not amused by the turn
of events; at one point, after reviewing reports of naval actions, he exclaimed that
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'we can't do anything with these very scrappy reports on the fringes of things. ,52
Many of these situation reports were indeed 'scrappy', betraying the nervous energy
of naval officers who often believed they were anywhere but on the 'fringes of
things', but then again Antrobus would have known that the Navy was indeed
involved in a war, and that the peace process would have to wait its turn.
That this war involvement did not, on occasions, escalate out of control in the vicinity
of the Treaty Ports was as much a matter of good fortune as it was fine judgement.
The vulnerabilty of some of the British forts has already been stressed, but at
Berehaven it was the garison's mainland landing point at Castletownbere which was
the weak link. At the end of August, after a British shore pary in the town had
received several casualties in an ambush, the destroyer Vanity arrved to find that the
British C.O. at Berehaven was planning a shore raid to 'round up' known LR.A.
gunmen. The Navy intervened, and Vanity's commander reported the situation with
the warning: 'I don't think it would be a success and it seems to be entirely against
our policy in Ireland and very liable to give offence to the Free Staters. ,53 True
though these words may have been, in reality the stading orders forbidding armed
British landing paries were meant to be broken in situations where a British garrson
felt compromised. In October, H.M.S. Leamington was instrumental in laying a trap
for republican forces during an anticipated night attack; after a pre-aranged signal
from shore to ship, she landed an armed pary of marines, with apparently successful
results. 
54 Here, as so often with naval actions in 1922, there was again a fine line
between defensive and offensive action, between merely supporting the Provisional
Government and fighting their war for them.
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The same could be said for Queenstown, although here British interests extended over
large areas of land and difficult waterways, where attempts to pin down the LR.A.
proved elusive; the ealier mentioned eve of war plans against a full attack (Appendix
5), gave way, in the event, to purely reactive measures against hit-and-run tactics.
Too often the Navy was left chasing shadows, as in July when the S.N.O. received
firm intellgence that the republicans were planning to block the channel below
Queenstown; the cruiser Danae immediately sent an armed party of marnes up river
only to find that the dee had been done and the channel blocked just below Cork
itself. 
55 The Admiralty had later to advise Lloyds Shipping Report that because of
risk of sniping between Cork and Queenstown it was 'not advisable' for any vessel
to try and clea Cork. 56 Only a relative peace ensued from General Dalton's
clearance of Cork in ealy August, and the Navy could do nothing to prevent the kind
of ambush which left four British soldiers badly wounded after a militay launch was
surprised on routine duty between Camden and Carlisle forts. 
57 The full assault for
which the Navy had planned never came, but even as the attrition continued into
November the priorities were still in place; when H.M.S Dragon arrived at
Queenstown that winter she reported that a 'squared char has been obtaned and all
calculations made ready for supporting the milta by gun fire' .58 Perhaps the
republicans' greatest failure was the inabilty to make this happen, to expose the depth
of the continuing British presence in Ireland, and the reliance that both the British and
a reluctat Provisional Government had placed on the Royal Navy.
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2. Full Astern
(Churchil) said that the first point was that it was vita... to gather
together a sufficient force to hold the water line ... He hoped that
later the Secretay of State for War would state how the British par
of this force could be obtaned.
Cabinet minute on Chanak crisis,
September 1922.59
The reason for the recall ... is given as the improving conditions in
Southern Ireland.
The Times, on the withdrawal of
destroyers from Irish waters.
October 1922.60
The Admiralty's balancing act in the ealy months of the civil war, already
complicated by the political in-fighting over the Irish naval command, was continually
at risk from two other factors. The first was that no matter how many already scarce
ships were dispatched to Ireland there would always be pressure for more,
particularly when the Northern Ireland government was demanding naval protection.
As early as May the Admiralty was calculating that it would have to remove a
destroyer based at Carlingford Lough if it was to meet the patrol demands of the
South, and it was hoped that the Northern government might even buy and crew its
own armed launches to augment the defence of Carlingford.61 This idea came to
nothing, and under the indirect pressure of Major-General Solly Flood, the Northern
Ireland chief of security forces, the C.LD. Sub-Committee on Ireland agree to meet
at the beginning of June to consider 'Naval Measures for the Defence of the
Waterline Boundary of Ulster'. At this meeting Solly Flood requested naval
protection on all principal waters subject to LR.A. incursions. Clealy this was going
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to be impossible, and the Admiralty had to insist that on inland waters there were
anyway technical reasons - such as ships' draughts - that prevented compliance. 
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Notwithstading this pressure, the Admiralty had also to console its own S.N.O. at
Belfast, who wanted it known that 'the presence of a cruiser at Bangor and a T.B.D.
(Torpedo Boat Destroyer) at Belfast had a good moral effect.' No doubt they did,
but by July the Admiralty had to advise him that it was not possible to provide any
extra protection for Belfast docks, and that if extra were neeed the Northern
government would have to provide. 
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The second factor was potentially far more embarassing, and was one that no amount
of ships seemed likely to remedy. There was no question that the Navy was
providing more than just helpful assistance to the Provisional Government, but this
was, in effect, its 'hidden' role, and one that could not be advertised for fear of
embarrassing Dublin and aiding republican propaganda. However, in its accountable
role, of being seen to blockade and intercept republican shipments, the Navy's patrols
were an abject and expensive failure. When, in July, Churchil wanted statistics on
naval operations, he was informed that up to that date there had been a tota of
seventy six interceptions, of which ten had been sizeable vessels and the rest fishing
boats. The only 'success' had been in early June when the S.S. Seattle Spirit had been
stopped and ammunition found, and even then the Admiralty was convinced that the
circumstances of the find made it an isolated case. 
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The Admiralty had no intention of disguising the situation, informing the Colonial
Office that 'although the patrols in Irish Waters have been most vigilant and
painstang, their activities have not been successful in intercepting Coasting Vessels
who (sic), it is understood, are now considered by the Free State Government to be
the chief offenders in gun-running'. 65 For obvious reasons the British Army Council
was also alive to the Navy's failure: by September it was advising the P.G.!.
Committee that although it acknowledged the Navy's task as 'both difficult and
arduous', there was 'little doubt' that gun-running stil continued, and that therefore
every effort had to be made by Customs and Excise, and Scotland Yard, to stop
gun-running at source - in British ports.66 Easily said, but there were those who stil
had their doubts. As an internal Admiralty minute argued: 'Little is being done by
Customs Officials to stop arms going in to Ireland, in fact, it has been suggested that
the Customs Officials at Ayr are assisting the LR.A.'. 67
At point here was the virtual collapse of reliable British intellgence since its zenith
in early 1921, a factor that was literally proving costly to the Admiralty in terms of
damages for the wrongful arest and detention of shipping. A crisis of confidence
came in late August when intellgence sources pinpointed a steamer, the Wicklow
Head, which had just left Hamburg for Ireland. Enough was enough: the Admiralty
advised the Colonial Office that this time it was not prepared to arest the ship unless
the Provisional Government agreed to meet any demurrage charges. 
68 Lionel Curtis,
as head of Irish affairs at the Colonial Office, shared this scepticism and took the
problem direct to his old friend, and political chief, Churchil, warning him that
although he (Curtis) had arranged for the Irish to accept responsibilty for the arest,
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there could be embarrassment all round, especially as the Morning Post had got wind
of the story. Curtis' s lambasting of the intellgence procedure is informative:
Hitherto all this kind of intellgence work has centred on Dublin.
Henceforth there are to be three organisations, one here, one in Belfast
and one in Dublin. The London and Dublin deparments have already
got at cross purposes ... I now find there is no liaison between the
Intellgence service here and in Belfast, and I have written Sir
Wyndham Childs (Asst Commissioner, Metropolita Police) to suggest
that the first communication to be made by the police in Belfast (re
Wicklow Head should have been made without a moment's delay to
him. The different Intellgence Services ought not to develop into
water-tight departments. They must lear to keep in touch with one
another. 
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Curtis was also concerned about possible representations to the German government
'who have committed a breach of the Versailles Treaty in allowing the stuff to be
shipped. ,70 In the event, however, his, and the Admiralty's deeper qualms, proved
well founded and nothing but general cargo was found when the Wicklow Head was
searched. But Curtis had at least done his job well: when the ship's owners
presented an immediate claim for damages, it was a simple matter for the Admiralty
to disclaim liabilty and direct the company to what, unti then, had been just an
interested bystader - the Provisional Government.71
Nevertheless, by late summer the Admiralty had far greater concerns than the
attempted outwitting of either the LR.A. or Provisional Government. Indeed, its
candid approach to patrol failures may have been designed to support its constat
claim that the Navy was no longer in a position to waste ships for what one official
referred to as 'barren results,.72 The pressure for ships of the Atlantic Fleet to
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resume 'proper duties' led to the Chief of Naval Staff requesting the withdrawal of
the Irish patrols as ealy as the beginning of August, and yet although Churchil
agreed only in principle that the patrols might be 'somewhat reduced', it would not
be long before the Admiralty produced an overwhelming reason for immediate
reductions. 
73 The catayst was the developing international crisis in the eastern
Mediterranean: put simply, Admiral Brock, C.in C. Mediterranea, did not have
enough ships to cover the emergency, with the result that battleships, cruisers and a
destroyer flotila had to be taken from an Atlantic Fleet already depleted by its Irish
commitments.74
It is interesting that in the light of the Chanak crisis Churchil was wiling to assemble
a Cabinet Sub-Committee to discuss further troop withdrawals from Dublin, yet had
declined to allow the P.G.!. Committee to arbitrate on naval withdrawals. Instead,
he opted to delay any firm decision in the hope that an inter-deparmenta solution
might be found.75 His dilemma was indee acute: while the Admiralty's arguments
were now irresistible, this was not the time, at the height of the civil war, to send
signals to the republicans, or, for that matter, to a faint-heated Provisional
Government, that the Royal Navy was in retreat. Moreover, it was Ireland and not
the far away neutral zones of the Dardenelles that stil dominated the domestic news,
and the reaction of his Unionist colleagues to naval withdrawals would be predictable.
Nor was Churchil going to receive comfort from his mentor Lionel Curtis, who was
busy shaping a long term Colonial Office 'view' of the Chanak crisis. After the
Admiralty had tried to lobby him, explaining the predicament, Curtis pulled no
punches in giving his verdict to Churchil:
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In considering this subject, it is very necessar to keep in mind that in
withholding from the Irish Free State any right to organise Naval
Forces of their own for five years at any rate, Great Britan
specifically undertook to discharge these functions.
Reminding Churchil of the contents of Article 6 of the Treaty, and of the scheduled
conference in 1926, which would determine Ireland's own share of coastal defence,
he continued:
It is of vita importce to our position at that Conference that we shall
be able to show that these naval functions have been adequately
discharged by the British Navy...
To neglect any precautions which might have the effect of cutting off
the rebels from their supplies is likely to prove a very expensive policy
in the long run, and wil prejudice our position when the time comes
for Ireland to claim the right to a Navy of her own.76
These were not words that Churchil wanted to read, despite the fact that Curtis was
espousing principles that would be held dea by Colonial Office officials in the
coming years. On this occasion Churchil would have, in part, to reject the advice
on grounds of expediency, rather than conviction, and yet he was determined that if
reductions had to be made they would be done on the quiet and not exposed in a
forum. As such, it seems that Curtis was given the personal task of reaching a
compromise with the Admiralty, with the result that an agreement for the immediate
withdrawal of 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers and 4 minesweepers, was greeted by Churchil
with a scribbled annotation: 'I agree. Keep all movements secret, so that they are not
missed. 
m But once the Admiralty had been given this green light, in mid
September, it seems that the cuts went deeper stil; indee, the proposed strength of
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the Patrol, as from October, makes for an interesting comparison with that on station
at the end of July (see Appendix 4). Within three months, there was, all told, an
effective reduction by half of cruisers and destroyers, from 14 ships to 7, and this
was not to include the withdrawal of virtually all minesweepers and trawlers which
would anyway have had to have been withdrawn from winter service on the Atlantic
coast. 
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There was, of course, no way in which withdrawals on this scale could be kept
'secret', and in its attempt to conform and disguise what was happening, the
Admiralty was in danger of turning a serious and delicate situation into farce; one can
only imagine the reaction of S.N.O. Queenstown and ships' captans to the Admiralty
order that 'by shifting their anchorage frequently the deterrent effect on gun-runners
wil be much the same as if the patrols were still in place. ,79 With the Morning Post
to the fore, the press published the 'secret' on the 5th October, at which point
Churchil appeas to have decided on tough tactics to avoid a row: a Colonial Office
press release of the same day simply denied the recall of ships and claimed they were
'remaining on duty as previously.' This release was caried by the press the
following day without question, although as both The Times and Manchester Guardian
had taen the line that recalls indicated an improved situation in Ireland, it is not
quite clea what their readers were supposed to make of the subsequent denial. 
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But if it was one matter to dupe the press, it was quite another to try and dupe the
Provisional Government. There is some evidence that the Colonial Office was wiling
to bring Sir James Craig into consultation on withdrawals, but the same does not exist
for Collns's successor, Cosgrave, who, it seems, was denied information even on an
informal basis: in October, Cope was instructed to tell him nothing without London's
approval. 
81 Again, the absence of material confirming intra-Dublin communication
on naval matters in this period becomes crucial. It is quite possible that in this
instace Churchil felt able to exploit Irish sensitivity, knowing full well that neither
Cosgrave nor his Army chief, Mulcahy, could afford to comment.
It was perhaps fortunate for Churchil that the forced recall of ships coincided with
a general collapse in the republican position. Together, these points would account
for a marked fall in recorded incidents involving the Navy during the autumn and
winter months of the civil war, as would the effect of winter sea conditions. But
incidents there stil were, and one of them was to expose the fragilty of the British
position on the eve of the final troop exodus from Dublin. It should not be forgotten
that General Macready, as G. O. C. in C., was responsible for the actions of all British
forces in the Irish theatre, and in theory, at least, with Admiral Fox along-side, it was
possible for him to continually oversee the extent and effect of naval operations. In
practice, however, this cannot be demonstrated (Fox's executive authority has already
been questioned), and apart from the one, earlier mentioned, policy intervention, and
a couple of, largely uninformative, comments in his memoir, Macready does not
appear to have concerned himself with naval matters. 
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What then is to be made of an extraordinar letter that he wrote in mid-November,
at a time when he was under considerable strain, in which he unburdened himself to
J. Masterton-Smith, Permanent Under-Secretay at the Colonial Office? This
'personal' letter was spurred by a further flare up of LR.A. activity at Kenmare in
October, during which H.M.S. Vansittart was fired on and one rating wounded. It
seems that at the request of a local National Army commandant, Vansittart sought
permission of S.N.O. Queenstown for a bombardment of the town, and he, in turn,
contacted Dublin for clarification. Macready did see and overrle this request, and
at the same time passed instruction to both S.N.O.s, through Admiral Fox, that:
the Navy should adhere to the Army policy, viz., that if attacked in
any way, immediate return should be made, but on no account should
after reprisals take place.
By implication Macready had not previously issued such instructions, but this much
was given only as background information to Masterton-Smith. The letter continued:
Loughnane rang me ... and tells me that he got a wire from the
Colonial Office to go and see Cosgrave, and he (Cosgrave) was quite
ignorant of the fact that the Navy has for a very long time been
working, I wil not say under me, for that might hurt the susceptibilty
of the Senior Service, but has been working in very close conjunction
under my advice. Any other policy would lead to considerable friction
over here ...
What I want to put to you is this, that if the Colonial Office wire these
things direct to Loughnane where Naval or Milta action is
concerned, without my being informed, there is sure to be unnecessary
trouble. As a matter of fact Loughnane wil in future, I think, let me
know, as he was quite ignorant of the fact before that I had anything
to do with the Navy. It is just the ignorance of some people in
Whitehall of the way in which we manage to keep the peace here and
the system of working, which leads to occasional trouble, and perhaps
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you wil make it clear that whenever the Army or Navy are concerned
I should be informed at the same time as Loughnane ...83
The question here is whether Loughnane, the newly appointed replacement for Cope
in Dublin, had merely upset the system, or, more importtly, had inadvertently
exposed it. The style of the letter gives every indication that Macready was writing
not to complain or inform, but rather to try to ensure his reputation in posterity - this
shortly before the final withdrawal and his personal retirement from Army life. It was
somewhat typical that Cosgrave might be kept in ignorance of Macready's close
supervision of the Navy, but it is strange indeed that no one else in Dublin or the
Colonial Office appeas to have been aware of it. In other words, had it not been for
Loughnane's arrival and an extraordinar request from the S.N.D., would Macready
himself have been aware of it? A last chance to re-invent the liaison system the way
he would have wanted it, rather than the way it actually was, may have proved
irresistible.
It has been intimated throughout this chapter that not only was the Navy's role during
the civil war intended to compensate for the restricted abilty of Macready's army,
but that, stemming from Churchil, there was a conscious desire to play down the full
extent of that role. Despite Macready's protestations to the contrar, the evidence
suggests that Churchil wanted to work directly through the Admiralty to the S.N.O.-
the only man on the spot - and in this manner keep contending generals and admirals,
and even his own Cabinet committees, from confusing and highlighting the issue. It
was a risky strategy, dictated by peculiar circumstances, and it is not clear that
Churchil, or, to a lesser extent, his post-October successor, Devonshire, would have
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had a ready answer had there been a serious reversal to ship or shore defence. But
from a British viewpoint, and that of a humbled Provisional Government, the strategy
obviously worked. The bulk of the evidence may be one-sided and fragmenta, and
yet there can be no mistaking that the material and physical assistace of the Navy
and its marnes in the critical ealy months of the civil war had a marked effect on
its course and duration. While previous histories of this war have, quite properly,
concentrated on the internal strife - an internecine fight for ideological and political
control - there has perhaps been too much acceptace, based purely on the defensive
role of remaining British troops, of Britan being just a concerned and distant
spectator to the wider fighting. The point is that outside Dublin, and particularly in
Munster, it was the Royal Navy that made many of the National troops' advances
possible, a feat that had little to do with the known task of gun-running interceptions.
And what of the legacy of this close involvement? By the time that the Free State
came into existence, in December 1922, both countries had been denied the relatively
clean-brea from British forces involvement that the Treaty had promised. It has
been seen that, at first, the Admiralty had had no intention to bother with Ireland, and
yet as a result of the distrust engendered by internal fragmentation, there was going
to be an ever-watching Irish Patrol, of no less than three destroyers, for the
foreseeable future. 
84 Similarly, this chapter, and the previous, has highlighted the
newly perceived vulnerabilty of Britan's fixed defence interests once its troops had,
all too suddenly, left the south and west. In other words, little had happened in 1922
to allow Britan to let down its guard and communicate openly, or to allow the Irish
to feel free from oppressive scrutiny and occupation; much had happened to remind
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the Free State government of its forced indebtedness and impotence, and this was
bound to cause resentments in the future. Given that, to paraphrase R.F. Foster, the
Free State's pre-occupation in the 1920s was self-definition against Britan,85 the
question remained as to whether defence relations could start afresh. How both
countries coped with the legacy of 1922 and the recent past, and with the hopes for
the future, is the subject of the following chapters.
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CHAPlER 4 THE CASUALTIES OF WAR
1: The Dead and Deserted
I am sure you wi11eave nothing undone to give him a proper buriaL.
It is unfair to have his remains in such a place as his are in a swamp.
He is surely somebody's boy.
Extract from a Cork farmer's
letter on the discovery of the
remains of an unknown British
soldier on his land.
September 1924.1
Between 1916 and the beginning of 1924, almost 5,000 serving British soldiers simply
'disappeared' while on duty in Ireland. Their names were known, but not their fate.
Obviously the vast majority would have been deserters, with possibly up to a third
having Irish family connections, but hidden within this tota was a gruesome reminder
of the tactics of unorthodox warfare, tactics which no official statistics, on either side,
could countenance. Only after the bulk of British forces had left the Free State, at
the end of 1922, could it be hinted that an unknown number of British soldiers had
been encouraged to 'desert' in order to buildup local intellgence networks, and that
in response the LR.A. had executed many of these men, often killng 'genuine'
deserters by mistae. 
2 This was not, however, British confession for its own sake;
the object was to impress on the Free State Government that it too had a moral
responsibilty to assist the British Army Council in setting their records straight. The
Irish would indeed assist the British, but in the process there would be constat and
painful reminders, throughout the Cosgrave years, of the differences that had, and
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still did, separate the two countries.
Some events did not of course await the official deparure of British troops. Almost
within days of the Treaty being signed it seems that Cope was coming under Castle
pressure to exploit his good relations with the new Provisional Government and bring
some method to the seach for the missing. Having given a sample list of men
reported missing pre-Truce (including R.I.C. members), Cope followed up with a
personal plea to Diarmuid 0' Hegary , Secreta to the Provisional Government,
tellng him: 'We are getting a good dea of pressure from various sources and it
seems to me pretty hard lines on parents, wives etc. of these missing men to be kept
in anxiety for so long.'3 But with the best wil in the world, the Provisional
Government would not be capable of providing the concert of resources that would
be necessar for such an unending and difficult task. After consulting the Adjutat
General, the best that O'Hegary could offer was to contact Cope 'from time to time'
as and when information became available.4 In the early par of 1922, however, it
could not have been envisaged that the Provisional Government would soon be
overwhelmed by another war, and that in consequence the tota of British dead and
missing, though far smaller than Irish losses, would inexorably rise once more.
For obvious reasons the British do not appear to have resumed serious inquiry until
the close of the civil war, by which time it is clear that the War Office had gained
active, if not official, agreement that the Irish would hand over to the British any
deserters located, and that Dublin would procee with an Indemnity/Amnesty Bil
(reciprocating the Royal Proclamation of January 1922), that would protect all British
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personnel from liabilty for pre- Truce actions. 
5 As a result, the Irish archives
indicate that the Department of Defence was inundated with individual and collective
cases of missing men, passed on by the Colonial Office on behalf of the War Office.
Little collation appeas to have been involved, the War Office simply providing
detals as and when individual regiments and units might respond. 
6 These same
archives also suggest that on the Irish side there was little or no political/milta
resentment over this extra burden, and the investigating body - the 2nd Bureau,
General Staff at Dublin G.H.Q. - appears to have worked dilgently at the task until
it handed over responsibilty for the dwindling number of cases to the Civic Guard
in 1926.7 As might be expected, results often depended on the quality of information
the British could provide, and on the degree of contact the missing men may have had
with Irish forces. In one paricular pre- Truce case, where the British seemed
unusually concerned for the fate of four Royal Marnes, the Irish were, by 1924, able
to notify that they were probable deserters, as no record existed of their being
'apprehended or ... molested' by Irish forces. Such distinction was importat, both
to the militaes and the families involved. 
8 In many cases the task was simpler -
British recalcitrants had often joined the Irish National forces in 1922, and these
records were to hand.
This last point leads directly to the politics which had to infuse even this most
sympathetic of subjects. The lack of Irish frustration at the costs and time involved
in investigations can in small par be explained by the wilingness of the British not
to press for quick results (at the beginning of 1924 the Colonial Office requested only
a résumé of progress every three months)9, and in larger par by the somewhat
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unexpected British understading of the Irish commitment to deserters who had given
service either to the LR.A. or to later National forces. At a formal meeting in
London in October 1923, a seemingly amicable agreement was reached between
Mulcahy, as Minister for Defence, and the Lords Derby and Devonshire, on the
procedure in such cases. Henceforth, the Irish authorities would not be required:
to apprehend and return deserters from the British Army who deserted
at any date prior to the 1st November 1923, and gave service in the
Irish Forces, whether pre- Truce or in the present National Forces.
With some satisfaction the Deparment of Defence was also able to inform the
Executive Council that as a result of the agreement it was 'not proposed to tae any
action against such British Army deserters as have already been arested and whose
cases come within the terms of the agreement'. In return, it was also agreed that the
Free State government would make 'every effort' to apprehend and arest deserters
(outwith the above clauses) who sought refuge in the Free State.IO
In practice the British had little choice but to allow some who would otherwise be
termed defectors and traitors to go free, but there was also method behind this
agreement. A workable retrieval system was necessar in order to enhance milita
discipline on the mainland; as things stood, the Free State might provide an all too
convenient sanctuar for future, as well as past, Service miscreats. Neither, it
seems, was the timing of the agreement a matter of chance: it was probably no
coincidence that within days a court case involving a confessed deserter, arested in
Dublin and escorted to Belfast, began to make news. The man was apparently freed
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after a K. C. had made nonsense of British pretensions to continued miltay
jurisdiction in the Free State. The precedent thus set caused alarm at the Colonial
Office; the case was brought to the personal attention of Devonshire, and it was
suggested that the legal deparment would have to tae serious note of the
implications. The War Office seems to have been content that with the benefit of the
agreement they could literally soldier on, but this confidence made little impression
on the Colonial Office, with Antrobus noting: 'I have all along been afraid that this
would happen. The procedure by which a number of deserters have been
apprehended with the goodwil and assurance of the F. S. Govt has ... no real legal
basis.' He suggested that legislation in both countries was the only solution.ii
Nevertheless, the 'goodwil and assurance' of the Free State in the arest and
returning of deserters does appea to have held good until 1926, when the legal
implications began to come too close to home. The turning point came when an
arested deserter had to be released before he could be handed over to a British
milta escort pary from Northern Ireland. The soldier's father had applied for a
writ of Habeas Corpus, and the Deparment of Defence was advised that there was
no defence to the writ in law.12 Perhaps too, Cosgrave had grown weary of giving
reciprocal support to Britan following the final, and hard won, release of all
Nationalist political prisoners in Northern Ireland, and by 1926 he may have been
sensitive to the political capita that de Valera and constitutional republicanism might
gain if the issue was publicised. Whatever the reasons, and they were probably as
much political as legal, co-operation with the British milta ceased suddenly and
permanently, much to the chagrin of the War Office.13
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Interestingly, the British backlash did not, and indee could not, come through formal
dispatch channels. With no legal sanctions to assist them, the War Office protested
through James McNeil, the High Commissioner in London, and if his immediate
report to the Department of External Affairs was correct, then it seems that the War
Office was preparng to retaiate in kind. According to McNeil, if the Irish did not
resume the return of deserters then, he was informed 'that any other practice would
possibly lead to complications such as the stopping of allowances to ex-British
soldiers in the Saorstat. ,14 It can be safely assumed that the then Dominions Office,
especially with Le Amery in charge, would not have tolerated any vendetta on these
lines, but in the event the Irish did not rise to the bait, and they did not change their
mind. The War Office did try once more, in 1929, to resurrect the 1923 agreement,
though this time it advised that the position was merely 'undesirable'. As if to show
that both the War Office and Dominions Office stil harboured vain hopes of a model
Dominion, the Irish government was further advised that if its present laws could not
cope it should enact a new law, as per Section 657 of Canada's Criminal Code, which
deat specifically with forces desertions.1s The advice was ignored: the period of
co-operation had been one thing, but there had never been even the slightest hint that
the Free State would indulge in the politics of legislation to assist the British milta.
While the position on deserters was reaching a perhaps predictable staemate, the
related issue of the missing and the dead continued. Overall the subject was handled
with extreme sensitivity on both sides, though it soon became clear that even the dead
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could not escape from politics. Indeed, it was somewhat surprising that the 1923
deserter agreement had operated at all considering that the two countries remained in
dispute until 1925 over compensation for British forces killed and injured post-Truce
(that is, those not covered by the mutual indemnity provisions for pre-July 1921
actions). By ealy 1923 the British had submitted an initial sixty three such cases to
the Free State, together with the relevant decree awards, and although the Deparment
of Finance began processing the compensations it was soon apparent that, on vetting,
the Deparment of Defence was urging a refusal of responsibilty in certn of the
cases.16 The British might well have been advised to scrutinise their lists more
closely: in one case Defence pointed to evidence that the auxiliar officer involved
had been injured only after he had made 'a violent and unprovoked assault' in a
public place.17 As a result of such disputed submissions, it was perhaps inevitable
that the Free State would respond with its own claims for post-Truce compensations,
at which point Leo Amery intervened personally to cut short a threatened diplomatic
row. His suggested compromise, in March 1925, of an agreement 'under which each
Government should assume the liability for payment of such compensation ...' was
quickly accepted by the Irish government. This did not, however, result in a simple
extension of the pre- Truce indemnities, but rather a more judicious pruning of cases
deemed suitable for submission.18
But when it came to honouring the dead, not only of the recent conflct, but also of
wars where their soldiers had fought side by side, the British began to feel the full
force of Irish indepen.dence. It was in July 1923 that Loughnane, who replaced Cope
in Dublin, first approached Mulcahy to inquire if the Free State would consider
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accepting responsibility for the future care of war graves, a precedent for which had
been set by the Union of South Africa. In the interim, Loughnane suggested that the
Imperial War Graves Commission might be entrusted to tae on the task. The subtlety
of this approach suggests that the British were well aware that they might insult Irish
sensitivities on this subject, and Mulcahy's reply tended to confirm it: the Free State
would indeed make every effort to give the British dead, and those being returned to
Britan for burial, full milta honours, but it was notable that all reference to the
War Graves Commission was studiously avoided.19 The hint was not taen,
however, and London tried a different tack in 1924, this time suggesting that the Free
State might wish to appoint a representative to the Commission and paricipate in its
general expenses. The Executive Council rejected this and instead voted to tae
'entire charge' of milta graves. 
20
Takng 'entire charge' also meat having to relive certn incidents of the recent past
which the governments of both countries might have preferred to forget. As
previously mentioned, the storm over the Macroom killings of April 1922 came close
to derailng the Treaty, 21 but with the discovery of the remains of at least two of the
soldiers, in the summer of 1923, the anger and scandal which had affected both
countries threatened to erupt once more. Before Dublin could confirm the finds, and
even before London had been informed, a Unionist M.P. was somehow able to taunt
the government front bench with precise information on the whereabouts of the
burials. 
22 In the same way that the full story of the original incident may never be
known, then neither may the story of the later recovery of the bodies. If a local Cork
Civil Guard report was accurate, and all the bodies had been quicklimed when hastily
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buried, then it is probably as well that both governments appear to have suppressed
official information and comment. 23 It was probably with this in mind, and knowing
that there would be wide press coverage, that it was not until December that the
bodies were escorted back to England with full milta honours provided by the Free
State. Officially, the original incident too could now be laid to rest: Devonshire
passed on to Dublin a letter of gratitude from a grieving parent, and the Army
Council's 'cordial appreciation' for the assistace given by the Deparment of
Defence. 
24 But such was the disgust of some diehards that even then they refused
to let go: almost two years after the original incident a self-styled 'Vigilans' was
writing to The Times demanding a full public inquiry. 25
If the Macroom incident came back to haunt both governments, then so too, in the
most tragic of circumstaces, did the notorious Kilmichael 'Ambush' of November
1920, which had left three LR.A. men and seventeen British auxilaries dead.26 The
discovery in 1925 of the body of an auxiliar officer, who was executed after the
ambush, was to become a minor cause célèbre in both countries, and was to renew
old bitternesses in the Cork healand of republicanism. In brief, the controversy
revolved around the refusal by frantic parents to accept that the remains found were
those of their son, a stace which was to lead to over eighteen months of increasingly
exasperated correspondence between the two governments, a situation not helped by
detals being published in the press of both countries during 1926.27 Old angers,
never far from the surface, erupted once more at a committee meeting of the Cork
Board of Heath in November 1926, when it was proposed to re-intern the officer in
consecrated ground at the Council's own expense. While the Chairman insisted that
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they had a duty to treat everyone with respect, a fellow committee member offered
the rebuke that he 'objected to any expense being incurred out of public money
considering that the bodies of their comrades, which were burned with lime, were
lying in Cork jail' .28 This outburst has to be set not only against the memory of
British reprisals after the Kilmichael ambush,29 but also against the pathetic and
continuing requests by Cork familes to the Deparment of Justice for the
re-internment of Volunteers executed by the British between 1916-1921. In having
to refuse these requests, how were the Executive Council and the Cork authorities
supposed to explain that the British had been all too efficient in ensuring that not even
the individual remains of potential Irish martyrs would be allowed to survive?30 It
was the memory of quicklime, as much as the gun, that stil overshadowed relations
during the later 1920s.
2. Prisoners
The moral effect that the Irish are volunteering to fight against
England wil be great.
A German Milta Attache, on the
formation of the Irish Brigade. 191431
To the British, Lance-Corporal James Dowling remained one of the most despicable
of traitors ever to shame the uniform of His Majesty's Services; to the Irish
Nationalists he became a symbol of the struggle for independence, a patriot who
remained imprisoned for his political beliefs. The fate of James Dowling was to
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prove a thorn in the side of Anglo- Irish relations from the moment of independence,
and the manner of his final release in 1924 possibly marks one of the most intriguing,
and revealing, episodes of high politics during the Cosgrave yeas. Moreover, and
as befitted Dowling's endeavours, some of the intrigue appeas to have been played
out in the milta sphere.
In brief, the Dowling story began after his capture by the Germans in the 1st World
War. As a P.O.W he joined Roger Casement's Irish Brigade, and according to the
British was a leading recruiter for its cause. In 1918 he was landed by German
submarne off the Galway coast in order to, as F.S.L. Lyons puts it, 'discover
whether there were any prospects for a rising', but was soon arrested by the British
as part of the so-called 'German Plot' .32 According to a later British document, he
was saved from Roger Casement's fate only on the suggestion of the then Director
of Naval Intellgence, Sir Reginald Hall, that he be reprieved in return for the
disclosure of all his accrued intellgence information.33 As such, after the British
Amnesty Proclamation of 1922, Dowling and the Connaught Rangers ringleaders of
the 1920 Indian Army mutiny became the only Irish 'political' prisoners that the
British (as opposed to the Northern Ireland government) refused to release.34
Despite, however, the public stace of the British government, in that Courts Martial
rulings were outside the general amnesty, it was certan that Dowling would become
a political pawn; it is now known that his release, and those of the Rangers, was tied
up with the promised progress of the reciprocal Irish Indemnity/Amnesty Bil which
Cosgrave introduced to the Dail in December 1922. The Rangers were promptly
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released, and by July 1923 it seems that Devonshire had promised Dowling's early
freedom in return for the said Bil, which had actually been passed in Februar. 35
According to one historian of this period, this event 'marked the formal and legal end
of British milta involvement in Saorstat Eireann', a view which this thesis might
challenge as premature both in whole and, in the case of Dowling, in par.36
In high politics, promises, by themselves, are worth little, and the contents of a July
1923 memorandum, passed between Lionel Curtis and his Permanent
Under-Secretay, Masterton Smith, make it clear that there was stil extreme political
opposition to the Colonial Office view on Dowling's release. Curtis wanted it known
that the British position was 'not good', and that they could expect no easing of Irish
pressure on this issue. Of paricular concern was the unanimity of support for his
release, not least among 'loyalists' in both Dail and Senate, a factor which Curtis
believed posed a threat to Britan at the League of Nations and at Imperial
Conferences. More directly, and considering what was to follow, it was significant
that Curtis also believed that the British stace threatened 'to estrange the British and
Free State armies'. Further, he held that a stad on principle could not be justified,
pointing out that the 1922 Royal Amnesty was granted in respect of all offences prior
to the Truce of July 1921, and that Dowling's motive 'was clealy political'. It was
noted that Cosgrave expected a Cabinet decision on the issue, and not just a
deparmenta judgement, and to this end Curtis urged approval of a Free State
proposal for a 'Committee of Judges' to review the case and help faciltate the
release. In other words, in order to get Dowling free the Free State was wiling to
connive in a face-saving device that might help a largely hostile Tory Cabinet to
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accept the unacceptable. 
37
But this Colonial Office pressure appears to have got nowhere. When Mulcahy
arived in London for discussions, in November 1923, he was informed by Lord
Derby, the Secretary for War, that Dowling would not be released, this despite an
official decision being delayed by the fall of the Baldwin government. 38 But
Mulcahy was not going to be put off by a general election; back in Dublin,
Loughnane was informed that protest would be resumed the moment a new Secreta
of State was appointed.39 This raises the question of just how bellgerent the
Executive Council and, in paricular, Mulcahy, on behalf of the Army, was prepared
to become in order to secure a principle.
Soon after the general election the Colonial Office prepared a draft advisory note for
the incoming Prime Minister, giving a history of the Dowling case and the advice that
Derby had 'kindly refused' a formal rejection of Irish claims pending a new P.M.
tang office.40 At this point it may have been known that Baldwin had no intention
of upsetting the diehards and that he had already been approached and given a verdict
that a new Conservative government would 'not act in the present circumstances',4
Nevertheless, the Colonial Office draft stil pushed for Dowling's release, noting that
Baldwin had personally been in favour, on grounds of 'general policy', and that there
was now 'imperative need' of an agreement. This 'imperative' was explained, and
in so doing Curtis's ealier 1923 waring of milta estrangement began to have
context. The new Prime Minister (soon to be MacDonald) was given a waring that
urgent C.LD. defence arrangements with the Free State were under direct threat
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because of the Dowling issue. Heading the list was the 'absolutely vita' nee of the
Admiralty to have agreed control of Irish cable and wireless stations in time of war,
and it was stressed that its requirements 'are such as no other Dominion has been
asked to concede, and wil be extremely difficult for the Government of the Free
State to concede'. To leave no room for doubt, this same draft concluded that even
if Mulcahy were to give his approval on C.LD. requirements, he would likely be
vetoed by his Dublin colleagues 'unless the atmosphere has been previously cleared
on this last outstanding grievance.' - Le. Dowling.
Unfortunately for the British government, this was not the 'last outstading' defence
related issue that caused grievance, and Curtis may have understated the web of
obstruction that Mulcahy was weaving around this perceived intransigence. Another
issue on which the British position was 'not good', and which the MacDonald
government was also to inherit, was the continuing occupation of the small Border
fort at Beiieek in Donegal, first taen over during the Border troubles of Spring
1922.42 In September 1923, Mulcahy had given a clea signal to the War Office that
unless British troops quit Belleek he would obstruct a planned command change at the
Lough Swily defences, itself a sensitive issue in that it required an extension of
Northern Ireland District Command into Free State territory. Currently, all the
Southern Treaty Port defences came under Western Command at Chester, and the
Free State took the view that as Belleek was already under Northern command, a
further extension at Swily would be provocative. 
43
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There was then enough reason, on behalf of the C.LD., Admiralty and War Office,
why the incoming Labour government should act quickly on these key, and probably
related, problems. In truth, however, there were no ealy indications that it intended
to do so, and though there was some agitation in the pary on the question of
prominent Northern political internees, the new Colonial Secreta, J.H.Thomas,
must have known that even this stace was likely to cause parliamenta friction.44
Baldwin certinly feared that this would be the case; in the wake of the general
election, he had written to Craig to plea for the release of Cahir Healy, the Northern
Nationalist M.P. for Fermanagh and Tyrone (a figure also dear to Southern heas),
explaining that the issue was bound to be raised in the next Parliament 'on divisive
terms', and that 'Labour wil go to town on it.' Craig had already spurned Baldwin's
earlier overtures on political prisoners, much to the pique of the Colonial Office, and
the former would have known that his position was solid so long as Baldwin was
unable to move his own party on James Dowling's release.45
Once Labour was in office, however, there was simply no time to concentrate on
what appeared to be incidenta problems. Thomas's first, and urgent, priority was
to find a format within which the long promised Boundar Commission (for which
Cosgrave had kept constant pressure on London) could operate, and to this end he
brought Craig and Cosgrave together in London at the beginning of Februar. 46 This
vital meeting did not go well, and either because of, or in spite of, the threatened
deadlock, it seems that Thomas decided that he had to tae action where it was at
least possible. While it is accepted that policy itself may have begun to 'drift' at this
point, it has been seen, not least in terms of Britan's own defence interests, that the
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position was far too volatile to allow any drift in executive attention.47 The first
inkling of movement came on the 8th February when the Press Association hinted that
the question of political prisoners 'may shortly be settled'; confirmation of Dowling's
release came the following week, though only the republican organ Sinn Fein seems
to have heralded the event, and at approximately the same time, if not simultaeously,
Cahir Healy was also free by Craig.48
In this same week, and spurred on by his own officials, Thomas also turned his
attention to the situation at Belleek. Curtis advised that the British had to pull out,
and that a formal request for such could be expected from Cosgrave 'very soon'. He
added that the government 'could hardly refuse to comply', as there was no longer
a milta justification for the retention of British troops; it was known that G.O.C.
Northern Ireland concurred: 'indee', Curtis argued, 'there is reason to believe that
he would be glad to withdraw the platoon.' It was suggested that on Mulcahy's
expected return to London, in late February/early March, he should be informed of
British intentions, but that in the meantime both Sir Stephen Tallents, the Imperial
Secreta to Northern Ireland, and G.O.C. General Cameron, should see Craig and
explain the predicament. The whole tone of this missive suggests that Curtis knew
Thomas to be receptive, and it was a measure of the new urgency being injected into
matters that the approach to Craig was urged despite the acknowledgement that it
could prove counter-productive. With Craig being difficult over the Boundar
Commission, there were obvious doubts about raising the problem of the Border post;
the Northern government wanted Belleek held as a matter of continuing security. 49
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There is no doubting that the Labour government, daunted by the Craig-Cosgrave
meeting, and the defence warnings of the Colonial Office, did try to better relations
with the Free State, this even at the cost of temporarly aggravating relations with the
North. But the irony in this process was that the man who had done so much to goad
the British into action over Dowling and Belleek, Mulcahy, received no personal
benefit. He was not to make his planned return visit to London: by Februar his
position was being threatened by a growing rebellon within the 'OLd' LR.A. factions
of the Irish Army, and in March this mutiny would force him into a 'scapegoat'
resignation. There is no evidence that British decisions were directly affected by this
threatened revolt, or vice versa, yet by the same token the previous stonewalling of
the Bonar Law and Baldwin governments had hardly assisted matters; Mulcahy had
been attempting to thin out and professionalise the old LR.A. elements in the Army,
and it did not help if these erstwhile supporters believed, falsely, that he was aiding
Britan on these defence related issues. 
50 In truth, his careful tit-for-tat obstructions
smacked of political sophistication: during this episode, one Colonial Office official
paid him the unintended compliment of being 'disingenuous'. 51
Nevertheless, defence relations did improve after Thomas had instigated change.
Belleek was not finally evacuated until August, but there seem to have been no
further objections to the Lough Swily command change, and a more tolerant line was
taen on the warime use of WIT stations. By June, Hankey, as Secreta to the
C.LD., had put forward new proposals for control of these stations, and agreement
was later confirmed 'in principle' by the Executive CounciL. 52
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3. Reservists
(H.M.Government) wil now have to depend for the machinery of
calling them up, and for enforcing the law against any recalcitrants,
upon the goodwil and co-operation of your ministers.
British appeal to Ireland on the
position of reservists. August 192353
When the bulk of British forces left Ireland in 1922, there remained a number of
awkward personnel problems that had no obvious solution, and for which no
provision had been made in the Treaty. One such was the position of a small, but
significant, number of Irish reservists. An agreement to cease recruiting and disband
the Southern Irish regiments of the regular Army had been reached, 
54 but this
particular question remained open and was to have intriguing implications. Reservists
had been recruited, and were retaned, under the varous Reserve Forces Acts from
1882 to 1907, and unless the Dail chose to repeal this commitment they would remain
as subject to Imperial law as any mainland counterpart, and be liable for permanent
service in an emergency, annual training and normal punishment for desertion. 
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The obvious problem that independence would raise had not been lost on the War
Office, and within days of the Treaty being signed it had put the question of what was
to be done with reservists to the newly formed Provisional Government of Ireland
Committee (P.G.!.).56 In response, the Technical Sub-Committee of the P.G.!. put
forward its views for possible Cabinet consideration in March 1922, outlning the
difficulty and 'wasteful' effort of trying to retan reservists when the British
authorities would soon have no actual power to prosecute those who did not respond
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to the call. It is notable, moreover, that even at this early stage the Technical
Committee had began to ponder a singular dilemma that would arse when Ireland
became a Dominion proper. It was noted that as a matter of practicality it was
present policy to discharge any reservist who left Britan for the Dominions, the
implication being that while in geographic terms the Irish reservists would stil be
close at hand, they could hardly be treated any differently. 57 Decision was deferred
for three months pending negotiations, but it seems that it was not until November
that the Viceregal Lodge first made informal contact with Mulcahy, and then only on
behalf of the Admiralty. If this tentative approach suggested that London was
expecting stiff opposition, then they were in for a surprise: the Colonial Office was
informed that the coming Free State government 'would certnly recognise' the
priority of the Imperial government in the event of any naval mobilsation. More to
the point, the Colonial Office was invited to take up the whole question on a formal
basis with Dublin.58
This subject was to bring a unique twist to defence relations in the 1920s, being the
one area where the Provisional and Free State governments gave active, if qualified,
support, and where it was the British departments that began to delay and see
intractable problems. At least, that is, the Colonial Office and War Office saw
problems: the Admiralty appears to have believed that all would be business as usual,
and it was on this subject, in December 1922, that an irritated Colonial Office official
noted: 'The Adm like some other Depts has not yet grasped that the F.S. is now a
Dominion. ,59 The War Office, however, was only too aware of this fact, and its
Permanent Under-Secreta, H.J.Creey, let it be known that there was little point
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in having men liable for militay service if the only way to ensure this was through
a tota dependence on the Free State. He wanted the entire question held over unless
the Imperial Parliament intended to legislate. The clear intimation was that the War
Office was wiling to discharge all its Free State reservists rather than risk a future
humilation at the hands of a so-called Dominion.60
It should be noted that the question of numbers and finance did not realy enter these
existing, or future, calculations. There were some 2,300 Army reservists, whose
total training costs (to be paid by Britan) were £40,000 per annum, and less than 100
members of the Royal Fleet Reserve. 
61 To Loughnane, who replaced Andy Cope in
Dublin, the question was about finding an avenue which promised to lead to
co-operation and future parnership, and he grew frustrated when he head of the War
Office's doubts. In February 1923 he suggested that it would be 'very unfortunate
indee' if reservists were discharged, and urged the Colonial Office to press
'strongly' in order to prevent the War Office drifting. 
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But the question did drift, and it was not unti August that the Colonial Office made
a formal approach. Possibly because of the encouraging signals already received, the
inquiry was notably open and disarming, and it confessed that future progress would
be totaly dependent upon the 'goodwil and co-operation' of Free State ministers. On
the British side the immediate problem was seen as procedural, and it was requested
that the Irish might like to duplicate, for the benefit of naval reservists, the
management system previously operated by the Irish Boards of Trade and Customs
and Excise. 
63 But, having received all the right signals, and having calmed their own
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fears, it was now that the British were embarrassed by a wall of Irish silence. In
November a reminder commented on the 'considerable inconvenience' being caused
by the lack of a reply, and by May 1924 the continuing silence produced the remark
that it was 'unnecessar ... to dwell at length upon the embarrassment occasioned to
the Admiralty and War Office by the absence of any understading on the subject'.64
In fact, there was little need to inquire of the reasons for this silence; the growing
rebellon within the Free State's own Army had become all consuming, and as
previously mentioned, the court case involving a confessed British deserter, in
October 1923, began to highlight the legal and political minefield that the Attorney
General's office and the Deparment of Defence might enter once commitment had
been given in this related area. 
65 There was every reason why the former would
need time to appraise the Free State's apparently fragile legal responsibilty, under
Article 73 of the Constitution (see Appendix 2), and to assess the politics of
promoting the more binding legislation which the Colonial Office was keen to advise
upon. 
66 As in the case of deserters, there was a difference between seeing the British
point of view and actually legislating for it.
In this instance, however, there was every indication that, within the existing
framework, the Irish government wanted to continue an agreement without first
extracting major concessions, a position evidenced by the support given at an
Executive Council meeting in November 1923, and by the formal reply which was
finally elicited in May 1924. The Free State would be prepared to duplicate the
necessary administrative machinery, and would be prepared to arest and hand over
recalcitrants to the relevant British authorities. In return, all that was asked was that
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any reservist be given the option, by notice, of resigning, and that naval reservists
would be allowed to be 'absorbed' within any Irish Coasta Defence Force that might
result from the scheduled Article 6 conference in 1926.67 In all, this has to be seen
as a reasonable, if calculated, reply, despite the added advice that new legislation to
cover these points was not being contemplated.
This reply was almost guarantee to have at least two contrasting responses in
London, neither of which directly addressed the possibilty that it might be based on
proper self interest and a completely independent future. The Colonial Office was
almost bound to seize on the positive aspects of Irish goodwil, as an aid to Dominion
development and harmony, and the Admiralty was equally bound to stand aghast at
the implications for its own strategic control. For the remainder of 1924, however,
little happened excepting that the War Office, for its par, wanted it known that it had
taken heart from the Irish proposals; despite lingering reservations, the Army Council
noted 'with much satisfaction the willngness ... to assist them'. There was of course
no suggestion that the Army reserve should one day be absorbed within the Free State
Army. 
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But if the War Office attitude was no longer a problem, it seems that until Leo
Amery took charge, the Colonial Office fought shy of provoking an Admiralty
reaction. When this came, at the beginning of 1925, it was much as expected: the
Colonial Office was advised that the idea of the Irish absorbing naval reservists after
five years 'would give rise to considerable administrative difficulties', and that it
would be better to let the small numbers involved 'die out, and to postpone the
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question of resuscitating it (the naval reserve) until the question of the coast defence
of the LP.S. has been settled.' On the other hand, the Admiralty accepted that its
view might be 'undesirable' given that it was by no means certan that the Free State
would want its own naval force after 1926.69 In short, the Admiralty wanted it both
ways: if, as it desired, the Irish could be prevented from claiming a naval force, then
reservists would stil be of use, but otherwise it wanted the whole matter dropped.
The Admiralty had in fact to apply considerable ingenuity in order to keep these
options open; when it appeared that the Colonial Office might actually agree that a
Royal Naval Reserve was untenable, claiming that natural wastage would anyway
eliminate the problem by 1926, the Admiralty responded by claiming that this was not
the case, as it was stil enrollng men in the Pree State 'under the ordinar
regulations. ,70 Presumably this meant through mainland agencies, but the Colonial
Office did not appear to query this claim.
But perhaps the Admiralty's biggest problem was going to be Leo Amery himself,
and the vigour with which he began to tackle this problem during 1925. Indee, the
question of reservists gives an importat insight into Amery's early thoughts about
the Free State in general. Having spent the earlier par of the yea trying to persuade
people like Tim Heay and J. Keating, the ex-Nationalist M.P., to ignore reports
about 'one regarded with suspicion as a notorious "die hard"', Amery neeed
something that was likely to produce quick and tagible evidence of mutual
goodwil. 
71 As such, he began to elevate the reservist question well beyond its
immediate level of political/milita importce, and was, by June 1925, canvassing
for an inter-departmental conference to discuss the 'whole question. m To assist this,
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the Colonial Office distributed a review of the existing position together with its own
observations on future progress. It is a reveaing document, seemingly bearing
Amery's personal and idealistic stamp, and sections of its summar warrant quotation:
The Free State Government has displayed good wil and readiness to
co-operate in a matter in which it would not have been surprising to
find them very reluctat to help; it would be a pity to rebuff them by
dropping the whole scheme as suggested by the Admiralty. Moreover,
the reason given by the Admiralty for this proposal is that (the)
number of reservists ... has now become so small: but it is to be noted
that the offer of the Free State includes the enrolment of reservists,
and there would appea to be no reason why the coast population of
the Irish Free State should not continue to afford in the future, as it
has in the past, a good recruiting field for the Royal Naval Reserve.
The proposal that the Free State Government should co-operate in the
enlistment of recruits for the Royal Naval Reserve is, of course,
bound up with the condition that the whole... should be transferable to
the Free State Naval Force if and when such a force is set up. The
Admiralty object... to this condition on the ground that it would give
rise to considerable administrative difficulties. But apar from the fact
that it does not seem very probable that the Free State wil be ready
in 192(6) to set up a naval force of their own, it is possible that the
difficulties foreseen by the Admiralty could be overcome, and that it
would be advantageous to His Majesty's Government to fall in with
this condition. If and when the Free State does set up a naval force of
its own, it is very desirable that it should be in the same relation to the
British Navy as naval forces of the other self-governing Dominions;
and this object is far more likely to be obtaned if there is a flourishing
local Royal Naval Reserve organisation ... It is suggested that when
the time comes for the Naval Conference for which provision is made
in Article 6 of the Treaty, the Free State Government should be
encouraged to procee on the lines suggested above. If His Majesty's
Government succee, they wil then be in a far better position to
approach the question of bringing the Free State Army into line with
the local forces maintaned in other Dominions - and this object wil
also be assisted if the Free State are already actively co-operating in
connection with the Army and Air Force Reserve.73
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Progressive though Amery may have been, three immediate points stad out from this
projection of the imperial mind: firstly, the Colonial Office appears to have read more
altruistic goodwil into the Free State's attitude than the latter's official
correspondence would allow for. Secondly, the reservist issue was clealy being
magnified as a means to a greater end - a unified system of Dominion local defences.
Again, and as wil be demonstrated in a later chapter dealing with the preparations
for the 1926 Treaty conference, there is no evidence that the Free State was thinking
along these lines. Lastly, and perhaps as far as the future was concerned, most
importtly, there was enough in this document to cause serious alarm to the
Admiralty and its diehard sympathisers. By this date the Admiralty had already
witnessed the 'surrender' of the Navy's control of Revenue and Fishery Protection
in Irish waters, and now it seemed that Amery would be wiling to pre-judge the
outcome of the scheduled 1926 Conference and assume that there would be a Free
State Coasta Defence Force in the nea future. 
74 Where would it all end?
Amery did get his inter-departmenta conference, in September 1925, although it
seems that the price paid for declarng his deparment's hand was that little or no
headway was made.75 Some nine months later, in June and July 1926, the then
Dominions Office had to remind the Admiralty that it had stil not received the
detaled requirements (the War Office had long since co-operated) that would be
necessary in order to draft a formal reply, now some two years overdue, to the Free
State government.76 But all this Dominion Office effort was leading nowhere: the
Admiralty did not realy have to defend its own doubts when other departments,
principally the Treasury, had begun to produce their own. At the same time as the
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Dominions Office was pressing the Admiralty for a reply, the Treasury was going
over the Irish proposals and finding them far too vague on the question of
accountabilty and allowable resignation. The Admiralty was informed by the latter
that if 'you have no right to call up a man in the event of mobilsation, you lose the
benefit for which you pay his reserve pension. If this is intended, ought we not to
claim a contribution from the Free State towards his reserve pension?,.77 In
comparison to the broader vision that Amery had been trying for, this might be seen
as nit-picking, and yet from the viewpoint of the Exchequer it was more than fair
comment. Indeed, in so doing the Treasury had raised another core question which
both the Dominions Office and Free State had so far evaded. The Irish may have
offered few objections to a reserve force, paid for by Britan, and from which they
might gain tagible and future benefit, but would they stil be as interested if asked
to pledge legal and financial commitment to this aspect of Imperial defence? The
experience so far, as in the case of deserters, suggested that the political goodwil of
the Free State extended only so far as its own interests were served, and certnly no
further than could be accommodated through the status quo.
The vital point, however, was that there was not enough collective wil even to try
to test Irish resolve on this issue. The Dominions Office did manage a perfunctory
reply to Dublin later in 1926, requesting, among other things, that the Royal Naval
Reserve be excluded from any agreement,78 but in essence the issue was already dead
and had anyway (as wil be detaled in later chapters) been overtken at this date by
the direction of the Free State's internal defence policy, and by the wider planning
considerations for the coming Article 6 Conference in December. 79 As regards this
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last point, the significance of the Dominions Office's failure to have achieved any
coherent understading at the above 1925 inter-departmenta conference cannot be
underestimated. Here had been the early chance to set the agenda for future C.LD.
discussions on Ireland, and its failure spoke volumes for the chances of agreement if,
and when, the bi-lateral Coasta Defence Conference actually began.
4. The Tommy and the Tar
I am informed that there is no law or Regulation in force in the Irish
Free State forbidding the weang of uniform by members of His
Majesty's forces.
Sir Laming Worthington-Evans,
Secreta of State for War,
speakng in the Commons, June 1925.80
While the nature of the 1919-21 campaign may have resulted in some of the worst
lapses of discipline in modern British milita history, it was certinly not the case
that the Southern Irish generally came to despise the regular British Army. On the
contrar, and somewhat to their cost, the political and milta commanders of a stil
poorly trained Free State Army were often in awe of the traditional methods for
instiling discipline and esprit de corps, paricularly among junior officers. 
81 But
while the Imperial model remained convenient, and in many ways enviable - to the
point of sending men to officer training schools in Britan - it equally did not follow
that the British Service uniform was a politically acceptable sight on Free State soiL. 82
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A distinction has, of course, to be made here between the British forces who were
retaned, per force, at the defended Treaty Ports of Cobh (Queenstown), Berehaven
and Lough Swily, and those on official or private visits unconnected with Treaty
obligations. The presence of the former did create its own problems and resentments,
and these are discussed in a latter chapter, but outwith these coastal areas, where the
British uniform remained a common sight, it could be expected that the Irish
government would be wary of the British trying to extend their rights of Empire. As
earlier indicated, the fact that it had taen until August 1924 finally to get the British
to quit Belleek, was not likely to endea Dublin to the belief that London truly
respected its independence.
But to a certan extent the situation which arose after 1922 had been connived at by
the British siege mentaity which had developed during the protracted 'retreat' to, and
then from, Dublin in that year. In order to cut further embarrassing losses, the War
Office had ordered General Macready, as early as August 1922, to restrict Service
leave in Ireland to those cases 'where hardship would follow' if it was not granted,
and then only on the 'distinct understading that the recipient procees at his own risk
and in plain clothes. '83 It must be remembered that this was at a time when the
British Army, despite the nominal civil authority of the Provisional Government, stil
held militay sovereignty, and when Macready, through Churchil, held more direct
power than any person in Ireland, North or South. Even so, the problem went
beyond trying to lessen the exposure of Macready's own battaions; earlier in May
there had been public disquiet over the vulnerabilty of men from the disbanded Irish
regiments and the R.I.C. having to return and face anti-Treaty forces in their home
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towns and vilages. And as if to turn the screw, the former C.I.G.S., Sir Henry
Wilson, had taken pleasure in trying to ridicule Churchil with reference to off-duty
soldiers having to go about unarmed because it was 'not safe' .84 The consequence of
this determination not to provoke incidents, with either uniform or arms, had started
to become institutionalised by September 1922, when Cope had officially to rebuke
the Provisional Government for allowing a National Army soldier to be seen armed
and in uniform in London; to ensure a degree of fairness, Cope promised that, in
future, security forces in Northern Ireland would not be allowed to cross the Border
in uniform. In return, the Provisional Government promised to reciprocate on its
Border crossings. 
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This caution held in the years that followed. It was notable that Britan did not
appear to object when the Executive Council declined an invitation from the Legion
of Irish Ex-Servicemen for the Governor General to attend the 1924 Armistice
celebrations in Dublin. The invitation also extended to the President, but it was
judged that 'the time was not ripe for the Government to publicly associate itself (sic)
with functions of this nature', and thought 'somewhat anomalous' that the Governor
General, Tim Heay, should accept such an invitation. The same doubts held for the
1925 Armistice Day celebrations. 
86 Indee, any occasion that might tend to highlight
the British Service uniform, or to honour Ireland's past association with British
milita endeavours, was bound to cause political embarassment. That the Colonial
Office, if not the War Office or Admiralty, recognised this problem was made
apparent early in 1924, when it thought better than to make a formal approach to
Cosgrave on a subject close to the War Office's hea; the distinguished record of the
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recently disbanded Royal Dublin Fusiliers was a matter of pride to the War Office,
and it very much wanted the Colours of the outstading battaions to be placed with
others of the regiment in St.Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin. The problem here was not
with the placement itself, but with the escort ceremony which would have to occasion
the deposit, and this, moreover, in the centre of the capita. Loughnane first made
a personal approach to Cosgrave, only to be told that the question had 'better be
postponed for a few months', but in the event in was not until April 1925 that another
attempt was risked - equally without success. Cosgrave did tae personal note of the
position, and later turned a blind eye to smaller, and less conspicuous, Colour
ceremonies in the provinces, yet it had been made clear that this was a tolerance that
had set limits. 87
It was, however, to be an incident in far away Bundoran, near Sligo, which finally
brought these underlying tensions to a head. The incident, in May 1925, concerned
a young recruit of the Enniskillen Fusilers, based at Omagh in Northern Ireland,
who, on returning to his home town was detained by the Civic Guard and made to
exchange his uniform for civilan dress; on leaving Bundoran the same evening, he
was. escorted to the train by the Guard and given back his tunic. The subsequent
question which excited both the Unionist press and the Commons, was whether he
had been detaned simply for his own safety - because by showing off his new
uniform he had attracted a 'rowdy element in the crowd88 - or whether he had
actually been arested for wearing the uniform of His Majesty's Forces. An outraged
correspondent of the Morning Post was in little doubt, insisting that the soldier had
been told that he had committed an offence by entering the Free State in uniform, and
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that the incident had exposed 'the extent to which the British uniform is hated in the
Free State. '89
This was of course just the type of nuisance incident which was guarantee to cause
maximum, if short lived, embarassment to ministers of both countries. Even so, the
manner in which the basic principle involved was handled was revealing. Knowing
that Unionist MPs had tabled Commons questions on the 'arrest', the Colonial Office
contacted Diarmuid O'Hegary and immediately affrmed that the soldier had broken
the unwritten code which had been established since 1922. But in confirming that the
War Office would stand by this agreement, it was then hinted that the British
government might be in trouble for admitting to it; to prevent this, it was suggested
that Irish ministers might like to offer some soothing words. 
90 Cosgrave was not,
however, likely to fall into this tender trap and rush a reply. Although there was no
suggestion from the Irish side that the soldier had been arested, it is difficult to
imagine a response which might not have compromised his government at some later
date. The simple reality was that the wearer of a British uniform was not welcome
and was stil at some risk, and all informed agencies had accepted this, together with
the fact that the R.O.I.A. regulations of 1920, though technically stil in force at this
date, could no longer be invoked in the South.91
British embarassment only increased when the Northern government became
indirectly involved, via an (apparently) hostile report on the incident by G.O.C.
General Cameron, a copy of which was forwarded to Dublin. Cameron had
obviously to be implicated, but his relationship with the Northern government was,
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to say the least, ambiguous, and when O'Hegary was notified that London had given
certn assurances to him, the wider implications would have been evident. London
was, nevertheless, stil on the defensive; while Cosgrave, through O'Hegary, was
again being pressed by the Colonial Office to lend support, the latter was also
apologising that 'such harmless incidents' should be the subject of political
excitement. Cosgrave did not, however, respond, and maintained a 'wait and see'
attitude. 
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In the Commons the Conservative front bench had an uncomfortble time staling
questions from indignant Unionist MPs, and a week's notice was requested because
of the 'seriousness' of the matter. When, in due course, these same questions were
repeated, Worthington-Evans, the Secreta for War, had little option but to admit
at least a half-truth about the state of Anglo-Irish miltay relations. He insisted that
the incident had been 'greatly misrepresented', and that the soldier had not been
arrested, but for the first time was forced to concede that 'it is stil considered
advisable by the British milita authorities in Ireland that soldiers should not wear
their uniform while on leave in the Irish Free State.' It was perhaps as well that he
did not mention Irish political sensitivities, as despite having to accept the security
advice, some MPs were not overly impressed with the government's passive stace.
Colonel Gretton summed up their contempt when he asked: 'Is there any other par
of the British Empire where the War Office consider it inadvisable for British soldiers
to wea the King's uniform?' The reply was in the negative.93
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To what extent these Commons scenes proved a formative experience to the British
establishment is debatable. The British uniform was one of the most potent symbols
of Empire, and yet a Conservative government had, in effect, been prepared to
disown it, and this within the 'British' Isles. But there may have been other, hidden,
reasons for this reticence, reasons that would only unfold within the next few months
of 1925.94 As the following chapters wil ilustrate, the British government was more
vulnerable under the Treaty defence provisions that it had supposed, and the Free
State had greater ambitions to contan British forces than were demonstrated in one
particular incident, fortuitous prelude though it may have been. Meantime, it has
been seen, on the subjects of deserters and reservists, that even active co-operation
had defined, self-interested, limits, and that outwith the coasta areas under Treaty
obligations, the British uniform was received with a reluctance that already spoke of
alienation. The Free State may have been retaned within the Empire, but the lesson
was that it was never going to be of the Empire.
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CHAPlER 5 : THE SPOILS OF WAR
1. HibernIa Rules The Waves?
(The Admiralty) were not informed of this contemplation and are
apprehensive that the risks of misunderstading and friction thus
introduced have not been reaised.
Admiralty to Cabinet on the
wording of Article 6 of
Treaty. 8-12-1921.1
Whatever the fortune and status of Service personnel in the Free State might be, there
were also many other (post-Treaty) technical issues to be resolved, issues which
affected the War Office and Admiralty just as much, and which were as equally
relevant to Irish ambition. The ink had not had time to dry on the Treaty before the
Admiralty attempted to war the Cabinet on the consequences of the 'essential
principle' of absolute responsibilty in coastal defence having been diluted in political
negotiation. It was argued that no definition of the term 'Fishery or Revenue
Protection Vessel' had been struck, and that as the future Free State would be
authorised to construct and maintan such vessels as necessar, under Article 6 of the
Treaty, there would be problems in handing over this right to 'an inexperienced
service'. Noting previous encounters with the French fishing fleets, it was stressed
that 'extreme bitterness' could be generated between nations over difficulties with
Fishery Protection. 
2
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It is of interest that the Admiralty immediately noted Article 6 as an enabling
provision, and did not try to interpret it in a literal or obtuse sense; that is, that the
Free State could actually operate a coasta protection, and not just prepare for the
same pending the outcome of the scheduled Coasta Defence conference five yeas
hence. Central to this observation was the position of British shipping in presumed
Irish terrtorial waters, and the extent to which Admiralty control had been retaned
in these same waters. But throughout most of 1922 such questions seemed of little
import to British ministers; the Provisional Government had only limited, internal,
authority, and it has previously been seen that the Navy's control of these waters in
1922 was absolute. MPs did ponder the fate of British shipping after the sta of the
civil war, yet Churchil would only hint at the existence of separate terrtorial waters,
answering that all powers and duties of the Imperial government had been transferred
'except as modified by Articles 6,7 and 9 of the Treaty' (see Appendix 1). This, as
the Admiralty had been only too quick to point out, stil left much room for
interpretation. 
3
In the event, a practical examination of these quandares came sooner than even the
Admiralty could have anticipated. By October 1922, and well before the British
decision to quit Dublin had been taen, Cosgrave had begun to consult Loughnane on
the availabilty of converted trawlers for coasta patrols and gun-running prevention.
Loughnane advised London that Cosgrave was aware that this brought into question
Article 6, and that such trawlers could not 'reasonably be seen' as Revenue or
Fishery Protection vessels. Nevertheless, Loughnane took the Irish par and stressed
the urgency of the request and the belief that the Provisional Government wanted only
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to co-operate with the British against gun-running; that the Irish would have the
advantage of local knowledge was also seen as a plus.4 Although London would
have noted that such vessels would be useful to a somewhat desperate 'war
government', it could have been expected, at this time, that there would have been
political reservations; this request may not have ranked in significance with the
Provisional Government's earlier decision to join the League of Nations, but it was
the first physical and external expression of a new found independence that held a
potential challenge to Britan. In this case, it was surprising that Devonshire, the
incoming Conservative Colonial Secreta, should, in November, disregard the offer
of makng this an extraordinar departure, and agree in principle that the request was
in accordance with Article 6 'since the regulation of the importtion of arms is a
Custom duty.' Provided they were classed as Revenue vessels, and it was understood
that they could operate only 'in addition' to H.M. ships in Irish waters, then the
British would have no objections. In order, however, to curtl Irish ambitions, it
was also stressed that H.M. ships 'would not be withdrawn', and that such vessels
'must take no action against foreign ships outside British or Irish terrtorial waters.,5
But perhaps active British approval was not so surprising: the previously mentioned
'Wicklow Head' debacle, and the Navy's forlorn experience in gun-running prevention
generally, was matched only by the embarassment of having to withdraw so many
ships from the Irish Patrol to serve in the Mediterranean at the time of the Chanak
crisis. 
6 At the turn of 1923, there were stil five Patrol destroyers operating along
the west coast, from Galway, Shannon and Berehaven, but given the continuing
anxiety over ilicit arms imports, this no longer comprised a substantial presence. 
7
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Perhaps too, London was flattered by the promise of co-operation and the potential
financial rewards to be had from sellng surplus ships to a captive market. By
February 1923 the Free State had indee purchased 12 armed trawlers, for an initial
cash payment of £87,000, and though this in itself was a small sum, in terms of
Imperial defence sales, a precedent for further such orders had been set. Such outlay
was not of course a small matter for the, technically bankrpt, Free State, and the
manner in which the Executive Council expedited these purchases told of its
determination to bring the civil war to a rapid conclusion. Unfortunately for the
Admiralty, however, it seems that the wish for a completely independent war
capabilty, around the coast and inlets of the war zones, outweighed any thought of
future co-operation. There is no evidence that these trawlers worked in tandem with
Navy gun-running patrols at any time in 1923, and it wil be seen, in a later chapter
deaing with the planning for the Article 6 conference, that almost no consideration
was given to the possibility of this fleet forming the nucleus of a Free State Naval
Service. 
8
Co-operation or not, to the Admiralty the mere fact of such dealings with Dublin
tended to reinforce its doubts. In December 1922 it sought clarification from the
P.G.L Technical Committee (LT.C.) as to the extent and legality of its powers now
that the Free State was formally in place. While the Admiralty understood only too
clealy that it was stil responsible for the defence of Ireland by sea, the point was
made that it was only 'presumably' responsible 'for the maintenance of order within
Irish waters, excepting whatever rights the Irish claimed on Revenue and Fishery
Protection'. The principal question, however, concerned the future legal rights of the
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Royal Navy to stop and search vessels in Irish waters, and the fact that previous
authority for this had rested with the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (R.O.LA)
of 1920. The Admiralty cited Article 73 of the Free State Constitution in the hope
that these Regulations 'would remain in force unti ... specifically repealed or
amended', and was concerned not to fall foul of the Irish government should any
modifications be made.9 An examination of Article 73 (see Appendix 2) shows that
the position was far from clea; as all existing laws were subject to their being
consistent with the Constitution as a whole, then nothing could be taen for granted.
It was a measure of just how little attention had been paid to the legal specifics of
defence and Irish independence, that the LT. C. was in no position to give the
Admiralty clear answers to its pointed questions. Succeeding only in fudging the
issue, it was explained that the R.O.LA. had been' ...in the nature of emergency
legislation for special conditions which no longer existed and that consequently it
must be assumed that the Regulations were no longer applicable'. Pushing the
problem back to the Admiralty, the LT.C. asked if there were any other existing
powers by which the Navy could operate.1O The Free State had been in formal
existence for nealy two months when the Admiralty replied that on the basis of the
R.O.I.A. 'having lapsed' it considered that there were no legal/constitutional powers
to support the Navy's current stop-and-search operations in Irish waters. 
11
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During the Home Rule emergency of 1913-14 the Navy had operated under a
Customs Act proclamation which had subsequently been revoked, and the Admiralty
was now advised that it had no valid search powers under the existing Firearms Act.
On a technicality, power of search was stil held within the actual limits of any Irish
port, but it was pointed out that this was of little value since Free State Customs
could themselves handle this area. In these circumstaces, the Admiralty wanted the
British government to secure agreement with Dublin on future naval operations
'anywhere' within Irish terrtorial waters, advising that in the meantime the Navy
would be prepared only to shadow and inform Dublin of suspected gun-running
vessels pending an undertng by the same 'to indemnify the Admiralty against any
action for damages'. Otherwise, the Admiralty continued to assume that the
'ordinar' powers of maintaning general order in these waters were in place and
needed no modifications. 
12
For its part, the Colonial Office appeared to be in no paricular rush to deal with the
Admiralty's protestations; Antrobus advised that as the republican threat was receding
he was not sure of the need for any urgency in the matter.13 This was probably a
case of grasping at any useful excuse, and it is almost certn that Devonshire and the
LT.C. would have concurred. The Admiralty had raised questions that simply had
no immediate answer, chief among them being the current status of the R.O.LA. -
the same problem which had confronted General Macready when he had given his
'ultimatum' some two months ealier.14 From their inception these Regulations had
been fraught with constitutional and practical difficulties for enforcement, and now
their status was further eroded by the supposed temporar nature of their original
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needY It was small wonder, however, that the government intended to sit on the
problem: until the Treaty was totaly secured it would have been foolhardy to
advertise the weakesses of the Act by attempting amendments, especially when its
authority was stil relevant to the North. Indee, it was to be another two yeas
before its suspension was even considered, during which time the government
studiously avoided any confrontation with Dublin on this issue. 
16
To an extent the British government, in the immediate post-Treaty era, could afford
some complacency in matters of detaL. If nee be, and as Churchil had already
intimated, it could always insist on a catch-all interpretation of Articles 6, 7 and 9,
and rely on the fact that the primacy of the Treaty was written into the Free State
Constitution. But theoretical comforts in London were a far cry from the practical
difficulties stil faced by the Navy (and Army) in Ireland. The Free State had already
demonstrated that although it remained preoccupied with the ravages of civil war, it
could stil find time to keep a wary eye on Royal Navy operations; what had been
taken for granted prior to December 1922, with litte hee paid to Irish external
concerns, was now no longer possible. Indeed, the Free State was only three weeks
old when Loughnane had to war the Colonial Office that the Executive Council was
more than curious about an incident involving the detention of an American steamer,
boarded by a destroyer as it headed for Castletownbere in Bantry Bay. The Irish
government and Customs had been told nothing of the incident, having to learn of it
from a report in the Irish Times, and it now wanted to know the full facts of the
case. 
17 This sensitivity was more than understadable given that Dublin had been
made responsible for damages in cases of wrongful arest, and it was probably this
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incident, or similar, that prompted the above declaration of new procedures by the
Admiralty.
But the makng of its own rules did not signify that the Admiralty understood Irish
ambition, and the former was to receive another rude awakening when, in direct
negotiations, it tried to belittle Irish belief in the worth of separate terrtorial waters.
The very idea of this was of course anathema to the Admiralty, but in fairness it had
been given little firm direction by the government, and was not, it seems, a pary to
the 'Revenue' trawler agreement which had created an importat precedent under
Article 6. Reaising that Fishery Protection was too importt to be left to chance,
it was the Admiralty that in Februar 1923 made the running, asking the Dublin
government for a formal meeting in order to clarfy the situation. The Irish
concurred, but when the meeting convened it soon become clea that they had no
intention of entering into any negotiations which might reverse the gains already
made. The Attorney General, Kennedy, and the then minister of Fisheries, Fionan
Lynch, straightaway thanked the five Admiralty representatives for their neeless
concern; after prior consultation with their own Defence Minister they were able to
report that they could provide all the necessar protection for their own Fisheries.
If, however, this was gamesmanship, then it was a somewhat risky game to play;
responding in kind, the Admiralty team insisted that this was not necessar as the
Navy already had two gunboats, based at Fleetwood and Pembroke, for this very
purpose. In resisting this offer, the crucial point of the meeting then began to
emerge. When asked what the position of British trawlers would be in Free State
waters, Kennedy replied that this was a complex area neeing further discussion, but
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that for the present it could be taen that the British were excluded by virtue of the
Free State's claimed territorial waters.18 With an armed trawler fleet soon to be in
service, Kennedy could probably afford to be assertive, but in truth he was beginning
to stretch a point here. Unknown to the Admiralty, he had received an internal legal
report which, while noting that Free State jurisdiction was 'beyond question', had
concluded that British subjects probably retained the right to fish within a three mile
limit, 
19
It was a testimony to British hesitancy on this subject that the Admiralty went into
this meeting without the mediating experience of a minister or senior official, and it
can only be suspected that there was some forewarning of the course it was likely to
tae. But given its course, what followed was somewhat predictable and was to prove
that the age of British gunboat diplomacy had not yet passed. In May 1923, the
Colonial Office, acting seemingly as a simple conduit for Admiralty intentions,
informed Dublin that it had leat of their wish for 'active' advice on Fishery
Protection and was therefore enclosing a programme of imminent 'visits' by the
gunboats Doon and Cheiwell to varous Free State ports and waters. 
20
The Irish were not amused. In language that was barely controlled, Lynch advised
the Executive Council that at the earlier London meeting it had been made 'perfectly
plain' that British help was not required, adding that it had been obvious that the Irish
representatives 'were only being polite' in suggesting that sometime assistance, on
invitation, could be envisaged. He concluded:
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it would be very unfortunate for the Government, from the political
point of view, if British gun-boats made a practice of visiting our ports
at this early stage of our career. In fact, I am not clear whether such
visits, except on special invitation ... are not breaches of the Treaty. 21
The Executive Council would have neeed litle reminding that this matter touched
on the Treaty defence provisions and their interpretation. With the gunboats having
already arived there was little time to dwell on the situation, but with no little
diplomatic skill, an answer was found. The Colonial Office was informed that there
appeaed to have been an unfortunate 'misunderstading' at the London meeting and
that, as no such visits had been invited, there had been no time in which to prepare
a reception for H.M. ships. It was requested, therefore, that the Admiralty might like
to cancel the last par of the visit should it 'require the vessels in question for duty
elsewhere'. It seems that the Colonial Office, if not the Admiralty, was only too
keen to accept this face-saving formula, because the reply accepted that in future a
'formal' invitation to Irish waters would first be awaited. No such invitation was to
come, but in the event it was not until July 1924 that the Admiralty bowed to the
inevitable and reduced its Irish Sea protection schedules;22 it may not have been a
coincidence that by this date the republican threat had been exhausted and that, in
consequence, the intellgence that such vessels gathered was no' longer essential. 
23
By this date too, the Irish had begun to confirm their new status with a 'Trawling in
Prohibited Areas Act', and the fact that they were then liaising with the Colonial
Office, over the enforcement of this legislation, suggests that peace, of a kind, had
been restored on this issue.24
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The wider picture would suggest that the Admiralty had good and selfish reasons to
defer to such Colonial Office peace overtures. To continue to antagonise Dublin on
the subject of terrtorial waters was to prejudice Britan's essential interest in the
strategic use of Free State coasta facilities, and much of the fine print of the Treaty
Annex stil awaited bi-lateral resolution. It was not until December 1923 that the
Admiralty managed to arrange a meeting with Mulcahy to discuss these issues, and
there was every indication that the 13-point agenda (see Appendix 6) would lead to
protracted negotiations; as the previous chapter has indicated, this was at a time when
Mulcahy and his Executive Council colleagues were offering difficult obstructions on
various other defence matters. To an extent, the Free State was, by definition,
already committed to fulfi the requirements of the Treaty Annex, but when Cosgrave
perused the agenda for this December meeting he could only blanch at the
implications of Admiralty and War Office on-shore establishments in wartime. He
advised Kennedy, the Attorney General:
The landing of British agents, soldiers etc. & the provision of offices
for same ought if at all possible be avoided.
The Crux appeas to me in 1.3.5 & 7 (of the agenda) for
accommodation on shore. With tactful officers and officials this is bad
enough - but with those not inclined to be tactful there are many
dangerous complications...
Cosgrave had to admit that many of the agenda points were legitimate and
'reasonable', yet he wanted Kennedy to liaise with Defence so as to find possible
grounds for refusals. 
25 In short, if the small peacetime garsons at the Treaty Ports
were barely tolerable, then the thought of these same areas being flooded with British
131
forces in times of emergency was simply unacceptable. Perhaps not surprisingly, no
evidence has been found to confirm that the planned meeting took place and it is
known that even the Admiralty's principal emergency requirements had only been
resolved 'in principle' by the time of the scheduled 1926 Coasta Defence conference.
In December 1925, Dublin tried to insist on full transfer control of the WIT Stations
at Valencia and Malin Head. 
26
But in 1923 it was not just the theory of British 'in charge' rights at the Treaty Ports
that was being challenged. There was no doubting that the Irish had gained full
Customs and Excise powers over their own ports and waters, but what was the
position at Cobh (Queenstown), Berehaven and Lough Swily? By the beginning of
1923 the War Office was complaining that Dublin had not, as yet, granted import
duty exemption to the garrisoned troops. It seems that the former believed this to
have been an oversight, but Antrobus, at the Colonial Office, sensed trouble and tried
to explain that the position of British forces in the Free State was far from clear;
there were no permanent garrisons in any other Dominion, and as such this had to be
treated as a 'peculiar problem' which, by implication, would require tactful
negotiation - the Irish, after all, had not exactly invited British forces to stay. 27
Be that as it may, the War Office was growing impatient and insisted that as there
was a 'general rule' of exemption for troops stationed in the Dominions, Devonshire
himself should approach the Free State for confirmation. 28 This was done, but in
claiming exemption on the grounds of 'long established practice', London only
managed to advertise that there were no legal or constitutional grounds for such a
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right. It appears that Dublin was well aware of this, and that there was a political
determination to spike the British guns on this matter. Ostensibly, the request became
stuck in the log-jam of paperwork at the Attorney General's Office, but by December
1923 the Finance Office was sending 'very urgent' reminders to the same, pointing
out that the British request had remained unanswered for seven months and that it was
not 'to our credit that we have so long delayed in sending a reply.' Meanwhile, the
Royal Navy could not avoid being caught up in the attrition: there had been a minor
confrontation at Cobh when crew supplies for one of the permanent Patrol destroyers,
H.M.S. Seawolf, had been impounded after its captan refused to pay Irish duty.
Constat British pressure finally brought results, but not before the situation had been
reduced to something of a farce, with a full diplomatic dispatch being used to decide
the fate of sixty two bags of sugar bound for the Spike Island Royal Army Service
Corps. Irish principle was eventually satisfied, and exemption officially granted, only
in August 1925:29 it may not have been a coincidence that in the same month the
British volunteered a 'Landing' agreement (detaled in the following chapter) which
restricted the entry and movement of British forces in the Free State. 30
Yet diagnostic though these ealy, and coasta related, technical skirmishes may have
been, there remained many unanswered questions as to the Free State's intentions and
abilties to enforce territorial claims. Until the scheduled Coasta Defence review of
1926 actually took place, it was most certanly going to be the case that Dublin could
not win any permanent defence solutions; indee, the de facto existence of separate
territorial waters could only threaten to complicate matters, especially as the Treaty
had not envisaged the legal ramifications of such divisions. If the struggle for such
133
principles could descend to the level of disputing the fate of bags of sugar, then the
outlook did not seem promising.
2. Britannia Rules The. Shores?
... but if we are not up and doing, and if our Government is not able
to speak with a strong, determined voice, it is quite conceivable that
England may pull the wool over our eyes and may let us in for several
milions a yea.
Ernest Blythe, Finance Minister,
speang on settlement counter-claims,
October 1923.J
The comparatively rapid withdrawal of British forces to Dublin, by the late Spring
of 1922, created more than just operational problems for the Dublin and London
governments. Describing the withdrawals, it is all too easy to tak of the
'surrendering', or the 'handing over' of baracks and other properties as being the
end of British commitment, once National forces had taen area responsibility. In
most cases, however, this was only the beginning of a different form of commitment,
and one which threatened administrative and financial embarrassment to the
Provisional Government and its Free State successors. In reaity, all that was 'handed
over' was bricks and mort or the 'enjoyment' of land; ownership and title dees
were to remain with the War Office, or, as in large par with Admiralty property,
with local landowners from whom it had been rented, and to whom the Irish
government would be committed to continue payments regardless of nee.
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At issue were considerable areas of land: the War Office owned some 7,000 acres at
the Kilworth and Moorepark arilery ranges, and a further 6,000 acres at the Glen
Imaa range, the latter having over sixty existing tenants. Including numerous smaller
rifle ranges, and the drillng and exercise grounds adjacent to many baracks, the tota
of War Office land in Southern Ireland amounted to 22,428 acres, attracting rents of
between £7,000-£9,000 a year. 32 In contrast, outwith its own property at Cobh
(Queenstown), the Admiralty held only 113 sites around the coastlne, mostly
coastguard stations and houses, for which the yearly rents totaled less than £650.33
The British did not, however, wait for a civil war to begin before they sought solid
assurances on Service property from the Provisional Government. Indee, the Treaty
itself had not even been ratified by the Imperial parliament when in February,
General Macready sought, and apparently gained, definite promises on transfers from
Collns - this at a time when it was known that British troop evacuations were being
postponed. Few detals of this meeting have been found, although it was to have
importt consequences and would later be held by the British to have formed the
basis for all future Irish commitments for the 'safe custody' of Imperial property.34
As G.O.C. in C. Ireland, Macready would have held the authority to negotiate an
agreement on behalf of the Admiralty as well as the War office, but it seems that
after he had broken the ice in Februar, the former then attempted, at the cost of no
litte confusion, to press its own dialogues and agreements with Collns through C.
in C. Western Approaches at BuncranaY
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The Admiralty should perhaps have delayed its own rapid evacuation timetables until
a viable structure of communication and command had been established with the
Provisional Government. The C. in C. failed, repeatedly, to elicit any response from
Collns until the end of April, and was then confounded to learn from him that all
property transfers had been delayed 'for the present'. The Admiralty in London was
immediately informed of the C. in C. ' s indignation at having been told nothing of this
delay. Assuming (wrongly) that this was now a matter of policy, the latter insisted
that no such delay instructions had been received from London, and that he was
finding it 'equally difficult to obtan any information from the authorities at Dublin
Castle'. His embarassment at this silence would have been acute, because while
waiting for Collns to respond, several local station transfers had already been
completed in the Queenstown area, and preparations for evacuation or transfer, at a
local agreement level, were, seemingly, well advanced elsewhere. 36 But the C. in
C. was to receive little relief from either London or Dublin in the nea future. The
Admiralty went through the motions of requesting of the P.G.!. Committee that
Collns should be 'pressed to procee' with the official transfer of naval property, but
there is no indication that this was considered to be anything of a priority. 37
The priorities were indeed elsewhere, as evidenced by the urgency of Macready's
February meeting on miltary property. That there was to be subsequent confusion
in Dublin, as to exactly what Collns had agreed to, was perhaps not surprising, but
then Collns's performance has to be set against the chaotic backdrop of 1922. In
comparison to British holistic thinking, his only concern had been to take over as
much Service property as he could manage at any given time, and as such Macready
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had been in a strong bargaining position. As previously ilustrated, Collns's
foolhardy attempt to get hold of at least one of the Port defences at Queenstown,
during the sea-landings of August, suggested that he had litte time for British
sensitivities as to the future security and legal status of existing property. 38
These momenta attentions of the Provisional Government were entirely consistent
with the extreme pressures it was under, both from republicans and the British, but
while the overall attention of the British government and its officials was anything but
fleeting, it was stil the case that its Service deparments were jealously guarding their
own interests. Naval transfers may generally have been given a low priority, but
when it came to property actually owned by the Admiralty there were to be no
allowances made for Collns's waverings. Having already decided that the Navy's
principal dockyard at Haulbowline (Queenstown) was redundant, the Admiralty was
later to state that Collns, by 'express wish', and to prevent imminent closure, had
agree to take full responsibilty for the yard as from 1st April 1922, pending the
formulation of policy for the same.39 With a bi-lateral financial conference due ealy
in 1923, the Treasury took up the Admiralty's claim in December 1922, informing
the Colonial Office that no monies had yet been received from the Irish government
in respect of Haulbowline. The Admiralty had made no financial provision for the
dockyard in its 1922-3 estimates, and the Treasury insisted that current maintenance,
paid from 'Navy balances', was 'obviously a most irregular arrangement'. As such,
the Colonial Office was requested to demand £50,000 'at once' from the now Free
State government as an interim payment. By the time the British had prepared an
agenda for the coming financial conference the debt had been itemised at £25,000 per
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quarter, and the decision taken that the Free State should pay an initial £75,000 up
to the end of December; the dockyard (valued at some £12 milions) would then be
closed if formal agreement on a Free State takeover could not be reached.40
This specific debt should be set against the fact that the fledgling Free State was
technically bankrpt. Civil war damage, to date, was estimated at £30 milions, and
it was known that no overseas loan could be raised before its debts to Britan had
been fixed. Tom Jones records that at the beginning of 1923 the Irish had less than
£650,000 'in their chest', and although Bonar Law was telling the Treasury to be
'helpful' with guarantees, Tory diehards could not help but smell blood.41
Haulbowline was not the largest Irish debt to be faced at the Februar financial
conference, but it certnly threatened to be one of the most intractable. Joseph
Brennan, Secreta to the Finance Department, could only admit that the dockyard
problem was '... very unsatisfactory as we appear to be under a considerable but
vague liabilty. ,42 It is not known in what form Collns gave his original
commitment, but the alleged fact of it was now coming home to roost. But what
exactly was Dublin paying for? Irish records indicate that during the Treaty
negotiations, of December 1921, British ministers had given assurances that dockyard
transfers would not be subject to 'compensation' payments.43 To make matters
worse, the Admiralty was also to lodge a claim for civil war damage to its other
properties at Queenstown: the destruction of Admiralty House and the adjoining
Secreta's House was estimated at £125,000, and again it was held that both
properties had been 'handed over to the Provisional Government for safe custody' in
May 1922.44
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The reality of course was that such compound debts did not result in immediate
demands for payment. The 1923-6 financial settlements between Britan and the Free
State were of a nature so complex and contingent (at one time Collns had insisted
that Irish over-taation for the whole of the 19th century should enter the calculations)
that the detals of the Februar 1923 agreement were merged with later agreements
and set-offs and finally resolved through the December 1925 agreement and the
Ultimate Financial Settlement of March 1926. By this time, as the historian Ronan
Fanning has observed, the settlements had become more a matter of high politics than
of high finance. 
45 Equally to the point, however, there was no suggestion that the
Free State tried to escape from the legally obscure commitments on Admiralty debts
that Collns had apparently given; to place the Admiralty commitment in a wider
defence context, it should be noted that the more publicised debt to Britan for all
munitions supplied to the end of 1922 was no more than £250,000.46
In 1922, and in the absence of a coherent martime policy, the forecast as to whether
Haulbowline might be a liabilty or an economic lifeline could not have been made,
and yet the yard, and all the coastguard properties, were taken on as a mark of
independence, this despite the inheritace of basic problems, such as who was to run
them and how. When the S.N.O. Queenstown post was finally withdrawn by the
Admiralty, in March 1923, together with the King's Harbour Master, Queenstown,
the Defence Deparment complained that it had been told nothing of these
arrangements and did not welcome sole responsibilty for the same; it was remarked
that the Deparment for Industry and Commerce should also be involved in the future
running of these posts. 
47 Similarly, there was some controversy as to which
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Department would be responsible for the leasing arrangements and payments on the
varous coastguard properties. Fearing that it was being burdened with all the
Admiralty inheritances, Defence took this problem direct to Cosgrave and argued that
the Office of Public Works and the Department of Finance should tae over. 48
Behind such official misgivings was the knowledge of public criticism, especially in
the case of Haulbowline, that a small State had bitten off more than it could chew.
By the end of 1923 there were cries that the State could not afford the upkeep of the
dockyard, and that it should be sold off, but when later it seemed that the defence
contractors Armstrong-Whitworth would move in, the republican press was outraged.
Sinn Fein opined that in 'England's' next war 'the town of Cobh, and incidently
Cork, wil turn into an Inferno', and stated that Britan would make the naval yard
a 'controlled establishment'. 49 Alarmist though such reports were meant to be, the
Cosgrave administrations, by virtue of the ambiguous meaning of Article 49 of the
Constitution (which noted only the right to decline 'active' paricipation in an Imperial
war - see Appendix 2), could not afford to ignore a core truth. Haulbowline was to
have a chequered history up to the 2nd World War, but it was always to remain in
Irish hands: when, in 1924, the Admiralty neeed to buy back some coal stock at the
complex, the sale was agree only after Dublin was satisfied that this was not part of
a more general encroachment. 50
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On the purely miltary side of matters, and notwithstanding the Februar meeting of
Macready and Collns and the temporary halt of transfers in April, there was no real
movement by the War Office to put property transfers on a formal agenda unti the
end of September 1922. By this time the civil war was in full progress, and all
baracks and Army bases outside Dublin had, in theory at least, been handed over to
Provisional Government forces for safe keeping. At a formal meeting at the offices
of the Treasury Remembrancer at Dublin Castle, attended by the British miltary,
Andy Cope and A.P. Waterfield (the Dublin Treasury representative), pressure was
exerted on the Irish Finance representatives to accept formal and immediate financial
responsibility for all War Office property as from 1st October 1922.51 Certanly it
was the case that the British wanted to leave, but this urgency could have had little
to do with the final evacuation of British troops, the sudden decision for which was
at least six weeks away. Suspecting that they knew the rea reason for the urgency,
the Irish decided to resist the proposals until certan principles had been established.
T.K. Bewley, himself on loan to the Finance Department from the Treasury, led the
rebuff a few days later when he informed Waterfield:
I do not see how in present conditions we can agree to maintan the
properties in good condition. They are, after all, liable to destruction
at any moment, and this agreement would in practice mean that we
guarantee to rebuild any barrack, etc., destroyed by irregulars whether
required or not for the future Irish Army. 52
In fairness the British proposals may in part have been prompted by the desire to tidy
affairs while there was stil Treasury capacity in Dublin, but even so, the trained
abilty of public servants to 'go native' must have been regretted, because Bewley's
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rebuff did not stop at this. The entire legal ambience of British designs proved
politically objectionable to the Irish, and Bewley was no doubt following instructions
when he dissented to the Provisional Government and its successors being termed
simply as 'agents to the War Deparment'. He added that these words' ...realy add
nothing since the actual procedure is the same whether the Provisional Government
are owners or agents, and might be read as compromising the Irish claim.'
Moreover, the usage in the proposals of the term 'with the consent of the War
Office', to cover any future disposals, was seen as equally damaging. In short, the
conditions were humilating, and to advertise that the British Army was leaving in
body only, was to hold this and future Irish governments to political ransom.53
In truth it cannot be said that officials went out of their way, in 1922 or later, to
cause humiliations for the Southern Irish, but when the law coincided with property
rights there was going to be no compromise. Neatly sidestepping the issue of civil
war barrack damage altogether, Waterfields reply insisted that the use of 'agents' to
describe the Irish government was a legal necessity as it would not be the holder of
the original documents 'which we cannot of course par with pending the settlement
of the general question.' (this meaning an overall financial settlement, re Article 5 of
the Treaty). The Provisional Government could have copies of the titles, but
Waterfield went on to add that there would be no changes to phrasing because 'the
Provisional Government cannot sell without providing title; ergo, the War Office
must in fact be asked to consent and to par with the deeds on representations from
the Provisional Government that a sale is desired' .54 It should be added that, for its
par, the War Office had led and supported the Treasury view: its submission to the
142
September Dublin meeting had suggested that 'the Provisional Government, who are
in occupation of these lands for safe custody, should tae over the management; pay
the outgoings, and collect the revenues as agent and Trustee for the War
Deparment. ,55
Regardless of the protests that had been made through Bewley, there was little that
the Irish government could do: it had wanted the baracks and lands as its own, and
now had them, or at least the benefit of them. Accordingly, Cosgrave (at this time
Minister of Finance as well as Chairman of the Provisional Government) and
Devonshire, the new Colonial Secreta, signed a formal agreement in November
1922, which in essence confirmed that all the remaining properties of British
deparments were transferred to the coming Free State complete with all 'assets and
liabilties', but without prejudice to an ultimate financial settlement. As the British
had wanted at the ealier September meeting, the effective date of the transfers was
taen as 1st October. Unfortunately, no copy of the actual agreement has been
traced,56 but it is known that even as it was being signed there were those on the
British side who were worred, both about its legal and constitutional validity, and
possible Irish reactions to their new found domain.
It seems that it was the Treasury, rather than the War or Colonial Offices, that had
the wit to test the British proposals against the Articles of the Treaty and the agree
Free State Constitution, only to find that far from being a safeguard, the Constitution
might actually negate War Office titles to land. As a result, less than two weeks
before the agreement was signed, Waterfield (then back with the Treasury in
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London), with the full approval of his chief, Sir John Anderson, wrote to Cosgrave
seeking personal assurances on the interpretations of Articles 11 and 80 of the
Constitution. Even a brief inspection of these Articles (see Appendix 2) shows that
in any case of disputed title the British were indeed on a sticky wicket as regards the
comprehensive wording of the former, and for this reason the Treasury wanted
assurance that interpretation would be made only 'with direct reference to Article
80.'. Getting into even deeper water, it was then admitted that this Article was also
'open to interpretation', and that therefore a 'special arrangement' would be neeed
whereby Cosgrave 'expressly' accepted British interpretation and undertook not to
oppose it 'if the question should be raised in the courts.' To ensure that there was
no confusion as to what was at issue, Waterfield concluded with the point that the
class of property to be paricularly excluded from Article 1 1 meaning was that owned
by the War Deparment, Admiralty and Air Force. 
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As no record has been found that Cosgrave gave this personal undertaking, it can
only be assumed, given that an agreement was actually signed, that London was
satisfied to some degree. It was a measure, however, of the confusion that overtook
British officials, in their haste to tidy loose ends before the Free State was formally
in place, that the Treasury had presented Cosgrave with an importt letter in which
the Articles of the Treaty were confused with those of the Constitution - the meaing
might be clear, but it was not impressive that the War Office had to point out this
error. 
58 It is interesting, moreover, that when a copy of the letter was passed to the
Colonial Office it came with a reminder, commenting: 'as you know, it was decided
not to raise, at Cabinet Committee, the question of introducing into the Free State
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Constitution a clause deaing with this point. ,59 In this case, either Churchil had at
some ealier point dismissed the problem as being too contentious for inclusion, or,
it was a covert admission that officials had simply failed to do their homework and
were then, at the eleventh hour, trying to avoid having to explain the scale of the
potential problem to the new Conservative leaders.
At the War Office, H.J. Creey, the Permanent Under-Secreta liaising with the
Treasury, was unhappy with whole situation. He pointed out to the Colonial Office
that as far as the Treasury was concerned only further legislation could secure Article
11 of the Constitution, but that if the only viable alternative was to get Cosgrave's
personal endorsement, then it would have to be 'cast iron'. The War Office was not
just plagued with technical doubts: the level of its distrust of the South, and of their
intentions, can be gauged from Creey's observation that 'A malevolent landlord can
find many ways of makng a tenancy impossible or unduly costly'. 60 To believe,
however, that at any time in the foreseeble future a Dublin government would have
the inclination to try to compromise the British on this issue was somewhat
unreaistic. With the civil war and its aftermath to consider, there was probably more
trepidation on the Irish side as to the disturbance of the landlord status quo than on
the British. Bubbling beneath the surface of the war was the ever present land-hunger
question, and the British withdrawal in 1922 had tended only to aggravate the
problem; with the evacuation of Army held property in Limerick, in March, had
come land trouble which the Provisional Government 'chose' not to get involved in,
and even after the war there was trouble in the Mullngar area over the allocation of
ranch land under the domestic Ex-British Soldiers and Sailors Act. 61 The British
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legacy was problematic enough without trying to add to it.
If there was to be intimidation on the property question, then it would be supplied by
London. There was clearly a difference between land held in title and that which had
been only leased or requisitioned in recent years (mostly Admiralty properties), yet
at an informal bi-lateral meeting, in June 1923, the Irish side soon found that there
would be no release from the latter, largely untenanted, property which they did not
need but were forced to keep up. Choosing not to dwell on the November
agreement, the British side dismissed the question, arguing that it was Collns who
had accepted responsibility, and that then, as now, the administrative problems in
trying to disentagle these particular sites were prohibitive. What else was said at
this meeting is not known, 
62 but the lack of reference to the November agreement was
clearly not an oversight, because it was from this time that the British chose to
renegotiate the property question, in its entirety, without recall to the same.
Ostensibly, a Treasury memorandum which helped initiate this process contains little
that the British had not already achieved through the September 1922 meeting in
Dublin and the later formal agreement with Cosgrave, the point that Service property
had been transferred only 'for safe custody' was again central. But this time there
was one vita difference: heading the British proposals on formal transfer was the
passage: '... with the exception of those reserved by the British Government under the
Annex to the Treaty.'. In other words, in all previous negotiations London had
simply overlooked, or, more likely, taen for granted, the most vita of all remaining
British interests in the South - The Treaty Ports. On top of the scares that Article 11
146
of the Constitution had already caused, it was now seen that if the Irish chose to be
awkward they could also lay title claim to the defences at the Ports. Deciding to
ignore whatever assurances Cosgrave may (or may not) have given, the British now
insisted that the basis for negotiations was the original agreement between Collns and
General Macready of February 1922.63 The benefit to London of Collns's eagerness
to see the British go was stil very much at hand.
It is unlikely that through 1921-2 the British had taen a calculated, softly-softy,
approach on property titles in order to avoid provocation. If this were the case then
Articles 11 and 80 would have been so worded as to avoid future traps. The fact,
moreover, that these alarms were genuine, this time over the fate of the Treaty Ports,
can be demonstrated. It seems that for the first time since the Treaty the Colonial
Office was now having to define, in order to assist the above Treasury renegotiations,
the legalities of Britan's continued occupation of the Ports. But the advice of
Whiskard, the Colonial Office's former Irish Office specialist, was not about to make
happy reading for officials more used to precise information. While admitting that
there were problems, it was held that there was stil an overrding safeguard in the
provisions of the Treaty and the particular phrase '... to remain in charge of British
care and maintenance parties.' As such, it could be taken that the Ports were
protected from the snares of Article 11 of the subordinate Constitution, and were stil
the property of the British government which 'should presumably continue to assume
all liabilties and to collect all assets arsing from them'. On the other hand,
Whiskard admitted that the wording of the Treaty Annex could be taken to mean that
the government had only 'easement over these properties, in which case it was
147
suggested that they should be handled 'as with any other War Department Property. ,64
This was a critical admission: not only was the Colonial Office, as early as 1923,
prepared to risk a neutral stance on what was otherwise seen as an absolute interest,
but it also acknowledged, with the word 'easement, that the true ownership of all
Service property might now rest with the Free State. Indee, as far as the Ports were
concerned there was a prima facie case that the relevant Article 7 of the Treaty
recognised this last point, in that it begins: 'The Government of the Irish Free State
shall afford to His Majesty's Imperial Forces... '. This, of course, raises the
probabilty that when the Treaty was first mooted there had been no intention, or
perceived nee, to retan property titles, and the same appears to have applied to the
makng of the Constitution, despite its turbulent history in 1922. At what point then
did the British reaise that all their defence provisions had depended on the Irish
learning to love their new status, and that this was never going to happen? Certanly
this was the case in the latter half of 1923, because Whiskard now pushed the
Treasury to ignore his own doubts, and on behalf of the War Office and Admiralty,
whose confidences he had, secure the matter before the government lost the Ports by
default. 
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The lack of corresponding Irish material on this subject meas that there is no clea
picture as to what transpired. It seems that the renegotiations either staled or did not
proceed, because by November 1923 the Treasury was re-examining the previous
November agreement, in order, probably, to see if anything could be done with it. 66
At the same time there was more than a suggestion that Treasury was wiling to give
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up trying to solve the riddle of Article 11. The Colonial Office was advised that it
remained an outstanding question as to its 'true construction' regarding lands on
which defence works were retaned, and the right to these defences in peacetime.
Widening the concern, the Treasury added that the decision as to whether the Free
State or Britan should hold the originals of War Deparment title dees was also an
outstading question. The Treasury had clearly taen the Colonial Office's own
doubts to heart, and again this was a staling admission. This sudden lack of
confidence, in tota contrast to the bullsh attitudes of late 1922, may explain why the
Treasury now tried to persuade the Colonial Office to tae over all these unresolved
questions. 
67 This was an administrative recognition of the latter's prerogative in all
Dominion matters, but at the same time it was tatamount to an admission that, at
least in the short term, there was no solution to the property dilemma.
It is probable that Britan's cumulative problems with property transfers were not so
much the result of inadequate Constitutional provisions as they were of the hardening
of attitudes towards a neighbour stil deemed 'hostile'. This could be put down to a
general and predictable cooling of relations after Bonar Law and the Conservatives
came to power in November 1922, but it is at this point that the two parts of this
chapter may sta to coincide. Inherent distrust may have meant that a conscious
decision to pass original title to Service property had never been taen; despite the
wordings of both Treaty and Constitution, it had been made clear at the September
1922 meeting that the War Office, at least, harboured no such ideas. But to what
extent were politicians and officials shaken by the early determination of the Free
State to claim an independent presence in its own waters, and to bring to account
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British milta and naval coasta operations? That the Admiralty was unable to
digest this unpleasant reality was no reason for others to ignore the possible
implications; direct pressure could be applied when it was thought that only inland
property was vulnerable to an Article 11 dispute, but the staes were raised when the
Treaty Ports were also deemed threatened. By the end of 1923 there was much to
be said for simply holding on to partial agreements and letting sleeping dogs lie - at
least unti the coasta defence situation had to be reviewed at the end of 1926. At
that, it wil be seen that sidestepping the problem was not going to make it go away.
Given this scenaro, it was hardly surprising that the British did not want to make an
issue of defence property when consideration was given to the Ultimate Financial
Settlement of March 1926. Amongst the British claims that the Treasury was wiling
to waive, in return for other commitments, was 'claim to a proportion of the value
of property belonging to British Government Deparments', which was estimated at
approximately £5,000,000. It is obviously misleading to judge this estimate outwith
the politics and finance of the overall Settlement, but it is intriguing that this was one
item that Joseph Brennan does not appea to have cha1lenged.68 It may indee have
been considered generous: in comparson with the £31, milions per annum being paid
by the Free State in compensation to mainly absentee landlords, under land purchase
schemes, this one-off settlement may have been a bargain, particularly if Haulbowline
was included. On the other hand, if rentable value is any guide to calculation then
perhaps it was not such a bargain. As the vast majority of the property in question
would have been War Department land with, as was seen earlier, a maximum 1922
tenanted valuation of only £9,000 per annum, then the British may not have been
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stinting themselves, especially if the Free State's financial commitment as agent and
upkeeper is added to the equation. In respect of the land purchase schemes, Cosgrave
had already complained to London that no other example could be found of a country
paying such large sums for its own land. 
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And there were, moreover, two major ironies in consideration of this settlement and
ealier British feas. The first, was that up to this date there was every indication that
the Irish government had acted as an impeccable landlord and had taken the earlier
transfer agreements as read. During the 1925 Dail debate on Army Estimates some
mystery had been expressed as to the meaning of an item entitled simply: 'Miltay
lands surrendered, £1,200.' In answer, Hughes, the Defence Minister, explained:
'We took over a good deal of land from the British, and there was a condition that
such land had to be reinstated or surrendered. We have stil a good deal of land that
we took over, but these (particular) lands have been surrendered, and we had to
re-condition them when giving them back. ,70 This was hardly the sentiment or
language of a Ministry seeking to exploit British feas over Article 11 of the
Constitution. This statement also gives a good indication as to what probably
happened to the majority of defence land through time. In piecemeal fashion, it
would either have been surrendered back to the War Office for sale, or, as per the
September and November 1922 agreements, been sold off with the permission of the
British government. No record has been found of British legislation or Orders in
Council passing remaining titles to the Free State, and this includes search of the
1938 period when the Treaty Ports were finally handed back.71
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This point leads directly to the second irony, and the fact that the one item that
£5,000,000 and the 'Ultimate' Settement did not settle was the transfer of original
title deeds. It has been intimated that Britan would have to weigh this anomaly when
it came to discussing the many aspects of the scheduled review of 1926 (see chapters
7 and 8), but in the meantime it had the dilemma which, in itself, was enough to
prevent the subject being exposed to the Ultimate Settlement. If title deeds were
transferred, then so too might title to the Treaty Ports, and what price then for
Britan's 'in charge' rights at Churchill's much vaunted 'Sentinel Towers'? This
chapter has concentrated on the early, mostly technical and legalistic, skirmishes with
the Free State that gave rise to such severe doubts, but what of the equally importt
day-to-day situation on the ground and around the coasts? It has been seen that
Dublin's objections were as yet being centred on the continuing physical presence of
British milita and naval units, rather than on the pros and cons of abstract property
rights, and in the following chapter the consequences for this have also to be
examined.
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CHAPTER 6: THE TRATY PORTS - SENTINLS OR SYMOLS?
1. The Cobh Outrage and Aftermath
If Ireland had been a recognised Republic, what would have been the
result? There would have been a bombardment within 24-hours.
Ernest Blythe, Finance Minister,
taking of the Cobh outrage - 1925.1
At the beginning of 1924, the first Labour government would not have welcomed the
prospects for the coming yea of Anglo-Irish relations. It inherited a growing
impasse on the Article 12 provisions for a Boundary Commission, and this threatened
to dominate, if not overwhelm, the already fragile relations between Dublin and
London. 
2 Even so, Ramsay MacDonald could not have expected that his personal
baptism in Irish crisis would come as early as March and stem from the defence
provisions of the Treaty rather than those on the Border. With so much concentration
on the technical and legal aspects of defence, this was not the time for either British
or Irish officials to lose sight of the physical impact of the continuing British
occupation of the Treaty Ports; Mulcahy's drive to create a leaner and more
professional post civil war army was causing deep resentments within the 'Old' Army
structure and the 'Independent' LR.A., and it was not just staunch republicans who
believed that Cosgrave's governments were beginning to betray Collns's ideas and
become Anglo-centric, not least in the pattern of Army organisation. 
3 With
hindsight, it might be seen as inevitable that there would be some form of violent
backlash against remaining British forces as the Army 'mutiny' reached its crisis point
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during the ealy weeks of March.
The backlash came on the 21st March as a British shore leave pary from Spike Island
was disembarking at Cobh. Four members of the Cork No.l Brigade, LR.A.,
disguised in Free State officers' uniforms, drew up in a car and proceeed to
machine-gun the pary which was trapped at the pierhead. Of the 24 casualties only
one soldier died, but many were severely wounded including three civilans and two
women. For good measure, the same LR.A. men then drove further along the
harbour and strafed the Patrol destroyer Scythe, at anchor close in-shore, before
speeing off - this a distinct echo from the republicans' 'private' war with the Royal
Navy in 1922. The circumstaces suggested that the whole operation, which lasted
only minutes, had been carefully planned and was not just an opportunist encounter.
It remains inconclusive as to who ordered the attack, or whether Republican G.H.Q.
was directly involved.4
It should be stressed that the shock at this attack was as genuinely wide spread in the
Free State as it was in Britan. Under some internal pressure, Cosgrave actually went
as far as to call it 'an outrage unparalleled in our history', and even the arch Cork
republican Mar MacSwiney, not known in the past for lamenting British dead, sent
joint telegrams to 'disassociate' herself and the 'loyal citizens of the Irish Republic
in East Cork and Cork City' from such a dee.5 Nor were the public declarations of
mutual abhorrence and sympathy between Cosgrave and Ramsay MacDonald just a
cosmetic exercise: MacDonald sent a personal letter to the former, which, allowing
for the condescension, probably expressed the warmest sentiments that were to flow
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between any leaders of the two countries in the post-Treaty era. The letter
concluded: 'You have had heavy burdens and your worries have been enough after
distribution upon a score of shoulders to give each sufficient for a human being to
bea. How well you have done your work!' .6
Despite the fact that the Colonial Secretary, I.H. Thomas, had to take a more
business like approach with Cosgrave, waring of the possible consequences for
British public opinion should another attack occur, the official British tone of
accepting this a cruel 'accident', with the Free State as the rea and innocent victim,
could have been expected. There is no evidence that the LR.A.'s attempt to implicate
the Free State government and its Army had caused serious doubt at any level of the
British government, or within the ranks of senior Conservatives, and in the Commons
Thomas was emphatic that the motive could 'only have been to bring about the
downfall of the Free State Government, by embroilng it with this country'.7 With
the Treaty stil in the balance over more profound issues, Britan was not about to
over react to such crass intimidation. Indee, the experience could have had catharic
value, leading to a new understading of the burdens that British defence
requirements had imposed on a government that was stil trying to create an
'independent' Ireland. Instead, however, the incident led, within days, to new
tensions and recriminations between the two governments, and it was these factors,
and not the immediate and mutual sympathies, that were going to have lasting
currency.
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The cause of the tension was a second incident at Cobh, which occurred as a direct
result of the first and only a few hours later; neither government, for good reason,
was to make the detals of it public. Although it has been recorded that there was no
form of British reprisal for the Cobh outrage, it is possible that a localised one was
attempted. 
8 On the same evening as the main shooting, an armed pary of British
soldiers returned to Cobh from Spike Island, a journey which resulted in further
shooting and the wounding of the officer in charge of the shore pary. Within the
week, a milta Inquiry under Lt.CoL.Heywood, C.O. South Irish Coast Defences,
had concluded that the second shore pary had been fired upon from more than one
direction by 'person or persons unknown'.9 Unfortunately, however, for the British
authorities, there appear to have been many witnesses in this populated area who
would claim that the only shots fired later that evening had come from the British
soldiers themselves. A local reporter noted that they had 'fired a few rounds, whether
merely to clear the streets is uncertan', and also noted that many people had 'rushed
into the Town Hall and turned out the lights in anticipation of reprisals'.1O The fear
of reprisal may have been real indee: it had been a frequent, if not always
sanctioned, weapon during the Anglo-Irish war, and it had been less than four years
since the centre of Cork City had been fired in suspicious circumstances. In the
event, General Eoin O'Duffy's confidential report on the later incident was to
conclude, with Cosgrave's backing, that the shooting could not have occurred as the
British Inquiry had stated, and that the officer 'was wounded by fire from his own
party. '11
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It seems that the combined incidents had been serious enough for Eoin O'Duffy, who
was about to tae supreme control of the Free State Army, to be sent direct to Cork,
and for the experienced Lionel Curtis to be dispatched from London to Dublin.
Curtis evidently had lengthy discussions with Ernest Blythe, the Minister for Finance,
and the person who would be responsible for expediting compensation claims, and it
is clear that much time was taen up with the implications of the second incident, and
with the unease that Irish ministers felt for the actions of the British milita
authorities. 
12 If this should seem out of proportion with the magnitude of the
primar incident, then the politics, if not the principle, should be considered from
Cosgrave's viewpoint. Apar from apprehending the culprits and accepting full
responsibilty for compensation, there was little the Free State could do to cover its
humilation at the LR.A.'s resurgence. As it was, the government's competence
stood to be piloried by British public opinion, but if the British version of the second
incident was allowed to stad and be exploited then much worse could follow; in the
wake of the main attack the index quotation for the National Loan had fallen from 99
to below 85, and further publicity would not exactly be welcome. 
13 A single incident
could pass as a tragedy, but put together, the resulting and entirely false image of
anarchy stalking the streets of Ireland was one that could not be tolerated.
The British government's considered response to its counterpart's questions was
clinical in intent. Curtis informed James McNeil in London that while it was
acknowledged that Irish ministers found themselves 'unable to believe' the British
version of events, the British official Inquiry at Spike Island had clealy indicated
'that a second attack did in fact take place.' He added that the reason why the second
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attack had 'never been mentioned publicly over here' was because the Colonial
Secreta did not have the detals of the Inquiry when he had reported to the House
(on 24th March). In case the message was not clear, Curtis continued: 'You wil
realise what an awkward situation might arse if we had to make further
announcements now in view of representations regarding this paricular case which
might be made by your Government.' Curtis further insisted that Ernest Blythe had
agree with him that there no point in re-opening the matter in view of the small
award that would be made in the wounded officer's favour.14
The only resort left to Cosgrave was logic: the Deparment of Finance was instructed
to add the officer to the official compensation list, 'as had the previous outrage not
occurred the necessity for Captan Nevile's landing ... would (have been) obviated. ,15
Clearly, Cosgrave and his ministers believed that a second outrage, this time against
their own people, had taen place. In this case they would probably not have been
amused to lean what Curtis himself had learnt at approximately the same time as he
had been replying to McNeilL. Seemingly on his own initiative, Curtis had written
to Loughnane, in Dublin, asking him to get to the facts of the case. In reply, he was
informed that Heywood had told one of his own officers 'that he believed the
wounding... was accidenta. Further that Capt. Nevile's automatic revolver jammed
and that he was holding an enquiry into the whole affair.' There is no record of this
second Inquiry having taen place. 
16
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Considering that during 1924 Britan neeed every co-operation possible from the
Free State over the Boundar issue, it appeaed to be self defeating to tae such a
stonewall line on the 'second' outrage, especially when the Free State thought it to
be no small matter, either in politics or principle. But the question arses as to what
extent I.H. Thomas, or, for that matter, Cosgrave, was actually in control of events.
That British Service chiefs might well, for their own reasons, wish to cover the traces
of both incidents as quickly as possible, became apparent soon after Thomas had
given his statement to the House on the 24th March. While defending the Free State,
Thomas tried to emphasise the attack as a singular aberration by saying that there had
been no previous trouble, and that British forces had had only the best relations with
the people of Queenstown (Cobh). At this, Sir W. Davison, from the opposite back
bench, responded with several detaled, and seemingly informed, questions of the
Colonial Secretay. Was he aware, it was asked, that this was not the first time that
H.M.S. Scythe had been fired upon, and that her guns were kept ready to repulse
further attacks? Further, was he aware 'that the leave on shore of British men had
for some time been cancelled or suspended owing to the danger of these men being
murdered if they came ashore, and that it was only renewed on the occasion when
this very terrble occurrence took place?' Thomas replied that he was not aware of
these things and that on the advice of the Admiralty and War Office he could not
'conceive such a position'. Davison was unmoved, and asked that the facts be
re-checked with the Admiralty. 17
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Thomas had clealy been caught cold by this Commons encounter, as one of his
department officials was immediately detaled to get explanations from the Admiralty.
The latter's reply, the day after Davison's allegations, was a study in vagueness:
H.M. ships had not been fired upon 'so far as is known' since the 'trouble leading
up to the Constitution of the Free State ceased'. All shore leave restrictions in
Ireland had been removed 'some time last year', and the Admiralty thought it only
'unlikely' that new local restrictions had been imposed. 
is What this reply made
obvious was that even if Thomas had wished to get to the truth of the matter it would
not be easy. It is inconceivable that Davison's detaled knowledge could have been
without substace, and the indications were that either the South Irish Coast
Command was keeping information from the Admiralty, or, more likely, the latter
was playing shy with the government. This would make sense: by 1924 the
Admiralty was already sensitive to criticism of the upkeep costs of the Ports, not least
from the War Office, and the last thing it wanted was further adverse publicity for
its own policies. 
19 In this case, the Cobh incidents had been an embarassment in
more ways than one: in the following month both the Admiralty and the War Office
had to prepare precautionar statistics on the Ports for ministers who might previously
have been oblivious to such matters. 
20
The Admiralty nee not have been unduly worried. Ramsay MacDonald, like Bonar
Law before him, had no great taste for the southern Irish or their problems, and the
subject of the Free State was rarely, if ever, brought to Cabinet. Much as he loathed
Lloyd George, he shared with him, and his successors, a preference for delegating
complete responsibilty for the Free State to the Colonial Secreta. 21 But in turn,
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and as seen previously, Thomas too had received a harsh introduction to Irish affairs,
and the questions he faced in the House on the Cobh issue were unlikely to quicken
his enthusiasm for looking closely at the inherent contradictions they raised. 22 When
asked if there was no protection for garrison soldiers other than that provided by the
Free State, he chose, wisely, to rebuke any idea of Free State complicity rather than
to interpret the question as meaing that British troops might be needed to protect
British troops at a British miltay garrison - that way lay madness.23 Parliamentay
pressure for the government to act on the outrage, or at least to force Dublin into
draconian measures if the culprits were not caught, persisted for several months. On
the Unionist back benches there was a genuine fea of Free State complicity in the
episode, and at least one derisory comment was made on the need for a new
Cromwell. Support for the Treaty and the Free State had reached a new low, but
Thomas defended both against all comers and at one point provoked anger amongst
Unionist members by suggesting that it was proving equally difficult to track down
murderers in Northern Ireland.24
Amid the expected maulings in Parliament there were, however, some astute
observations which probably came close to exposing the government's contingency
planning in the event of a Border crisis. Less than two weeks after the Cobh tragedy
the government had to face several questions on the retention of the Restoration of
Order in Ireland Act (RO.I.A.), and of the Talbot Committee, appointed in July
1923, to review its provisions. The government was tight lipped on the subject, and
did not seem greatly perturbed that the deliberations of this Committee had apparently
stalled. But several members were concerned, wanting to know if and when this Act
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would be dropped; the emphasis was on the discarding of an embarrassing legacy of
British rule, and it was implicit that Britan might be inviting a repeat of the Cobh
outrage while it stil retaned this instrument of 'war'. 25
But if the situation was difficult for Thomas, it was far worse for Cosgrave. On the
very day of the Cobh incidents he had been given the official approval of the
Governor General to extend his powers and tae on the Minister of Defence post
from the resigning Mulcahy. This may have gained time in which to resolve the
internal Army crisis, but it was going to have little effect on his government's low
prestige in the wake of the tragedy. The Executive Council's offer of a £10,000
reward for the capture of the assailants was without precedent and genuinely reflected
its repugnance, and yet it would have been known to the Council, if not yet the
British government, that it was probably a hopeless gesture. Only three weeks prior
to the incidents the Executive Council had had to consider a Home Affairs report on
the 'lawless conditions' which stil prevailed in eight districts of the south and west,
including East and West Cork, and serious thought was given to arming the Civic
Guard and increasing its strength by 1,000 men in these areas.26 This fact may lend
credence to the suspicion that there had been serious, if less fata, conflct between
the Cork LR.A. and the British garisons before the 21st March. Even then, the
situation was to remain difficult: a 1925 press report of a sniping incident at
Templebreedy Fort, on the southern point of Cork harbour, suggests that the situation
was stil not secure a yea after the Cobh tragedy. 27
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The tragedy itself did not tip the balance in favour of arming the Civic Guard, and
in the event O'Duffy's confidential report to Cosgrave on the primar incident
confirmed that this would have made litte practical difference to the problems facing
the Dublin government. There was what he termed a 'conspiracy of silence', based
on fear, in the remote republican heartland of the Cork LR.A - a silence which made
the tracking of the culprits almost impossible. It was not a question of competence
or determination: O'Duffy did have an intellgence system in this 'hostile' area,
which had proved reliable, and yet it was one thing to lea within days the names
of the wanted men, and quite another to apprehend them, despite large-scale
searches. 
28 Under intense pressure, there were token arrests (and subsequent
releases) made later in the year, although by this time it may have been known that
at least three of the actual assailants had been smuggled to America with the aid of
Republican G.H.Q.29 The release of supposed suspects only increased the attacks
made on the Free State government by the right-wing British press, and in December
1924 the Executive Council, in desperation, actually discussed tang libel
proceedings against the Morning Post.3D Instead, it was decided to send the
Vice-President, O'Higgins, to London to acquaint the Prime Minister personally with
a truth too sensitive to commit to paper. But if par of that truth involved the
confession that unrestricted British access around Cobh and Berehaven only added to
the republicans' propaganda in these stronghold areas, then there is no evidence that
it was immediately listened to.31
If Britan was not going to play into the LR.A.'s hands by retaiating for the outrage,
then it was equally not going to make life easier for Cosgrave. In the hours and days
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after the attack, the only concession was not to overstate any emergency measures
which might escalate the tension. When G.O.C. Northern Ireland ciphered the War
Office that he was preparing for armoured car escorts across Free State territory (on
the Londonderr - Lough Swily route), he was signalled that no such action should
be taken pending further instruction. The measure was implemented, but only after
Loughnane had been instructed to explain to the Executive Council that it was for
'purely defensive' purposesY For its part, the Admiralty ensured that all three
destroyers of the Irish Patrol were on station: H.M.S. Sesame was dispatched to
Berehaven in order that Seawolf could augment Scythe, stil at berth at Cobh. Two
days after the attack Seawolf signalled that the situation was again 'normal' .33 All
shore leave for troops and naval ratings was suspended at the three Ports, although
as I.H. Thomas informed Cosgrave, the reality was that this could only be enforced
'for a few days', and the Free State would otherwise be held entirely responsible for
the 'safety of our troops'. Moreover, Thomas wanted to be informed of the
precautions Cosgrave intended to tae. 
34
What exactly was Cosgrave supposed to do? The attack had only served to highlight
the contradiction between British 'in charge' rights around and within the defended
areas of the Ports, and the ultimate responsibilty the Free State now had for its 'own'
terrtory. The reaity, of course, was that these were Free State territories in theory
only, and the fact that the Admiralty and War Office had, over the centuries,
expanded or contracted their operations at wil, without reference to secure limits,
simply added to problem that Thomas had now forced upon Cosgrave's attention.
O'Duffy's initial suggestion on security - that nothing much could be done in the
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short term unless British shore leave forces took to civilan dress - was frank though
hardly helpful; it would probably not have been a good idea to advise Thomas that
His Majesty's Imperial Forces should sta to hide themselves.35
For the longer term, however, O'Duffy had to tae the obvious first step of
negotiating security with British commanders at Spike Island and Lough Swily. It
was agreed that 1) a Free State milta post be established at Cobh, and that guards
be posted in the vicinity of the naval pier when British uniformed paries were on
evening shore leave, 2) at Berehaven, Free State milta posts and piquets be
established to cover pier landings from Bere Island. In return for these taes on
already limited Free State resources, O'Duffy reached an agreement that the 'fully
armed' British escorts travellng within the 26 Counties between Londonderr and
Lough Swily would be withdrawn, and that in this same area, the British escorts
conveying cash from Buncrana to Dunree Fort would be replaced by Free State
troops. On the face of it, these last points only increased the Free State's burden, yet
despite the probabilty that the British authorities regarded them as small concessions,
it would soon become clea that the Irish Army and government believed they had
struck a worthwhile bargain on the whole question of British movements between
North and South.36
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It was a small beginning, and yet these negotiations with the British had started a
process that would eventually lead to the complete handover of all three Ports, and
the final withdrawal of British forces, some 14 yeas into the future. The Irish had
previously won the right to their own Fishery Protection and Revenue/gun-running
patrols, but now, and for the first time since the Treaty, they were actively involved
in the British miltay management of the Ports - the defences and their garrisons
were no longer immutable problems over which they had no control. It could have
been no coincidence that the concessions O'Duffy had gained were immediately
incorporated in a separate, yet parallel, Report (No 3) on the internal Army crisis.
In this document he recommended to the Executive Council that 'consent be not given
to any agreement whereby bodies of armed British troops acting as escorts or
otherwise be empowered to operate within the terrtory of the Soarstat. i3 In short,
O'Duffy wanted to press home and widen the advantage he believed he had gained,
and did not want the government to let it slip by default. It would not have been lost
on the Council that, in large part, O'Duffy's reasoning would have taen in the
morale of his Army, and that of an unarmed police force, when faced with such
blatant intimidation. The wider point, apar from the British being there at all, was
that this would be an importat step in reducing the gun mentaity within sections of
their own society.
The Executive Council decided to defer any decision pending other forthcoming
reports on Army security; it was stil too soon after the Cobh tragedy to try and force
a tentative and localised agreement into a general issue.38 And yet, it is not clear
that O'Duffy was ready, or wiling, to let the matter rest, or that the Council did not
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consider the best way to give this recommendation effect. The official Army reports
would have contributed to Kevin O'Higgins's concurrent and more general appraisal
of internal security, and to his concern that the recent ad hoc Public Safety Acts were
due to lapse within the year. The two men who had gained most from the internal
power struggles over the Army crisis had been O'Higgins and his right-wing ally and
'devout admirer', O'Duffy, and in this case the fruit of the former's security
deliberations - The Treasonable and Seditious Offences Bil (which he introduced in
Februar 1925) - would have involved their close co-operation.39 Was it then a
coincidence that as a direct result of this Act becoming law, in April 1925, the British
government would formally recognise all the points that O'Duffy had fought for the
previous April?
It should be emphasised that the purpose of this Bil was not to please the British, but
to try and stabilse the authority of government in the Free State. As O'Higgins put
it, the Bil was neeed to 'equip the Executive with sufficient powers to dea with
offences directly against the State and provide suitable punishment for such
offences. ,40 Republicans saw it differently: to them it was simply 'The Murder
Bill', the purpose of which was to finally crush the alternative vision of a 'Free'
Ireland. 
41 Its passage through the Dail was bitterly contested, even without Sinn Fein
paricipation, and the Labour opposition echoed the popular belief that it would do
more harm than good by exposing the open wounds of Irish polity. 42 Such was the
furore that few of those involved would have had time to look over their shoulder at
London, but the point is that it could not have escaped O'Higgins, or his President,
that the British government would be watching the progress of the Bil with extreme
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interest. The prospect of de Valera and Sinn Fein being forced back into
constitutional politics was not one to be overlooked, and despite the seeming lack of
press interest on the mainland, the new Conservative government was hardly going
to be displeased with O'Higgins's efforts.
Even so, this does not realy explain why London should suddenly wish to formalise
previously informal agreements on the movements of British forces. If certan clauses
in the Treason Act (i. e. those dealing with unauthorised milita exercises and
assemblies) were used against the British, then obviously it would cause
embarrassment, but the idea that this, or any future Irish government, would choose
such a direct form of confrontation was hardly credible. At this date it would have
been internationally respected that no Free State law could subvert the Articles of the
Treaty, and London could have insisted, rightly, that the Act had only a domestic
validity that in no way obstructed British milita nees. Nor could it be argued that
this point had become an issue in the Dail; indeed, no reference to external
considerations has been found in the Dail debates of the Bil.43 Nevertheless, by the
Summer of 1925 the Colonial Office had prepared and delivered a detaled Admiralty
order for the Executive Council's attention - its main section read:
No armed party should be landed for drill or other purposes in the
Irish Free State nor should drill be cared out by unarmed paries in
the terrtory of the Irish Free State without the prior permission of the
responsible authority.
By the Treasonable Offences Act 1925 (Irish Free State) the responsible
authority for this purpose is the Government of the Irish Free State. Any
proposed landing should be notified beforehand to the Government at Dublin
through the Admiralty.
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The order, though equally relevant to the War Office, went on to specify, however,
that these new regulations did not apply to the actual Treaty garsons which stil held
the 'authority to maintan troops'. Subject to the Irish government's attention, it was
intended that this order be issued to the Fleet 'forthwith'.44
Far from being surprised at receiving this notification, the President's Office and the
Attorney General examined it with a thoroughness that suggests that it was not only
expected, but that it was also essential to a pre-aranged agreement. London was left
in no doubt of the principles involved when it was informed that the word 'troops',
in the final par of the order, was unacceptable, and that the term 'care and
maintenance paries', as per the Treaty, should instead be inserted. More to the
point, it was to be almost six months before the Attorney General was finally satisfied
that the word 'landed', in the first par of the order, did cover all land passage, and
in paricular, passage between Northern Ireland and the Free State over the land
frontier. 
45 It is inconceivable that this conclusion had not been the result of some
more hard bargaining with London, and there is some evidence to suggest that even
then the Admiralty and War Office had been reluctant to concede officially the
implications of these new restrictions: the Admiralty was to advise the C.LD., in
August 1926, that in general war conditions the landing of armed forces in the Free
State would be complicated by the fact that under the Treasonable Offences Act 'such
landings would only be allowed within the actual defences of Queenstown, Berehaven
and Lough Swily.' So too the War Office had to advise the C.LD., in October of
the same year, that it was restricted to essential movements, facilities for the training
of troops on Free State territory not being accorded.46
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In just over a yea the Free State had progressed from a localised agreement of
convenience to a formal understanding on the limits of British miltary operations, a
limit that in theory was pegged to the literal (and therefore inoperable?) requirements
of the Treaty. It is reasonable to assume that this process was tightly connected, and
that central to it was the successful implementation of the Treasonable Offences Act.
That Britan was not the object of this Act, and did not have to comply with it, only
strengthens the suspicion that at some point a begrudged 'reward' factor entered
British calculations. It is possible that there was active collusion over an Act that
London wanted just as much as O'Higgins, but then it is more than probable that the
Irish government simply made it known, in strong terms, that it expected the initial
1924 agreements and the spirit of the Treason Act to be fully respected. Deliberate
obstructions, such as the previously mentioned enforcement of Customs duties, told
their own story, and were anyway makng the daily operations of garisons
intolerable. 
47 In the wider context and climate of 1925, Britan might well have
wished to make down payments of good wil in view of the coming Boundary
Commission, Financial Settlement and Coastal Defence negotiations, and in this
respect the unprecedented visit of Leo Amery to Dublin, in ealy August 1925, taes
on added significance. 
48 Whatever the associations, the Free State was slowly, and
cautiously, closing the net on both the British government's, and its milta's, free
transit attitudes.
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2. Conditions and Contingencies
Rightly or wrongly, the Free State has been made a Dominion and the Free
State forces are as much par of the forces of the Empire as the British Army,
however absurd that may seem.
Extract, War Office study report
on Port defences - July 1925.49
No matter how much good faith both sides placed in the above Landing agreement,
it could do little more than paper over the divides which British occupation was
causing. On the surface a new, post Cobh tragedy, sensitivity was already in place:
the Colonial Office had, for the first time, begun to supply the Irish with timetables
for the routine relief of Heavy Battery Units, and it was noted, in view of the Free
State Army's protection responsibilties, that these reliefs would in future be
transferred directly by ship and not overland to-and-from Cobh.50 Indeed, the
Admiralty had become so sensitive to incidents in the area of Cobh, that when a
destroyer almost shelled a fishing boat the accident was given full dispatch status
before Dublin was even aware of it. 51
At a deeper level, however, the tensions which were to be so vividly ilustrated in
the, previously mentioned, Bundoran 'arest' case,52 were being played out with
mundane routine in the Port areas where the British uniform remained a common
sight. Following the March 1924 incidents, the British O.C. at Spike Island appears
to have gone out of his way to seek the assistance and advice of his counterpart at
Irish Southern Command, Cork, particularly after receiving an anonymous warning
that his troops were again being tageted by gunmen. The British C.O. explained that
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it was proving impossible to keep troops penned within the defended areas, and that
a 'certan amount of trouble' was being caused thereby, but it was not exactly made
clear what was wanted of the Irish Army. 53 If, as the Southern Command and
Dublin G.H.Q. took it, the British wanted their drunks and absentees to be rounded
up for their own safety, then they were going to be disappointed. This new found
attempt at camaraderie, as the Irish correspondence on this subject was to
demonstrate, was entirely misplaced. Maintaning its overview of the situation, the
Irish Army intended to leave all misdemeanours to the Civic Guard, avoiding any risk
of direct involvement, or possible confrontation, with British forces. The British
were on their own and properly expected to keep within their own bases. 
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If the War Office needed reminding of what the ground situation was actually like at
these outposts of Empire, then a study tour by two mid-ranking officers, in July
1925, certanly provided a refresher. Their 'Report on a visit to the British Garrisons
in Ireland' (for detals of mid-1920s manpower and organisation see Appendix 4) is
of interest for its almost naive immediacy, and though their seniors in London
frowned on such direct style, the grim detals of the report could hardly be ignored. 
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On the technical front, the report confirmed that for the most part the defences and
communication systems at all three Ports were adequate neither for seaward warfare,
nor (and seen to be of more immediate import) landward defence against possible
snipers and republican attack. The 'futilty' of the Berehaven defences, guarding the
Admiralty's most prized Irish harbour, was cited especially: 'The lay-out of the
batteries gives one the impression of an inheritace of the best part of a century
old. ,56
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It is, nonetheless, on the subject of personnel problems and relations with the Free
State that the report is at its most revealing. The uncertin future of the Irish
command, together with yearly reliefs and the remote isolation of many of the forts,
only exacerbated the uneasy relations between troops and local populace. At
Berehaven the reporters could sympathise with many of the reasons for low morale,
noting the 'undercurrent of suspicion' created by the 'mountainy' men of the district.
In the more cosmopolita atmosphere of Cobh, where the dances for other ranks were
'embarrassingly popular with the native female element', relations were obviously
better and compliments were paid to the discipline, appearance and effect of the Free
State troops and Civic Guard. But even here, after almost four years of
independence, the underlying position was still tense; the most the report could offer
was that 'The British and Free State troops, if not exactly friendly, at least do not go
out of their way to cause trouble. ,57
Rounding on the implications for the above, the report reached the notable conclusion
that what was happening on the ground was importnt to the future of the Free State
within the Empire. There had to be a reason why relations were seemingly incapable
of mending themselves, and to this end it was strongly urged that an order of Western
Command (Chester), restricting fraternisation between British and Free State forces,
be immediately rescinded. This suggestion caused some alarm at the War Office
before it was realised that no such order had ever existed; in other words, and
assuming the reporters had not been deliberately misled, since independence an
apocryphal explanation had arsen to help both British and Irish forces cope with the
politics of their mutually detested situation. 
58
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Commission was established, then political compromise was always possible. The
1921 spectre of 'armed conquest', with upwards of 100,000 troops, had given way
to the 1924 position of either tota blockade or international non-recognition should
the Free State collapse over the Boundar issue and a Republic be declared. This,
at least, was the Colonial Office 'view', and at that there was deparmental in-fighting
to secure one or other of the options. 
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Whatever the choice, it is clea that there was mandarn unanimity with the basic
milta requirements, and these included the nee to secure all the Treaty Ports, plus
the cable stations at Valencia and Watervile. In the event of such a crisis the
General Staff and C.I.G.S. agree that Queenstown (Cobh) garson would be boosted
by 'at least' one infantry Brigade, plus units of taks and armour, and Berehaven by
one additional battaion. Presumably Lough Swily would have been automatically
secured by way of the 2-3 Divisions neeed to secure the Border and isolate Donegal,
or else by the five British battaions already stationed neaby in Northern Ireland.63
What credence these contingency options actually had is open to debate, but perhaps
Paul Canning oversimplifies the case in presuming that non-recognition would have
been the 'likely' policy.64 Although both the Colonial Office and the Cabinet
Secretay, Hankey, seemed determined that the 1924 Boundar situation was
dangerous enough to warant an inter-deparmenta Inquiry, to finalise planning, the
point is that Thomas and MacDonald seemed just as determined to have 'no further
steps' taken, and to prevent themselves being hemmed in by advisers. 65 Their
reluctance was understadable: if conquest was now out of the question, then the two
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policy alternatives both retaned alarmingly war-like elements, especially after the
Colonial Office had finished qualifying the General Staff's basic needs. Indeed,
Lionel Curtis reaised that his preferred option of blockade could 'only be maintaned
under conditions which are avowedly and professedly those of war. '66 Whiskard
prepared several objections to the blockade theory, one of which concerned the safety
of 'loyalists' and the possible nee for the Admiralty to provide ships at suitable
points for their evacuation; he thought that troops would be neeed to hold inland
refugee concentration points because 'a massacre of loyalists (and such a thing is not
impossible in Ireland) is a contingency to guard against'. 67
The fact that there was little in the climate of 1924 that could justify such dire
reasoning, becomes the more reveaing when Whiskad's motive is considered: if he
did not personally adhere to this idea, then it is evident that he was prepared to play
on the prejudices of Cabinet members who might just believe it. For good measure,
Whiskad tried to overcome the milita observation - that any option would involve
a serious depletion of the Home Expeditionar Force - by arguing for the equivalent
of a new Auxiliary or Black and Tan force. 
68 Given such ideas, it is small wonder
that Thomas refused to allow others to pre-empt an emergency; this was, in the
meatime, supposed to be a Dominion, and almost any political expediency was
preferable to the options on offer. It is questionable that the Cobh outrage, by itself,
could have intensified such ideas, but it is less doubtful that the existing right to
occupy Free State territory fuelled ideas of physical intervention. The Ports,
particularly the southern ones, may have been seen by some as potential bridgeheads
rather than as points to be isolated, but either way the imperial mind continued to see
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Somewhat embarassed for the implied conduct of his own men, G.O.C. in C.
Chester at first denied that relations were fragile, before noting: 'But it is a serious
matter to require officers to open friendly relations with certin Free State officers
who are suspected of being concerned in some atrocious murders.' Further to this
human and enduring response, it was quite clea that the G.O.C. had no intention of
allowing the ground situation to be made any worse than need be; a report
recommendation that South Ireland Coast Defence should have an organised
Intellgence system (rather than relying on informal leave visits to the War Office),
met with the retort that such a system would endanger the troops and cause all round
'bad feeling and hostilty' .59 The War Office confirmed this opinion, but the report,
as a whole, made depressing reading for the Director of Milta Operations and
Intellgence, who ventured that it only re-enforced the view that 'if Ireland is hostile,
the Irish Coast Defences are useless to us. ,60 From bitter experience, the War Office
was never going to be convinced that the Free State could be made into an Imperial
parner, or be fully accepted as one.
The above study report came at a time when Whitehall, as evidenced by the Landing
agreement, was coming to terms with at least some of the implications for continuing
occupation. But there was a dea of strategic policy baggage to be very slowly
unpacked before the practical, if self-interested, advice of the War Office was ever
to be heeed. 
61 What relaxation there was from London stemmed largely from the
gradual easing of the Boundar Commission crisis throughout 1925; once the
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them as fixed and permanent British possessions.
3. Fighting a Losing Battle
. .. the presence of British Troops in those forts and a British Destroyer
in Cork Harbour is seriously damaging our prestige in the eyes of
Americans and other travellers ...
Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence,
Januar 1927.69
If the Free State was in any doubt that the Treaty Ports, especially Cobh, were stil
internationally regarded as 'British', then there was plenty to remind them. When the
former Minister of Defence, Richard Mulcahy, returned from an American trip at the
end of 1925, United States Lines gave him the option of only two landing cards at
Cobh - 'British' or 'Alien'. It was more in sorrow than in anger that this veteran of
the 1919-21 conflct reported the insult to his government,70 It was Mulcahy's old
deparment that had to bea the brunt of the continuing displays of Imperial rule, and
it was the Irish Army that had to observe, at close quarer during the enforced
shadowing patrols, the respect that foreign countries stil paid to the rituals of that
rule. Fort Camden, in Cork harbour, was stil the official British Flag Station in
Ireland, and it was traditional for foreign war ships entering the harbour to be saluted
by salvo from Camden and for them to return the salute to the Union Jack: 'King's
Regulations for the Army', and 'King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions', had
evidently not been affected by such passing matters as the Treaty and independence.71
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Matters first came to a head in the Summer of 1925, when the American battleship
U.S.S. Pittsburgh was due to make a high-level goodwil visit to Cobh. At External
Affairs, Desmond Fitzgerald was determined to make this a showcase for Free State
- U.S. relations by having an independent flag and gun-salute for the visiting admiral,
but all this scheme led to was embarassed diplomatic tussles in Washington, London
and Dublin. The main problem was over the international recognition of the
Tricolour: the Americans were sympathetic, to the point of secretly suggesting that
Fitzgerald try and cajole the British, but Washington could do nothing without
London's approval, and there the Admiralty was being less than co-operative. In the
end, it seems that the situation was saved by the personal intervention of Amery, who
suggested the simultaeous dipping of the Tricolour and a Union Jack, 'however
small' it might be.72
In London this may have seemed a passing and somewhat theatrical incident, though
neither External Affairs nor Defence seemed inclined to let it go. In any event, by
the following Summer the British O.C. at Spike Island was disconcerted enough to
raise the whole question of the saluting practice with Southern Command at
Devonport, with the result that the War Office, if not the Admiralty, was willng to
come to a mutual understanding after consultation with the Irish government. Again,
the Irish appeaed to be makng piecemea and peaceful progress towards gaining
further control in their own terrtory, and in this instace it seems they had the
disguised blessing of the War Office and the continuing attention, at least, of the
United States government; the U.S. Consul at Cobh questioned the protocol of the
subject with G.O.C. Southern Command at the end of 1926, and in turn the Irish
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External Affairs Department was consulted on this development. 73
But all this manoeuvring came to nothing. As often happens, a specific issue can
become absorbed within the wider politic, and in this case External Affairs and
Defence had to await the outcome of the Imperial Conference of 1926, and the
scheduled Coasta Defence review, 'in the hope' that these would transform the entire
question of future British occupation.74 As the following chapters wil show,
however, this was not to be. Little of consequence to defence was raised at the
Imperial Conference, and a preliminar technical conference, in the Spring of 1927,
ended in a complete breakdown with London as to any full Coasta Defence review.
As far as the Cobh situation mattered, and it had mattered to the Irish ever since the
Treaty negotiations of December 1921, it was back to square one.75 But if External
Affairs now appeared hesitat, the paricular saluting issue clearly remained
something of an emblem to the Free State Army, and the case history of the Flag
Station was put back to the Executive Council in June 1927. The Defence submission
argued that it was 'a very undesirable position from the points of view of national
dignity and international courtesy.' It was desired that salutes should be replied to by
Soarstat forces:
and not by a detachment of foreign troops stationed on the Coast as a
temporar arrangement. Acquiesence in the British returning the
salutes would not promote recognition by foreign States of the
country's independence. In regard to the flag it is further essential that
salutes should be exchanged in mutual compliment to the Tricolour...
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The Executive Council was requested to press for the abandonment of a British Flag
Station, in order that its Free State replacement could be organised at Dun Laoghaire
(formerly Kingstown) harbour, nea the capita.76 But in view of the disastrous
technical conference a few months earlier, and with it the virtual end of hope for a
full Coasta Defence review, this was probably not the best time for Defence to push
for a solution; indee it is difficult to see how Cosgrave could have pursued it in the
resultat frosty atmosphere of defence relations with Britan. With the agreement of
the Defence Minister, Hughes, who was almost certnly a messenger rather than the
architect of the Army's grievance, it was decided that the proposal be 'temporarly
withdrawn' .77
This decision no doubt reflected the faint hope that Britain might be forced to re-open
coast/coasta defence negotiations in order to retain minimum goodwil. That
relations at Cobh were allowed to worsen was later to become obvious: by 1929,
C.in C. Devonport, reacting to reports from his ships' captans, had had enough of
the Free State's 'lack of courtesy and the ignoring of traditional ceremonies and
customs', and requested the Admiralty to remove the entire Irish Flotila in protest,78
As wil be seen in the final chapter, the Dominions Office and the Admiralty had
indeed become somewhat unnerved by the breakdown of negotiations, and by early
1928 Amery was attempting to harness a growing Service wish to compromise on
British occupation. Mentioning Irish attachment to Cobh, Amery attempted to gain
C.LD. approval for the complete handover of these defences, only to have the subject
dismissed out of hand by Churchil.79
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Again, Amery's attempt to get a partial settlement may have been related to his
doubts concerning a current, and unilateral, review by the Irish Defence Department
of its security commitments at the British bases, the first since the 1924 agreements.
The reason given for the review was the 'steadying political situation' within the
country, although it could not have escaped attention that with the collapse of any
comprehensive settlement with Britan, it was certnly time to tae stock of a liabilty
which had no end in sight. 
80 The review findings were interesting in that they could
be read as a political assessment as much they could a purely milita one. The
Army may have tried to push the politics of British 'in-charge' rights too far in
mid- 1927, but now, in ealy 1928, could be detected a new unity of purpose between
Defence and the Executive Council: that purpose was not to retreat, but to reaffirm
the Free State's presence and its vested interest in the future of its own territory.
The review proposals for Cobh ilustrate this point exactly. It was straightaway
recognised that there was no longer any likelihood of a 'wanton' attack by the LR.A.
on British forces, and therefore the 24-hour miltay guard at Haulbowline could be
replaced by an upgraded police complement. It was noted, however, that the milta
was stil protecting shore-leave paries, and that the presence of Irish Army patrols
tended for 'more settled conditions and relations between the civilan population and
the British Forces'. While no armed attack on British Forces was anticipated, the
point was further stretched by noting that 'a street row might easily develop into a
show of violence against British paries on leave', in which case it was felt that the
British would object to the withdrawal of this protection. It was also stressed that with
the Union Jack to be seen all around the harbour, on forts, destroyers and varous
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other ships and launches, the Irish uniform and flag simply had to stay, if only to
prevent foreigners and tourists from believing that Cobh was a British garson
town. 
81
It seems that this was exactly the form of expression that Cosgrave and External
Affairs wanted to hea, as Defence was reminded that the whole situation had now
come under policy direction and that affordable Irish troop evacuations were not to
be pre-empted. Cosgrave went on to advise Defence that the Free State had a 'clea
interest' at Cobh, and that of all the British garrisons, 'Cobh is the most importat
from our point of view'. This was in March 1928, and as such it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that these reactions were intended to spite the C.LD.'s very
recent rejection of Amery's compromise proposal. 
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The review proposals on Berehaven were also to be accepted, although here there was
stil a clear concern for the internal milta situation and the sheer remoteness of the
base. The Garda Chief Superintendent of West Cork did not want National troops
evacuated, and made it known that there were stil many arms dumps in the locality
and that 'Irregulars' were stil a 'menace to the State'. The British milita was
relatively secure on Bere Island, only visiting Castletownbere on shore leave twice
weekly, but it was considered that it was stil too much of a risk, in the short term,
to evacuate when the next neaest Irish miltary post was a hundred miles distant by
road. By the same token, it was recommended that the post at the Watervile cable
station be retaned, even though the situation had been 'quiet' enough for the
corresponding post at Valencia to have been already withdrawn some weeks earlier. 
83
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It is likely that the government had to react with a unique, and somewhat ironic,
sensitivity when dealing with Berehaven; as ealy as 1924 local commercial interests
had been vociferous about 'the disappearance of the English fleet', and the resultat
economic distress, and this pressure was to gain apace until in 1931 the 'Berehaven
Improvement Committee' was able to make the return of the Fleet an issue in the
national press. 84 No doubt to the government's relief, there appeas to have been no
such organised commercial sympathy for the British at Cobh or in the Lough Swily
area. Indeed, when in 1929 one of the three Patrol destroyers was removed from
Cobh, the Navy was surprised at the, first time, interest shown by the local press. 
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But the most surprising element in the Defence review was the recommendation, and
the apparent political acceptace, that the post at Buncrana (for the Lough Swily
forts) be evacuated forthwith. The President's Office made it known that although
'British troops in uniform are constatly in the vicinity of Buncrana ... It is not so
importat to "show the flag" in Buncrana as in Cobh', and it was suggested that on
this basis the Executive Council would probably approve the withdrawal. 
86 There
is no doubt that since the Boundar settlement of late 1925, and the collapse of
coastal defence taks, the Council found it uncomfortble to dwell on the permanency
of arrangements in this area. And yet, by the same token, it can be demonstrated that
this 'retreat' from Lough Swily was neither the result of complacency over the
general improvement in internal security, nor a simple case of concentrating resources
and attention at Cobh and Berehaven.
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At Buncrana in August 1927, a single, and seemingly minor shooting incident,
involving an armed British troop transport, was to expose just how much the Free
State stil questioned British transit across its terrtory, and just how indifferent the
British could be, both to those concerns and to the formal agreements that O'Duffy,
O'Higgins and the Executive Council thought they had gained in 1924-5. The detals
of the incident are here immaterial, but the politics which sprang from it are not.
Through the Garda, the Justice Department became immediately involved, informing
the President that the incident might have 'serious consequences' for future relations,
paricularly as the deparment was of the view that 'this armed party had no right to
be there at all'. It was suggested that the case be put straight to the Executive
Council in order that a full dispatch, requesting an immediate investigation and
report, might be sent to London. 
87 It was small wonder that there was some
agitation over the incident: no one wanted to be left holding the tatters of supposed
agreements that marked the only visible progress on British forces occupation since
1922.
But Cosgrave had to see the situation differently, not least because the government's
confidence had been shaken all round by the assassination of the Vice-President,
Kevin O'Higgins, only a month earlier. With the one man that the British really
trusted now gone, and with the hasty introduction of another Public Safety Act, this
was hardly the time to remind the British that they had agreed to restrict their defence
operations to unarmed essential movements. 
88 In confidence, Cosgrave advised
External Affairs that he wished the matter to be broached with the then Dominions
Office 'in a more or less informal manner', and through the offices of the High
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Commissioner in London. Evidently under pressure from his own ministers, he
admitted that the incident should be dealt with by dispatch, and yet he felt that 'in
view of the Cobh occurrence and any danger of recurrence it is considered that the
informal method of approach would be better in this case. ,89 Was it as much the
memory of London's clinical response to the stad made over the 'second' Cobh
incident that prompted this reaction? But that the Irish again felt that they had right
on their side, over an incident where it was held that British troops had again stated
firing for no licit reason, was evident from the instructions given to McNeil in
London: he was advised that Cosgrave regarded the matter as 'very serious', and that
he was to stress to the Dominions Office 'the necessity of an immediate
investigation. '90
Although Amery complied, the general background to the incident was going to
revea few surprises in London. That British forces had been deliberately ignoring
the letter of the Treaty, and the spirit of later agreements, was known at the highest
level: Worthing ton Evans had himself informed a sub-committee of the C.LD. in
1926 that although 'in theory' troops were confined to the adjacent areas of the
several forts, 'Actually, this restriction is not adhered to and passage of troops taes
place continually between the various posts at each defended port. ,91 He might have
added that this stil meant progress at wil between Northern Ireland and the South,
and that this was by no meas restricted to 'essential' journeys: another minor
incident involving British troops, in 1929, was to show that there had been continuous
traffic, for purely recreational purposes, between Londonderr and Lough Swily, and
that the local Garda was hard pressed to counter the community friction that this was
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causing.92 None of this, however, was to surface in the War Office's investigation
of the Buncrana incident; adhering strictly to the detals of the incident itself, McNeil
was duly advised that the War Office was satisfied that the shooting was accidenta
and that it considered the matter closed. 
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In fact, the War Office had not exactly helped matters by simply trusting to a report
by G.O.C Northern Ireland, a copy of which McNeil forwarded to Dublin.
Whichever way this report might be interpreted, it gave no indication that British
transports had only recently been re-armed (in view of the Public Safety Act), or that
the G.O.C. was aware of, or concerned for, past agreements.94 External Affairs was
satisfied neither with the report itself nor the War Office response, and McNeil, in
one of his last acts before being appointed Governor General, suggested that the
incident should be made the subject of a full dispatch. It was not to be: as External
Affairs had finally to advise Cosgrave, the reaity was that this 'would imply that we
did not accept the War Office report' .95 The level of impotence was the same, but
this time there was going to be no repeat of the 1924 humilation, and there was
going to be no point in tempting fate and retaining Free State milta posts in the
area - not while the British continued to arm their transports and travel at wil.
While the British command in Northern Ireland had their own security doubts, and
while there was insistence on fully operational coast defences, it was going to be
impossible to honour agreements in full and restrict the impact of the British presence
to a level that an already hard-pressed Irish government thought tolerable. Important
though it was, there was more to the question than armed British transports, and in
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fairness the Irish were not seeking to find obstructions wherever possible; in order
to facilitate essential traffic to Lough Swily they had, for example, agreed to waive
the nee for British milta drivers to have Free State licences.96 No, the core
problem was in getting the British to recognise that there were limits beyond which
the nee of strategic defence visibly undermined Irish independence, and actually
fuelled republican unrest.
Again in relation to Lough Swily, Patrick McGiligan, in one of his first forays with
External Affairs, had typified this wider doubt when, in 1926, he baulked at the first
Dominions Office request for troop landing permits. 
97 The permits were required
in order that Royal Artilery troops could resurvey gun-sight datum points around the
Donegal coast, but McGiligan believed there was more to the request than met the
eye, and queried the 'prejudicial effect' that agreement might have on the Free State
claim to secure territorial waters. He also warned his colleagues that
'misunderstading' as to its object was possible, urging that if permission had to be
given then public notices should be posted 'so as to obviate or lessen apprehension
in Donegal' .98
This last point, though valid, was very much clutching at straws, and there were, as
the Attorney General realised, no sustanable grounds for refusal. 
99 In this instace
the British were in line with the Treaty and within the letter of the 1925 Landing
agreement, and if there were hidden problems then there was nothing to be done with
them. It is probable that Irish ministers were not even aware of the existence of these
datum points, yet they would now have to accept that the Admiralty had produced
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another legitimate reason for naval vessels to have unrestricted access to Irish waters.
At a time (prior to the expected Coastal Defence review) when the Irish could have
expected some easing of miltay rigour, in respect of the Free State assuming its own
'share' of responsibilties, this measure was also a shar reminder of the Admiralty's
planning for permanent occupation. For its part, the Dominions Office may also have
had good reason, beyond that of showing initial respect to the 1925 agreement, to
elevate a minor and technical matter to dispatch status. When the permits were
granted, as they had to be, then a precedent would arse whereby future landing
requests, for whatever reason, might become a mere formality. The question arses
as to whether the Dominions Office and the Admiralty saw this as more of a political
test case than as a technical and milta necessity; the Irish Attorney General had
finished his deliberations over the original Landing order only in Februar, and this
first landing request had come less than two months later. 
ioo McGillgan may well
have been correct in thinking that there was more to this seemingly trivial matter than
met the eye.
In all, it can be argued that the imperial mind could see little difference between
upholding the Treaty Ports as visible symbols of Empire, and maintaning them as
essentials to defence. Fine dividing line though it was, the Irish had found it
increasingly difficult to accept this situation, and even though hopes of resisting the
impact of occupation had been partly met (as a direct result of the 1924 Cobh
outrage), the politics and principles involved had proved incapable of piecemeal
resolution. The only answer to both Irish and British suspicions was a comprehensive
settlement that would cement future defence relations; this, and previous chapters,
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have constructed a picture of how difficult, if not impossible, that task would be, but
the wider political and miltary reasons why the review, which had been scheduled
in the Treaty for this very purpose, was never to tae place must now be examined
in detaL.
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CHAPTER 7 THE CONFRENCE THAT NEVER WAS (PART ONE).
1. Preparig The Way
The most urgent matter in the development of our Coasta Defence
Scheme is the tang over of the Harbour Defences at Lough Swily,
Berehaven and Cobh. The tang over of these defences definitely
puts us on the road to complete control of our Coasta Defence.
Lt. Gen. Peadar MacMahon, Chief of Staff,
to Executive Council - March 1926.1
The one thing that could be said of the scheduled Coasta Defence Conference, due
to be held in December 1926, was that there would be a definite attempt to see it
convened. The problems of convention were as nothing compared to those that might
arse if either, or both, countries chose to forget this Treaty commitment. Despite
the general mellowing of relations by 1926, it was stil the Treaty and its aricle
numbers that dictated affairs, and if any major part of it was claimed to have been
abrogated then the whole stood to be nullfied. Thus, by numbers, the sections dealing
with the Boundar and finance had been settled (if more by high politics than
technical discussion), and now it was the turn of Article 6 - the last, but arguably not
least, of the major points of settement.
In almost every preceding chapter of this thesis, pointed reference has been made to
the defence related areas which remained in dispute and/or needed settlement if a
wider trust was to ensue. But whether, for example, it was London's fear of the
legality of retaning defence property, or Dublin's fear of re-encroachment by the
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British miltay, it was plain that any Conference was going to have to confront
differing visions of Irish independence. This was not what the imperial mind had
envisaged when the Treaty was signed in December 1921, although the crux, some
five years later, was whether Britan could insist stil on the purity of its defence
concerns. As seen in the previous chapter, the summer of 1925, culminating in Leo
Amery's extraordinary visit to Dublin, had witnessed some quid pro quo defence
arangements that can be said to have presaged the flexibilty that would be necessar
in any planning for the Conference. To hold the coming Conference to a strict Treaty
agenda, after demonstrating that the basis for British occupation was negotiable, was
to court disaster.
Yet to what extent, during the five intervening years had, firstly, the Free State
specifically prepared for the 1926 Conference? It was hardly surprising that the Irish
had many loyal citizens who were expert in naval matters (namely past and present
members of the Royal Navy), and who were wiling to advise on jumping the Treaty
gun. Indee, as ealy as July 1922 Army G.H.Q. had contacted one Louis Brady,
Assistant Harbour Master, Dublin, and National Assessor to the High Court of
Admiralty, regarding the organisation of a coasta naval force. Brady claimed to have
made his first approach on this subject in August 1921, a month after the Truce, and
saw himself assembling a fleet of ex-Royal Navy steam trawlers that might one day
expand to include destroyers.2 But there is no evidence that the then Provisional
Government was looking seriously at this premature offer, if only because it was
more concerned, at this stage, in examining the exact legal implications of Articles
6 and 7 of the Treaty.
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By March 1922, Hugh Kennedy, then Legal Adviser to the Provisional Government,
was already busy looking at the small print of the Treaty Annex. Seeking, primarly,
to isolate the limitations of Britan's need of 'Imperial Defence', especially in the use
of wireless stations, he nonetheless made a general legal observation that was to have
great influence on Dublin's thinking in the years to come. He concluded:
But the last words of Article 7(b) indicate a further limitation on the
Convention mentioned in the' Annex'. These words, in my opinion,
show that the Imperial Forces and Defence referred to in Article 7 are
the same as mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty, namely, the Imperial
Forces undertang the defence by sea of Great Britan and Ireland
unti the Irish Free State undertes her own coasta defence3 .... (see
Appendix IJ
Kennedy was certnly not confusing Articles 6 and 7, and yet it is evident that the
legal mind saw a conjunction, one with the other. Put another way, the rather
obvious connection that any lay person would have made between the development
of coasta defence and Britan's retention of the Treaty Ports (plus others in
emergency) did have foundation; this is exactly what the Admiralty had feared when
in December 1921 it had challenged the actual wording of the Treaty defence clauses
as being too obscure.4 As yet, Kennedy was providing only background information,
though this serious deliberation, together with Collns' s more cavalier approach to the
Ports during the civil war, tended to confirm that Dublin saw the bitter disputes of
the 1921 Treaty defence negotiations as 'unfinished business'. Kennedy doubtless
saw a long legal road ahead, though Collns, as with his attitude to the Treaty in
general, probably regarded the handing over of the Ports as inevitable, all par of the
rapid march to complete freeom.
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After Collns's death, however, his successors trod firmer ground, and at the
beginning of 1923 had advanced Irish rights, under Article 6, to an active Revenue
and Fishery Protection fleet of armed trawlers. Again, it was seen previously that
the Admiralty had objected forcibly to this deployment, though the object here is to
pursue what happened to this promising assertion of independence after the Admiralty
had backed down.5 This had been the first chance to build on the concept of coasta
defence, to devise strategies for the peacetime and emergency uses of armed vessels,
and to impress on a sceptical Admiralty that the Free State had the wherewithal to
handle naval matters. But within months of the (technically bankrpt) State paying
out a substatial sum for twelve such trawlers, the Defence Deparment, to whom
operational control had been given, was in trouble and asking for inter-departmental
help. According to Defence there was no clea definition of the 'type of work
necessary to be done by these vessels', nor of the number of vessels neeed to do it;
in a tellng memorandum to the Executive Council, of September 1923, it was
claimed: 'We would never have suggested purchasing twelve Trawlers and setting up
a Naval establishment such as we now have if it were not for the necessity and special
circumstances of controllng the coast and of despatching troops by water to the
different pars of the coast.,6
Quite plainly, the trawler purchases had been pressed for in the light of existing
problems, rather than future hopes. Perhaps it was inevitable that Free State Army
would give priority to mopping up operations at the end of the civil war, although this
raises the question of whether the government was in a position, at any time during
1923, to give adequate attention to an externally related issue, especially with a
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general election in the offing. Assuming that these trawlers comprised, in
themselves, a 'Naval establishment' (which they most certnly, as yet, did not) this
same Defence memorandum then reached its main point:
The expenditure in the upkeep of the boats and in the keeping of the
crews, and in the general administration of the marne service is likely
to be very costly - it would be more satisfactory, and more
administratively healthy to get rid of all those vessels, even if we had
to sta in two or three years' time to re-build the service.?
This was an alarming admission, with a clea inference that without adequate
co-ordinating action by the government, the Army was prepared to lay up these
trawlers, based at Dun Laoghaire and Haulbowline, and quietly forget about them.
It seems that this may well have happened: an inter-deparmenta meeting (of
Defence, Finance, Industry & Commerce and Fisheries) was aranged for ealy
October, but if it was held there is no clue as to its outcome, and the fate of these
vessels was never again referred to in later, more concentrated, planning for the 1926
Conference. 
8
There were, nevertheless, importt mitigations to this sorr performance. Firstly,
no matter how much Cosgrave may have wanted to dilute the Army's power, by
consideration of a proper naval administration, he was not in a position, politically
or financially, to do so, and throughout 1922-3 internal security was paramount. The
Irish Armed Forces did not as such officially exist until the Defence Forces
(Establishment) Order of October 1924. Secondly, the Army was no doubt sensitive
to the fact that any coasta protection service was, at this date, a dangerous leap into
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the unknown; in April 1923 Hugh Kennedy had bluffed the Admiralty when claiming
secure territorial waters, knowing that there was no clea idea of how legally to
enforce Revenue/Fishery infringement by British or foreign vessels. 
9 An
inter-deparmenta committee was formed to clarfy the subject, and in October 1923
an Irish submission to that yea's Imperial Conference received a sympathetic, if
non-committa, hearing. It seems that whereas the Admiralty continued to see a
threat to its own interests, the Colonial Office saw little harm in recruiting an Irish
stick to help beat off French and other continenta Fishery violations in home
waters.1O It has been seen that in 1924 the latter co-operated with the Free State over
the Trawling in Prohibited Areas Act, though the Irish Attorney General stil thought
it better to instigate some test cases before progressing further. 11 On this matter the
Irish certanly neeed friends: the French, for one, refused to recognise Free State
territorial waters, and the head of the French Fishery Patrol Service had even made
a remonstration visit to Dublin. 
12
It was a measure of how little legal consideration had been given to Article 6 of the
Treaty, that neither London nor Dublin dared look too closely into the murk of
terrtorial waters. And it was not just a question of foreign entanglement, as a
concurrent 1923 court case in Northern Ireland was about to demonstrate. Publicity
had been given to the prosecution of the owners of a pleasure boat, the S. S.
Greyhound, over the ilegal sale of alcohol when cruising Belfast Lough, this despite
the intention of the company concerned to defend the action on the grounds that the
Northern Ireland courts had no jurisdiction over coastal waters. In September 1923,
however, the case was finally, and mysteriously, dropped.
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The Free State Defence Deparment took a keen interest in this affair, and in its
outcome. According to Commandant Whitmore of the Intellgence Branch, there was
an excellent case for claiming that, under the Treaty, the coastal waters around the
six counties did indee come within the jurisdiction of the Free State. On legal
advice, the same inter-deparmenta committee that was anyway discussing this topic
decided not to pursue this line, though very shortly after it had submitted its final
report, in June 1925, Whitmore approached the Director of Intellgence with further
news of the Greyhound case. According to an un-named 'reliable source' , the former
Irish Attorney General, Sir Denis Henry, K.C., had advised Belfast that the Free
State might well have technical claim to the waters in question, and had doubted if
even the House of Lords could find in Northern Ireland's favour. This same source
claimed that in order to avoid further embarassment, Sir James Craig had then
personally intervened in the case. 
13
Here was another acute, if not impossible, obstacle to the furtherance of coasta
defence planning. The legalities of this case, though interesting, were bound to be
commanded by politics; there was enough strife in the offing over a Boundar
Commission delineation of the land Border without adding a further explosive
dimension. In blunt terms, regardless of the Free State's justification to secure
territorial waters, neither Craig nor Baldwin's government was going to allow this
episode to conspire against Northern Ireland's status. On the contrar, this status was
being enhanced in terms of naval, as well as miltary and para-miltay,
determination: with the arival of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve cruiser H.M.S.
Caroline, at permanent base at Belfast, some sections of the Free State press saw fit
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to note 'The first ship of the Ulster Navy' .14 As such, Cosgrave had to tread warily
and it was hardly surprising that the final report of his inquiry committee should note
that '... the position as it stads is altogether too indefinite for practical administrative
purposes', and recommend that relations with Britan and other powers be submitted
to further consideration by legal advisers. 
15 Thus after two years' internal
deliberation the Free State's terrtorial claims were no further forward, and she would
have to approach the detaled planning for the Coasta Defence Conference without
even the basic points of reference having been clarfied.
Alled to this dilemma, was the international friction likely to be caused by martime
use of the Tricolour, in defiance of London's wishes. As there was never a
suggestion, in any Free State quarer, that the Irish would be wiling to adopt a
variation of the Ensign, in accordance with other Dominions, then any future coasta
service stood to be humilated by non-recognition.16 This trap of both detal and
principle was reaL. To have asked London to consider an agree framework of
principles, prior to the Conference proper, would have been to prejudice the holding
and possible outcome of the same, and yet to go to the Conference with such points
outstading would be to advertise the basic weakesses of the Irish position. In terms
of the now redundant armed trawler fleet, the Defence Deparment was as much a
victim of these basic weaesses as it was a possible obstacle to the development of
a competent naval service.
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The Army did not, however, seek a tota abdication of responsibilty for naval
matters, and there were those in its senior ranks who had both the wil and expertise
to try again. Shortly after the spring 1924 'mutiny', the Adjutat General attempted
to promote, internally, the coasta defence planning of one of his own G.H.Q. staff,
a Captain James Johnston. Having had relevant service with the Royal Navy until
1919, Johnston had prepared a detaled memorandum on the 'Formation of a Coasta
Marine Service', in which he calculated that the Free State could operate a light
cruiser and a fleet of 'P' (Patrol) boats for a tota outlay of just over £250,000 per
annum. This figure was based on expected, low cost, donations of surplus Royal
Navy vessels and, notwithstading the above political impasse, coasta patrols
covering 800 miles within a 3-mile terrtorial limit. The Adjutat General was so
taen with the thoroughness of Johnston's calculations that he tried to impress on
G.a.c. Army that 'this figure wil provide us with not a "Comic Opera" Navy,
composed of old trawlers and unseaworthy Motor Launches, but a highly efficient
little fleet of modern up-to-date War Vessels.' Quite clealy, the armed trawler
episode had left its mark. 17
Though nothing came of this scheme, Johnston persevered with further plans during
1925 and, by mid 1926, had produced an even more elaborate scheme wherein the
Free State's 'Naval Defence Force' nees were compared to those of other, more
established, Dominions. Unfortunately, however, whereas his loyalty and expertise
was not in doubt, his political acumen was somewhat suspect; in presuming the
country's position in the event of another Europea war, Johnston went as far as to
venture that the 'aspirations of the nation' would not allow tota dependence on the
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Imperial Navy without 'lending a hand either materially or by contribution', and he
believed that an annual financial contribution towards the upkeep of the Royal Navy
was an option. Makng a primar issue of these points was not so much irrelevant
as naive, and with almost every phrase Johnston betrayed a background, steeped in
Empire tradition, that would not have endeaed him either to his own General Staff
or the Executive CounciL. 18
Johnston is interesting precisely because he, and his schemes, did not become central
to the Irish planning for the 1926 Conference, despite his evidently being one of the
most technically qualified persons in this field. 
19 The question that he, and no doubt
others of similar Navy experience, could not hope to press was the concept of coasta
defence as an extension of a general defence policy and, in turn, of national identity.
Indeed, it was for Peadar MacMahon, the Chief of Staff, to submit this exact question
to the Executive Council in March 1926, as par of the first detaled considerations
for the coming Conference; in so doing he was largely reiterating the views of the
Defence Council which had first been submitted to the Executive Council in July
1925. The primar question remained thus:
The problem of our Defence, or par Defence, of our Coast by our
own forces can only be considered in the light of the policy in regard
to Defence in general which is being cared out, and the actual steps
which can be profitably taen towards assumption of that responsibilty
are largely dependent on the extent to which we have progressed in the
realization of our Defence Policy. 20
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The answer to this question was for the Executive Council and not MacMahon, and
it follows that it is importat to examine the extent to which the Free State had
achieved a coherent defence policy by early 1926. What is more, it is also importat
to examine how much of that policy may have been driven, or indee thwarted, by
the prospect of the scheduled 1926 Conference.
2. Ourselves Alone?
A nation which leaves its defence permanently to others, leaves the
responsibilty of that defence to others, by the very fact ceases to be
a nation and becomes a Protectorate.
Deputy Esmonde, Dail speech - May 1925.21
Although the development of the Free State's defence policy has been analysed
elsewhere, little attention has been given to the looming effect of Articles 6 & 7 of
the Treaty. 22 It said much for the core stabilty of the country that the Defence
Council was able, as ealy as July 1925, to present a comprehensive set of proposals
to the Executive Council, even if the transition from considerations of internal
security to those of possible external aggression proved daunting. However, these
proposals could not afford to ignore either the fact of the Treaty, or the Dail's
concern as to its defence provisions. The Dail Army Estimate vote of May 1925
provided the first occasion when defence could be debated against a background of
near normality; between 1922-4 the Defence Deparment had consumed almost 30 per
cent of tota government expenditure and here was a real chance to rationalise this
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burden. 
23
But how to rationalise? There was a minority argument in the Dail that saw no need
for stading defence forces, given that Ireland's giant neighbour was committed to her
protection, but as the influential voice of Deputy E. Esmonde explained, such ideas
would break the 'spirit' of the Treaty and would reduce the country 'to a position of
slavery and dependence.' There was condemnation that Defence was the only
department without a stated policy objective, and Esmonde for one believed that it
was essential that policy be announced 'with regard to Article 6 of the Treaty, and
that he (Defence Minister P. Hughes) should orient his whole defence policy with the
object of dealing .... with the situation which wil be created when that Article comes
to be fulfilled in 18 months' time.,24 Behind such pressure was the, probably
accurate, suspicion that the government was driftng towards an entirely insular
defence policy, and it was noted that on the day previous to this Dail debate (13th
May), Desmond Fitzgerald, the External Affairs Minister, had informed a conference
of the League of Nations that the Free State was indeed seeking to reduce its Army
to a size compatible with internal order only. 25 What is more, as the historian Ronan
Fanning has indicated, the recent appointment of the nondescript Hughes as Defence
Minister told of the wish to demote the sphere of Army operations and influence.26
Interestingly, the Dail 'opposition', in the shape of Thomas Johnston, the Labour
leader, seemed to accept that defence policy had to revolve around the coming Article
6 Conference, though, as Johnston argued, this did not mean that the country should
'embark upon a scheme of defence which wil necessitate submarnes, or men-of-war
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ships, or mines in the sea, or chemical warfare and a great number of aeroplanes. '
In reply for the government, Hughes was non-committa, yet in confirming, for the
first time, that policy would keep 'that aricle of the Treaty in mind', he had also to
admit that the government had not as yet considered the matter and had no idea as to
whether a 'small scale' coasta defence force was feasible.27
That opportunity came, as mentioned, some two months later with the Defence
Council submissions. The three basic policy options were (in brief): 1) the gradual
assumption of entire internal and external defence nees; 2) forces as integral par of
Imperial British forces, and 3) concentration only on internal order and abandonment
of external matters to Britan. To what extent the phrasing of these supposedly
equally weighted alternatives was engineered, to produce a politically necessar
compromise around options 1 & 2, is a matter of conjecture,28 but what is certan is
that the policy schedule subsequently issued by the Executive Council, in November
1925, was designed to evade an ealy Article 6 commitment. With explicit reference
to the coming Conference, the schedule concluded:
Until this review has taken place it is not practicable to tae any
special steps other than to ensure that if co-operation with British
forces should become necessar at any time, the personnel of the Irish
Army would be capable of efficient co-operative action ...29
In theory, this document could/should have defined the likely extent to which the Irish
would be wiling to tae a 'share' of coasta defence, but the fact that it most
pointedly did not was to create a circular impasse. As seen, the Chief of Staff was
later to state that coasta defence policy was dependent on the direction of an overall
202
defence policy, and yet from the end of 1925 it was clear that the settled direction of
the latter would depend upon the Article 6 review a yea hence.
It cannot, however, be argued that the only point in issuing this defence schedule was
to placate internal criticisms. For the first time the principle, if not the mechanics,
of Irish neutrality was enshrined, and as such the above defence impasse has itself to
be seen in a wider political context. The key wording in the schedule stressed that
an 'independent national force' should be capable of full co-operation on Saorstat soil
'whether against actual hostilties or against violation of neutrality on the part of a
common enemy.'30 In his recent and critical assessment of Ireland's historical
commitment to the concept of neutrality, Trevor C. Salmon notes this as an 'oblique'
reference, designed merely to 'keep that option open', and points to the contrasting
emphasis placed on full co-operation with the British. But was this really an 'oblique'
reference? For a supposed Dominion to have expressed this word in any mid- 1920s
context was almost inconceivable, and although the Free State had been granted
existing Dominion practice, in that it could withdraw from 'active' participation in
an Imperial war, this was a nicety that was far removed from the concept of
neutrality. The Irish knew, and Salmon himself acknowledges, that the Imperial
parliament had been assured that even the suggestion of 'passive' paricipation by the
Irish had been ruled out by the Treaty defence provisions. In this context the Irish
defence schedule can be said to have cleverly differentiated between the reality of
British rights and the abhorrence of having to accept them.31
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It is on the rocks of this last point that most comparative analyses of the Irish
situation must eventually founder - whether they be in terms of 'other' Dominions,
or, in the case of Trevor C. Salmon, the absolutes of Western neutrality definition
as evolved by countries such as Sweden or Switzerland. None of these countries had,
per force, the troops and bases of a great power within their territory, and none were
deemed central to the 'Home' defence of an imperial power. In previous chapters it
has been seen that from 1922 onwards Dublin had spent much time and energy in
resisting the British in many defence related areas, and had forced an awareness that
outwith the Treaty Ports and the Border their forces were unwelcome; by 1925 the
British had agreed explicitly (Landing agreement) to curtl all unnecessar
movements of forces. If, therefore, the defence schedule reference to neutrality can
be accused of being 'oblique', then it was at least timely and consistent within the
Free State's own unique terms of reference.
Unfortunately, the comparative lack of research on the Cosgrave years has allowed
the stae perceptions of this period, as being atypical of the later struggles of de
Valera and Fianna Fail, to continue. Salmon himself predicates his brief inquiry of
this earlier period on the inherited idea that 'For the first ten years of the new state's
life, policy makng was in the hands of supporters and sympathizers with the
Treaty. '32 Such simplistic predications on this period are no longer tenable, as
Brendan Sexton's recent study of the Governor -Generalship system makes clear, 33 and
of more relevance to this thesis is the astute observation of the historian Ronan
Fanning - that in the wording of the 1925 defence policy 'the continuities with the
realities of 1939-45 are striking'. In other words, in terms of defence and neutrality
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de Valera's achievements had their foundations in the Cosgrave years.34
Whereas from 1932 de Valera was to have the bolster of the Statute of Westminster,
the daring of the Executive Council in 1925 was of a different order. Nevertheless,
the ability to phrase the defence policy in terms that would not cause immediate alarm
and protestation in London had to be guarded, and it was probably as well that the
government rejected the additional Defence Council advice that 'friendly and intimate'
defence relations should be established with the U.S.A., France and Germany. 
35 But
there could be little ambiguity as to the sentiment of neutrality and, as Panning again
makes clear, the Defence Council's proposals assumed the maintenance rather than
the introduction of the concept. 36 Once, therefore, the Executive Council confirmed
the establishment of an 'independent national force', the political framework within
which preparations for the Coasta Defence Conference could tae place had narrowed
cònsiderably - how was the Free State to 'share' its coasta responsibilties when there
were now overriding preconditions?
Thus when, as mentioned, Peadar MacMahon re-affrmed the Saorstat s defence
considerations, in March 1926, he could state with confidence that:
There appear to be strong reasons why our Government should
endeavour to secure that the Coasta Defence of its own territory
should be its own responsibilty. To logically exploit the Defence
Policy ... it is necessar that we should be able to safeguard our
shores without the presence within our terrtory of the armed forces of
another Power ... While we hold our own Coastlne it is not likely to
become the theatre of operations of the violent and primar nature
which would be likely to develop here were England maintaning
extensive or vita forces and were she engaged with a powerful
enemy.37
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The Chief of Staff believed that financial considerations also favoured this approach,
reminding the government that in any coming emergency the British would probably
instal defence organisations 'far in excess of what is necessary and economical for
the Defence of Ireland. That we wil be asked to at least share in the Bil of Costs
is certn, and that the extent of our liabilties would be a bone of contention is
likely. ,38 Here there was no favour granted even to the defence of the British Isles
per se, but while this could be interpreted as a cynical exploitation of the fact that
Britan would have to defend, come what may, the seaward approaches to Ireland,
it was also a logical adjunct to neutrality. What was not so logical, however, was
MacMahon's bullsh optimism on British attitudes to the Treaty Ports:
The tang over of these defences definitely puts us on the road to
complete control of our Coasta Defence. It is presumed, but is
probably a matter for legal consideration, that these defences wil be
handed over without charge by the British Government ... The
garrison for these defences should be organised as soon as possible.39
It was not just Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swily that came within this sweep: it
was envisaged that the harbours of Dublin, Waterford and Sligo would also need
defending as par of a combined land, naval and aerial coasta defence network.
Given the existing internal milita and economic situation of 1926, this might seem
to be a compounding of arogance, and yet the Army had few ilusions about the
future capacity to expand a coasta service into a sea-going naval force. In contrast
to the ealier schemes of the said Capt. Johnston, it was seen that, at best, a small
submarne force might eventually aid the efforts of light coasta craft, and it was
understood that the latter would have to double as Revenue and Fishery Protection
206
vessels in peacetime. It is probable that such a programme, to be financed over
several years, was feasible.40
But all plans would have to revolve around the key issue of gaining control of the
defences at the Treaty Ports, with the obvious implication that Articles 6 & 7 of the
Treaty had to be judged as conjoined. Hugh Kennedy, as seen, had made a legal
connection as early as 1922, and even the otherwise distrusted expert views of Capt.
Johnston assumed that all coasta batteries would be linked through his 'Naval
Defence Force. ,41 If the Executive Council did indeed want to hold fire on the
politics of this point, then this was the time, in ealy 1926, to give a clea signal to
the Army chiefs. All the latter required at this stage was government approval 'on
the general principles as outlined', but in the event the Executive Council queried
only minor technical points and, in May, decided that decisions would be held over
pending submission of full Establishment and Estimates tables. It was significant,
however, that when the same were produced by the Minister of Defence in July, only
five months before the scheduled bi-Iateral Conference, his report was headed
'Coasta Defence - Articles 6 & 7 of the Treaty.' With politics now conspiring with
technical nee, it seemed that a possible collsion course with Britan had been set.42
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3. Meanwhile in London ...
. .. the Admiralty must always retan control of the local naval defence
of the Irish Free State so that they may be in a position to carr on
whether the Irish Free State provides active assistance or not.
Admiralty to C.LD. on war contingency -
August 1926.43
In contrast to the intensity of preparations in Dublin, the initial approaches in London
to the coming Conference appeared suitably imperious. The first meeting of the
C.LD. Sub-Committee, formed, under Amery's chairmanship, to co-ordinate a
common Services policy, was held in July 1926 and it did not convene again, to any
effect, until December - some weeks after the decision to postpone the Conference
had been taen.
However, the lack of formal debate belied the amount of nervous 'Dublin-watching'
that had actually taen place. As ealy as September 1925, Worthington-Evans, the
War Secreta, had informed the C.LD. of his concern for the coming review.44 Not
only was it seen that the defence of 'certan' Irish ports had to be 'open to debate and
adjustment' (as par of the C.LD.'s ongoing Joint Committee review of all home and
abroad coasta defence - begun in March 1923),45 but it was thought to have been
made clea, as a result of the ealier mentioned Dail Army Estimate vote in May, that
the Irish now viewed Articles 6 & 7 as 'interdependent'. While the General Staff
maintaned their wish, from a 'purely miltay' stace, to see all the Free State
garsons evacuated, they had also to recognise the Admiralty's insistence on the
security of 'vita' Imperial communications. Therefore, Worthington-Evans required
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of the C.LD. an 'authoritative interpretation' of Articles 6 & 7 and from this a clear
expression of government policy. 46 The Admiralty, of course, was not slow to echo
this early alarm: a month later it too appealed to the C.LD. for a clear definition of
these Articles, reminding the same of the necessity of retaining all three Treaty Ports
after the scheduled Conference. 
47
It was plain that if Amery was to further his cherished ideal of Ireland, as a wiling
and welcomed Dominion, then he would have to respond quickly to these scares. But
having already exposed and overplayed the Dominion Office's hand, in regard to the
previously mentioned Naval Reserve question, it was equally clea that he would have
to manoeuvre with caution. 
48 Skirting around the implication of the
Worthington-Evans missive, in that the Articles 6 & 7 question should first be
reviewed by Law Officers, Amery provided the C.LD. with transcripts of the May
Dail debate and assured the Committee that there was nothing in them to suggest an
aggressive attitude. Further, he managed to persuade members that the factual
separation of the Articles was so 'beyond dispute' that the C.LD. could, with
confidence, discuss with the Irish the 'whole question of their naval, milita and air
defence.' With the support of Lord Birkenhead and Baldwin himself, Amery's views
were carried at the next full meeting of the C.LD. at the end of October. The
Dominions Office had won round one.49
It is importnt here to qualify what exactly Amery was trying to achieve. The
historian Paul Canning, in his general policy survey of this period, is quite correct
to emphasise that while Churchil and Maurice Hankey held influence over both the
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Cabinet and the C.LD., there was little scope for Irish sub-plots to develop into
serious dialogue. 
50 If only to protect his interests with the right-wing of the
Conservative pary, Churchil would strive to keep the Free State in its place and
ensure that the Treaty continued to be the ultimate settlement of relations between the
two countries; this together with Hankey's pure contempt for all Southern Irish
matters was enough to scotch most initiatives, and it would tae more than the
latter-day conversion of Birkenhead and the ambivalence of Baldwin to assuage the
Cabinet. If Chamberlain's Foreign Office suspicions of Ireland, and of Dominions
Office motives in general, are added to this picture then it is a wonder that Amery
managed any persuasion within the C.LD.51
The point, however, is that Amery's motives should not be subject to
over-abbreviation. Whereas Canning suggests that Amery's purpose was simply to
expand the debate to Article 7, it can be argued, not least from the points raised in
previous chapters of this thesis, that this was exactly the trap that Amery was trying
to avoid.52 The difference is small but importt: from the time he had taken charge
at the Colonial/Dominions Office his main Irish objective had been to move away
from the rigidity of the Treaty and its list of numbers in order to facilitate any
discussion of mutual interest. Therein was his idealistic mission to bring a wiling
Free State into the arms of the Empire. It can also be argued, especially in relation
to the actual train of thought in Dublin, that Amery was as much a victim of the
collective imperial mind as any of his more hostile colleagues, and yet it was he who
had brought things to the point where the holding of the scheduled Conference was
at least feasible. But for his courting of leading Free State figures, and his
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unprecedented 'bargaining' trip to Dublin in August 1925, defence relations might
have festered beyond recalL. It was, moreover, certan that if the two countries could
negotiate only in terms of strict, Admiralty led, definitions and Treaty Articles
(already dated by five years) then there was little chance of compromise.
Amery's chairmanship of the first meeting of the C.LD. Sub-Committee, in July
1926, ilustrated his real aims. While he comforted the representatives of all three
Services with the certnty that Britan would not be 'obliged' to venture beyond the
limitations of Article 6, he reaffrmed that the coming Conference would provide a
chance to discuss the 'whole question' of mutual defence needs, and not just the Free
State's share of coasta defence. As the Irish had been given general control of their
own affairs, Amery believed that there was little to be gained 'by insisting on
reservations on various matters of detal' , and he reminded the Services that with the
completion of the Boundar and financial settlements, defence matters were the last
great obstacle to more settled Anglo-Irish relationsY
But what Amery failed to convey was that these other major concerns had been
'settled' more by the dictates of high politics than technical discussion, and though
he had full C.LD. leave to tae this stace, his sentiments were somewhat wasted on
the, relatively junior, Service members of his Sub-Committee. Even so, if Amery
had been given the task of testing the limits of Service flexibilty then it did not tae
long to discover them; after some idle speculation on the Imperial status of any Irish
coastal craft, Geoffrey Whiskard, Amery's Dominion Office colleague, put the point
blank question: what line would the Services tae if the Free State wanted to take
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over the defences at the Treaty Ports? True to form, the Admiralty representative
rejected the idea out of hand, and in this he had the reluctant support of the War
Office member, who thought the idea 'premature'. It was notable that neither Amery
nor Whiskad attempted to mollify this view, nor venture that in line with 'open'
discussion the Free State was likely, and entitled, to raise this question.54
This first meeting of the Sub-Committee was importt in that it betrayed every
paradox in both the political and miltay situation. No sooner had the Admiralty
member reined in the discussion to the limits of Article 6, when the R.A.F. member
opened it up again to Article 7 and beyond. In as many words it was pointed out
that, in terms of new warfare technology and techniques, the existing defences at the
Treaty Ports were largely obsolete, and that soon extra land would be neeed for
aerodrome and sea-plane bases. To this the War Office added that it too would
require extra land for the placement of new armaments. As no one had a clear idea
of how far existing territorial land rights might extend at the Ports, Amery's
suggestion of tang this up with the Irish probably lacked confidence. Towards the
end of this meeting it had become clea that instead of discussing the retraction of
British forces and influence (even allowing for strict Article 6 limits), the topic had
changed to one of Imperial expansion. The Services were, of course, agreed that
Free State forces could be allowed no share or paricipation in this new
aggrandisement. Coming down to earth, however, the meeting ended with another,
politically necessary, contradiction: it was agree that the coming Conference would
have to be confined to Article 6 debate unless the Irish proved 'friendly'. In one
exploratory meeting, the British had gone full circle. 
55
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Despite the fact that Amery had given no sign of being able to break this circle, the
invited post-meeting comments to the full C.LD. were to show that the Admiralty
was more alarmed than ever. In August, the Admiralty again pointed to the inherent
contradiction between British rights under Article 7 of the Treaty and Irish rights to
'passive' war paricipation under Article 49 of the Constitution. Reminding the
C.LD. that the Free State was the only Dominion likely to tae advantage of this
constitutional exactness, the Admiralty insisted that even local naval defence would
'always' have to be under its direct control, regardless of the interpretation of 'share'
in Article 6.56
But having tried to undermine the very point of the Conference, the Admiralty too
found that it could not ignore its potential significance, nor its own wider interests.
Forgetting the aborted 1923 overtures,5? the C.LD. was advised that 'someday'
Britan would have to provide the Free State government with a list of the likely
demands to be made under Article 7 in any emergency. The coming Conference, it
was suggested, presented a 'good opportunity' to raise this matter, especially as
Britain's abilty to land armed forces in the Free State had been compromised by the
Irish Treasonable Offences Act of 1925 (and the corresponding Landing agreement).
In wartime, the Admiralty saw that Bantry and Berehaven would have to be
designated Special Defence Areas, and the Free State would be expected to draw up
a Defence of the Ream Act to cover this; in the meantime the Irish would have to
eamark office and living quarters for the large increase in British personnel that
would be expected in an emergency. In short, and despite its dogmatic rhetoric, the
Admiralty too neeed an open Conference where all aspects of mutual defence could
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be raised. But implicit here was an understading that there would be no room for
a two-way dialogue - for the Irish to be considered 'friendly' they would have to do
as they were told; as the Admiralty, in this instace, concluded: 'it is considered quite
sound in principle to depar from policy pursued in other Dominions.' How Amery
and the Dominions Office was supposed to cope with this 'principle' was not made
clear. 
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In contrast to the Admiralty, the War Office's first independent response to the
coming Conference, and to the July Sub-Committee meeting, was overladen with
practical and existing difficulties. 
59 It had, all along, felt obliged to spell out the
financial burden of upholding the Admiralty's demands, and perhaps one reason why
Baldwin and Birkenhead had supported Amery's aims was because both men had been
present at the C.LD. meeting in October 1925 when Worthington-Evans and Lord
Cavan (C.LG.S.) had noted that £150,000 was neeed to upgrade garrison
accommodation, on top of the £126,000 per annum neeed to upkeep Irish heavy
batteries. Cavan had suggested that drastic savings could be made if 'care and
maintenance paries' (as per the Treaty) were deployed instead of the 'full garrison'
actually in place,60 but when the Chiefs of Staff reported on the possibilty of
reductions, in June 1926, they could find little justification for this. Their main, and
predictable, objection was that the defences had to be guarded against 'marauding
bands or il-disposed individuals', and that while conditions had improved, the
possibilty of attack had not been 'completely removed' .61
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But did, by 1926, the outside chance of further attack really justify this reasoning?
The anomaly of Ireland does become striking when placed within the context of the
'radical economies', as the R.A.F. termed it, that marked most Service funding in the
1920s, and which became the more severe in the post-Locarno period. In terms of
'Home' defence, the Treaty Ports were now the only coasta defences with anything
like full establishment, and even the vital naval ports of Rosyth and Pembroke were
being reduced to tre 'care and maintenance' status; indee, the slow pace of the
C.LD.'s Joint Committee review of all Imperial coasta defence, which after some
three years was 'very far from complete', may have been influenced by this known
lack of resource. 
62 In this case, one has to question the purely political, as well the
miltay, motives that allowed for the already archaic Irish bases to be maintaned at
a unique leveL. This did not help the Services to focus on the wider realities when
considering the coming Conference: it was, for example, somewhat premature for the
R.A.F. to make elaborate plans for aerodromes and sea-bases in the Free State when
the government's air commitment, for 52 Home Defence squadrons by 1928, had
already been deferred to a 1936, at the earliest, completion date. Part of that wider
reality was that after the Locaro Pact of 1925 there was no conceivable threat from
a foreign power in home waters. 
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And yet, recent history and geo-politics did make the Irish situation unique,64 and
when it came to the crunch Amery had to protect some of his colleagues from their
own naivety. This was made plain at the end of July 1926 when the C.LD. met to
confirm the Joint Committee, and Chiefs of Staff, recommendation that, at least, the
'obsolete and badly sited' forts at the western end of Bere Island could be evacuated
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forthwith. Amery alone questioned the advisabilty of this, stating that a clear
understading of principle had first to be sought with the Free State, and that the
December Conference would provide the best opportunity to discuss this matter. His
point was that the validity of the Treaty Annex stood to be compromised, and in so
doing British forces might, in future nee, be deprived of re-occupying evacuated
territory. A frustrated Worthington-Evans believed that 'rather heavy weather was
being made over a very small matter', and a bemused Lord Balfour thought that use
of the phrase 'temporar withdrawal' would solve the problem. No doubt senior
members of the C.LD could afford to be indifferent to the possibilty of sending
confusing signals to Dublin, but Amery, with personal responsibilty for the coming
Conference, could not. Nevertheless, his waring was heeded and the evacuation was
approved only in principle, pending adjustments agreed between Amery and
Worthington-Evans.65
The problem for Amery was that this paricular objectivity might not have furthered
his overall negotiating position. The irony was that though he had lulled the C.LD.
into accepting the obvious, in that Article 6 debate must inexorably draw in all mutual
defence matters, he had also heightened an awareness of potential Irish hostility.
Worthington-Evans had rounded on Amery to the effect that if relations were that bad
then it did not matter what the War Office intended, and the impression may have
been given that serious talks with Irish were therefore pointless.66 In any event, the
differences between the two men were settled in the Dominion Office's favour by the
beginning of September. Beset with costing problems, and the archaic state of both
armament and accommodation at the Treaty ports, Worthington-Evans' only
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stipulation was that it was 'highly undesirable that conditions in these defences should
be allowed to continue as they are.' He agree to await the outcome of the December
Conference, and agreed also that any prior withdrawals might be interpreted as a
'technical surrender of our Treaty rights' .67
At every level the stakes for the December Conference were being raised, yet the
wider Amery was allowed to cast the net, the more difficult certan questions became.
Only at a subordinate level had the Dominions Office posed the question of Irish
rights and requirements, and Amery too had hidden behind the Treaty when nee
arose. But what rea protection did this offer? It has previously been seen that, in
1922-3, both the Colonial Office and Treasury had despaired of equating Britain's
defence rights and titles, under the Treaty, with the Free State's latent abilty to
exploit its Constitution,68 and this unease did not change over time. By October 1926
the Law Officers had concluded that, at the Treaty Ports, Britan's only rights were
to remain 'in charge', otherwise the lands 'would appea to have passed to the Irish
Free State subject to these limited rights.' As only legislation or agreement could
rectify this, and the politics was known to be sensitive, the Law Officers believed that
it was 'probably better to let sleeping dogs lie. ,69 But someone was going to have to
wake these dogs, and soon - the possibilty of the Imperial government going into a
'blind' Conference and being humilated could not be tolerated. It is in this context
that the scheduled Imperial Conference of 1926 took on great significance: here was
the one chance, only weeks before their bi-lateral undertng was due, for informal
meetings and understandings to be arranged. But was either country in a position to
take that chance?
CHAPlER 8
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THE CONFRENCE THAT NEVER WAS ( PART TWO ).
1. A Trial Run
The conduct of inter-Imperial relations is very largely a personal affair
and depends in no small measure on personal conduct and mutual
understading.
Address by Leo Amery to the Imperial
Conference - October 1926.1
The Imperial Conference of 1926, held in London between October 19th and
November 23rd, has been covered extensively by Irish and Commonwealth historians.
It has, quite properly, been seen as a milestone in the constitutional development of
the Commonwealth, the Balfour Report providing the foundation for the Statute of
Westminster in 1931. Indeed, so dominant were the constitutional issues of 1926 that
subsequent commentators have tended to neglect the contribution and approach that
the Free State made to other areas of debate, thus possibly inhibiting the emergence
of a more rounded picture of Irish-Commonwealth relations.
In 1969, David Harkness, in his The Restless Dominion, gave the effective impression
that the Free State was the subversive catayst of constitutional change at the Imperial
Conference, and though he failed to mention defence, it could be assumed that this
general agitation was sufficient to preclude sensitive Anglo- Irish discussion on more
specific issues. Beginning, however, with Hyam and Marin in 1975, there has been
a steady denial of the supposed disruptive influence of the Irish and it is now held that
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they too, notwithstading such minor constitutional disputes as 'O'Higgins Comma',
succumbed to the general sense of co-operation that was believed, especially by the
British, to have overten the Conference. Certnly the British viewed the two
principal Free State representatives, Kevin O'Higgins and Desmond Fitzgerald, as the
acceptable face of Irish independence, and Le Amery gave no indication that he was
concerned about their attitude. 
2 It may have been rather fanciful for Dominions
Office officials to later claim that de Valera himself might have submitted to the
'curious spirit of reunion', as the historian R.F. Holland terms it, that permeated
Conference proceeings, but if Maurice Hankey also believed that the Irish behaved
'decently' then there is little doubt that they were trying to co-operate.3
But it can be argued that the differing viewpoints concerning O'Higgins and
Fitzgerald, as to whether they led or followed the senior Dominions on constitutional
matters, actually tell us more about the Free State's growing confidence to
communicate with the wider world, than of its qualitative, and central, relationship
with Britan - as par of the Empire. Britan could afford to be generous on the
question of semantics, if, as the historian John Darin argues, she was supremely
confident that the 'substace' of her Imperial hold was unchanging. The news, for
example, of 'O'Higgins Comma' was greeted in both Westminster and Dublin with
indifferent silence. 
4
While such cumulative and principled advances were far from insignificant, of more
import to this thesis was the readiness of Britan and Ireland, in an informal
give-and-tae atmosphere, to make progress on the subject of the coming defence
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review. That the Dominion Office had hopes for this was made plain at the,
previously mentioned, first meeting of the C.LD. Sub-Committee in July 1926:
Geoffrey Whiskad had ventured that the problems with Article 7 of the Treaty might
be discussed jointly with the representatives at the Imperial Conference, an idea that
Amery approved of providing the Irish were 'friendly'. No doubt the thinking here
was that if the Irish probed the contradiction between Britan's continuing milita and
naval occupation of the Treaty Ports and the otherwise agree Imperial policy of
Dominion self-reliance in coasta defence, then the senior Dominion leaders might be
able to persuade them to accept that Britan's home defence was the bulwark of all
Empire security. 5
But in fact, by July, Amery was in a position to know that the Imperial Conference
was highly unlikely to provide a bridge across this paricular stretch of troubled
water. The problem lay with the C.LD. Sub-Committee that had been convened in
March to consider all the defence aspects of the Conference: with Hankey in the
Chair (he was the principal co-ordinator for the whole Conference) and the Foreign
Office in attendance, it soon became apparent that this Committee would take a
negative approach, both to the uses of an Imperial gathering in general and to the
participation of the Free State in particular. Indee, it is significant that, rather than
being a minor topic, low on the agenda for subsequent meetings, the position of the
Free State loomed large in the opening debate of this Committee. Having agreed that
it would be unwise, post Locarno, to raise the subject of 'passive' war paricipation
by a Dominion, the Admiralty member soon noted that his department 'did not intend
to raise any Irish questions at the Conference.' Perhaps trying to ensure that the
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December review was not compromised, the Dominions Office member agreed with
this line, arguing that it was better to consider any Irish questions 'purely ad hoc' and
not at the Imperial Conference. 
6
While it is always problematic to interpret recorded minutes, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the opening spell of this first meeting was designed, in par, to
find ways of excluding subjects to which the Free State might react. Thus a
suggestion that the C.LD. Joint Committee might, at least, conclude its review of
South African and Canadian port defences, in time for the Imperial Conference, was
blocked by Hankey, and no answer was given to a Dominions Office query as to why
Mediterranean port defences were being reviewed ahead of those of the Dominions,
especially when the latter were seeking urgent advice. With this subject out of the
way, there would obviously be little on the Imperial defence agenda to involve the
Irish directly, and in the four subsequent meetings of this Committee no further
reference was made to the Irish situation. 
7
And yet, although a paricular aversion to Irish matters can be detected, it is quite
clea that the ultimate purpose of this same Committee was to avoid as many areas
of Empire defence controversy as possible and to decide upon what the Dominions
should be allowed to know of Britan's wider international interests. Hence the
Foreign Office, ever watchful of perceived Dominions Office indiscretions, vetoed
a suggestion that a prepared overview memorandum on Empire defence policy might
be distributed to the Dominions for pre-Conference comment; it was enough, insisted
the Foreign Office, that a simple statement be read to the Conference and the
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Dominions be kept informed 'from time to time' of events. While it is known that the
Free State was often denied access to even routine material, it can be forgotten that
the Foreign Office often treated the established family with deep suspicion. 
8
In all, there was nothing in the preparations for the Imperial Conference that could
have aided Amery in his own Article 6 Sub-Committee deliberations. On the
contrary, there appears to have been no cross-referencing of material or personnel,
despite the C.LD. Imperial Conference Sub-Committee having finished its task in
May. More to the point, Amery's own officials were stil tending to bow to the
views of others on Ireland rather than argue their own C.LD. remit, of October 1925,
to pursue wider topics.
But the driving force, as always, behind any Imperial defence considerations was the
Admiralty, and it had made plain that there were no new initiatives or
recommendations to be placed before the Imperial Conference. Apart from an
updated paper on 'Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation', originally prepared in
1921, the Admiralty offered only its 1923 Conference position and was preparing
simply for a 'historical survey' in 1926.9 On Ireland, both the Imperial Conference
Sub-Committee and the Dominions Office may have been forewarned of the
Admiralty's damning views regarding the subject being raised at the Imperial
Conference: in an undated internal paper entitled 'Imperial Conference 1926: Naval
problems to be raised at - Preliminar information', the Free State was relegated to
a back section under the sub-heading 'Miscellaneous British Possessions' along with
the Falkland Islands, Newfoundland and Zanzibar, among others. It was
222
acknowledged that the Free State was entitled to Revenue/Fishery Protection vessels,
but nothing else, and no mention was made of likely changes pending the coming
bi-lateral Conference.1O Nor, for that matter, could either the Dominions Office or
Dublin expect innovation from the War Office at the Imperial Conference. Lord
Cavan, the C.I.G.S. until 1926, was later to admit his unwillng ignorance of
Dominion defence matters, and of the personalities and politics involved; he had
resented his being denied a learing tour of the Empire by the Labour government of
1924. Although his successor, Sir George Milne, tried to inject some bite into the
1930 Imperial Conference, there appears to have been very little impetus from the
milta in 1926.11
Had the British known, they nee not have worred that the Irish government was
preparng a contingency programme of defence matters to be raised at the Imperial
Conference. Indeed, none of the Conference questions being posed within the
Defence Deparment appea to have found their way to the Executive Council for
debate, the only recorded item concerning the same being the principled rejection of
London's offer to act as cost bearing hosts to Dominion representativesY But as
early as August, the Chief of Staff, Peadar MacMahon, had advised the Minister of
Defence that the question of the Free State's full naval defence, if not coasta defence,
might well be raised at the Imperial Conference within the context of Dominion
financial contributions to the upkeep of the Royal Navy. Based on nothing more than
past, and public, statements by Earl Jellcoe, MacMahon postulated that the Free State
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would be asked to contribute £1-3s per head annually, on the same basis as mainland
subjects. Not only did MacMahon see nothing wrong in principle with this, but for
the first time the Army paid due recognition to the specialist services - chars, coasta
pilots etc. - provided stil by the Admiralty, Lloyds and the Board of Trade, which
were beyond the capacity of the Free State to duplicate pending the long term
establishment of an Irish Admiralty. 13
But although MacMahon further acknowledged that the British would 'strenuously
combat' any idea of an independent Free State naval force, and agreed that the south
and west coasts of Ireland remained 'of first class strategic importnce navally', he
was also quick to warn his Minister not to rely on expert British advice at the
forthcoming Conferences. Such experts, argued MacMahon, were 'steeped in the
traditions and outlooks of the British Navy' and would advise on developments useful
only to Britan. The tenor, moreover, of the Army's advice had not changed since
its, previously mentioned, ealier submission in March: there was stil an underlying
assumption that the British would make moves to hand back the Treaty Ports, and
reference was made to the 'obnoxious clauses (Articles 6 & 7) on this subject in the
Treaty. ,14
Nevertheless, the Army's overrding concern for the Imperial Conference centred on
a subject that overshadowed all discussions on Articles 6 & 7 - the Geneva
Disarmament Conference, due to be held in March/April 1927. There was good
reason to make this a priority, because it seems that London had circulated Geneva
discussion documents, apropos the Imperial Conference, to all Dominions, with the
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implication of vita decisions having to be made. In the event no such debate took
place at the Imperial Conference, not least because the Admiralty and War Office
could not themselves agree on a common stace,15 but in the meantime the Irish
Defence Deparment paid an attention that reflected both the country's dedicated
membership of the League of Nations and its intended independent representation at
the Geneva Conference. 
16 In an undated memorandum entitled 'Imperial Conference
1926: Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Allocation of Quotas to the Several
Pars of the British Empire', Defence spelt out the fragilty of the Free State's
position; it is of interest that there seemed to be a common understanding that the
government wanted no mutual defence discussions with Britan at the Imperial
Conference, regardless of this stace being 'probably inadvisable', but Defence had
to indicate the implications of an Empire Quota system:
This question is one of very considerable and even urgent importce
to the Saorstat ... It is .,. necessar to point out that our position with
relation to Great Britan and the Six Counties, in addition to the
Defence Reservations in the Treaty, complicate this like every other
question bearing on our defence, and make it possible for Britan to
urge rather strong reasons why an exception must be made of the
Saorstat and the same status not accorded to her as the Dominions.1?
In essence, Defence recognised that there might be international, and especially
European, pressure for the Free State to be included within the Metropolitan Forces
of Great Britan and Northern Ireland, and was concerned that a 'very importat'
precedent for the treating of the British Commonweath as a single unit had been
established at the Washington Conference of 1921. With the probable exception of
New Zealand, it was thought that the Dominions would object to a single quota and
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support the assumed Irish position, in that any indication of agreement would be 'out
of keeping with all National Policy'. But when, and to what extent, did the Free
State dare taunt Britan with the increasingly transparent neutrality of its defence
policy? Defence knew that the British Service deparments could not agree on quotas
and suspected that it would require a 'special effort ... to bring about a real
appreciation of our position on the Continent'; in this case there was good reason not
to antagonise Britan at the Imperial Conference. 
18
Despite its own reservations, however, Defence was concerned that the government
would allow the situation to drift, arguing that a firm defence policy line was going
to be needed at the Imperial Conference, irrespective of the position taken at Geneva.
As defence policy was becoming increasingly based on external contingencies it was
believed that there was a need for 'closer co-operation' between Defence and External
Affairs. In expression there was certnly something of a cri de coeur here, and more
than a hint that Defence felt that it was being sidelined and denied valuable
information on general policy and international developments.19 Here again was
evidence of Cosgrave's determination to demote the influence of the Army; in short,
it seems that Defence had little or no idea of what might be said on its behalf at the
Imperial Conference.
In the event, what actually transpired at Conference was possibly beyond the Army's
worst imaginings. It wil be seen that something of a mystery surrounds O'Higgins's
open statements on Imperial defence (Desmond Fitzgerald seems to have made no
personal contribution), but a far greater enigma surrounds his private discussions in
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London. The day after his celebrated meeting with Lord Carson, on 22nd November,
O'Higgins met Amery to discuss the varous concessions that the former believed the
Free State would be wiling to make in order to achieve a united Ireland. To quote
O'Higgins's biographer, De Vere White: 'He also asked for a guarantee for Ireland's
defence in return for which Ireland would undertke to make a definite miltay force
available for imperial emergencies.' Was this a case of O'Higgins making policy on
the hoof, in seach of his desired Kingdom of Ireland, or did he have secret Executive
Council blessing to explore this line?20 If the latter, then was it the case that the
government had cold feet at the thought of the looming bi-lateral defence review in
December, and was trying to find a way out of confrontation? Whichever way it is
viewed, O'Higgins was confounding the agree and official defence policy of the
Saorstat.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Amery made no mention of this defence discussion in his
diaries, though he did refer to O'Higgins's suggestion that Lord Londonderry might
be acceptable as the first Viceroy of a united Ireland?i De Vere White writes that,
in pursuance of O'Higgins's defence offer, Lord Londonderr was 'rumoured' to
have made a secret visit to Dublin in the Summer of 1927; if so, and if O'Higgins
continued to try and undermine both the defence policy and the Defence Department,
then the latter was not exactly widening an understading with republican
sympathisers or enhancing his life expectacy. 22
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There are two interesting and related postscripts to O'Higgins's private adventures at
the Imperial Conference. Amery went as far as to submit a paper on the subject to
Cabinet in mid-December, but whether through caution or lack of time it was not
discussed. But at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain was plainly furious that
O'Higgins's ramblings had been allowed to procee so far: aiming a broadside at
Amery, he wanted the Cabinet to be informed that everything in O'Higgins's
proposals ran 'directly counter to all that was said and done at the Imperial
Conference.', and he insisted that, in the case of O'Higgins gaining the wrong
impression, both Dublin and Belfast should be notified that the British government
would not countenance the idea of a Dual Monarchy. To this, Amery retorted that
O'Higgins had been left 'under no possible doubt' that his suggestions ran counter to
the agree principles of the Imperial Conference, emphasising that even Tim Healy,
the Irish Governor-General, had believed the proposals to be 'fantastic'. But an
insight into how anxious Amery was to find some common ground, can be found in
his request to the Cabinet that the situation be kept under review lest Belfast (Sir
James Craig had dismissed the matter out of hand) began to mellow to the concept
of a Kingdom of Ireland. 
23
To this scenario should be added the acute observation of the historian Nicholas
Mansergh, who, while noting the vita question of the degree of Executive Council
support for O'Higgins, goes on to accent the impossibilty of his ambitions. The
concept of a Dual Monarchy ran directly counter to the ruling notion of an indivisible
Crown, and as such O'Higgins's idea 'belonged to Anglo-lrish not Irish
Commonwealth constitutional concepts. ,24 Yet in turn, it follows that the man who
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was taen to be the greatest apologist for the Treaty was actively, if not cynically,
trying to undermine its very design, a point that had obviously not been lost on
Chamberlain. Translating this to defence terms, how was Britan to approach the
scheduled bi-lateral Conference when even the most amenable of the Irish might not
accept that Articles 6 & 7 were also underpinned by the symbolism of an indivisible
Crown? No matter how tempting O'Higgins's specific defence proposals (as noted
by De Vere White) might have appeared, the Treaty itself embodied that indivisible
symbolism. The pity was that this defence offer, if true, was somewhat ingenious -
if Ireland was to dare to ask for the return of the Treaty Ports at the bi -lateral
Conference then it made sense to offer something tagible in return. Unfortunately
this can be only conjecture, though it is inconceivable that O'Higgins and Amery
could have discussed such defence matters without reference to the Free State's likely
position at that Conference.
With this background, the mystery of O'Higgins's, supposedly open, contribution to
the defence agenda of the Imperial Conference begins to have context. It seems that
he did make a brief statement to the other Dominion representatives, acknowledged
by Baldwin, but it was not published or recorded in any known official document.
The also brief remarks of the Prime Minister of Newfoundland are recorded, as are
those of the Maharajah of Burdwan, but Irish thoughts are conspicuous by their
singular absence. No mitigation appeas to have been made with a view to the
sensitive bi-lateral negotiations about to tae place, and, indee, no mention of these
pending negotiations is referred to in the official record of the Imperial Conference.25
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This is all the more curious when the contents of other Dominion defence statements
are examined. Hankey's preparatory Committee may have been able to prevent
detaled discussion of coasta defence matters from arising, but it could not deter a
subject which was of general and relevant interest to agree Imperial strategy.26
Even as a spectator, O'Higgins would have had ample time to reflect on the nature
of British milta occupation in his country, paricularly when considering the
statement of N. C. Havenga, the South African Minister of Finance. Havenga
insinuated that Britan's largesse was often forced by circumstace rather than
goodwil, reminding Conference that though Britan had formally surrendered the
Cape Peninsula, including the Simonstown naval base, to South African authority in
1921, the Union had been given little option but to take over this responsibility soon
after the start of the Great War. He noted also that it had been the intention of
Britan to resume control after the War, although by then the Union had other ideas.
Finally, and as if makng a pointed reference to the Irish situation, he noted: 'The
British Government handed over ... those defences, together with a large quantity of
war material and stores, as well as the landed and other property'.27
The point to be made here, is that Britan did have recent and relevant experience of
negotiating such matters with a country with which it had made an uneasy peace and
which retaned many secessionist and nationalist instincts. The geo-politics was
admittedly dissimilar, but here at least was a current stadard whereby Britan leased
what facilties it required while recognising the territorial sovereignty of a country
that had limited resources for defence spending.28
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The Irish could have also taen heart from the lukewarm responses of Havenga and
Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada to the likely costs of modern coasta
defence planning. The 1923 Imperial Conference had agree on the nee to create and
maintan a chain of Imperial air bases to help co-ordinate fixed defences, but both
men now implied that any such investment would have to cater for domestic inland
nees as a priority. 29 The irony was that the Free State Defence Deparment was
probably the only Empire unit to have given serious and detaled thought to the aerial
concept that Britan envisaged. In March 1926, Defence had submitted a plan to the
Executive Council, based on six amphibious planes at each of five 'Aerial Units'
(Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway and Sligo), involving initial outlay costs of
£546,000. On top of this, O.C. Army Corps of Engineers had submitted a capita
estimate, for the building of aerodromes, hangers etc., of some £250,000.30 To what
extent O'Higgins was aware of these estimates is unknown, but doubtless he would
have been in sympathy with the prevailing mood at the Conference, in that the
potential costs of such a specialised service were prohibitive. As such it is entirely
possible that his supposed offer to Amery, of an Imperial force in return for naval
protection, was intended to offset the otherwise crippling coasta defence costs that
Britan might insist upon if the Treaty Ports were returned.
And yet, it is unlikely that Amery and O'Higgins could have discussed aerial defence
spending in any detail, if at alL. Had the latter attempted this, then Amery would
have been obliged to inform him that the British Services were hostile to any Irish
involvement, and to have warned that the subject was anyway related to Article 7, not
6. The Air Staff had already considered the feasibilty of incorporating the existing
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Irish Air force, totaling some 28 planes, in their own expansion plans for the Treaty
Ports, and had concluded that none of these aircraft were suitable for repellng enemy
bombing attacks or were of use in sea reconnaissance. Amery's C.LD.
Sub-Committee had also been notified that the Air Staff did not challenge the
Admiralty and War Office view that they 'would be unwiling to rely on any air
co-operation in connection with the close defences of Berehaven, Queenstown and
Lough Swily, save that afforded by our own air forces. ,31 The Irish estimates had
of course been based on the very opposite view of having no British involvement.
Meawhile, by 1926 the Ports were becoming of little strategic use to either country
without localised air defence cover.
Thus the Imperial Conference ended in November with, it seems, more questions than
answers. On what turned out to be a very low key Imperial defence agenda, the
subjects for which the Irish Defence Deparment had prepared did not arise, and,
even supposing they had, it is not clear that O'Higgins was committed to anything
beyond his own 'fantastic' scheme. With the Admiralty again to the fore, it was
anyway plain that Britan did not intend to raise or provoke any question that might
compromise its position at the later bi-lateral Conference. Whatever the level and
significance of the Irish contribution to the constitutional debate at the Imperial
Conference, this was at least a subject that could be aired. But perhaps the real test
of Irish Dominion status, and of the Anglo-Irish divide, was to be found in a subject
that after five years was stil not open to peer discussion or public record.
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2. No Port in a Storm
Did the British Officer say 'You can have them' or 'You can have
them at the price of maintaning them'? Not by a long chalk! He
ruled the subject of the Ports out of order!
Minister Frank Aiken, deriding the efforts
of 1927 - Election speech, May 1943.32
The time consumed in preparation for the Imperial Conference provided, on both
sides, the necessar reason for postponing the Coasta Defence Conference. Even
before the Imperial Conference had formally closed, Amery and O'Higgins had
agree, in writing, to hold matters over for two or three months. In line, however,
with the five year requirement of the Treaty, the Conference was opened in London
on the 6th December, with High Commissioner James McNeil present, then
immediately adjourned.33
In consequence, when Amery convened the next meeting of his C.I.D.
Sub-Committee, in mid-December, the change in atmosphere was palpable. In
contrast to the contortions of the ealier July meeting, there was this time, with the
usual exception of the Admiralty members, a more directed and relaxed approach.
Ostensibly, there was little reason for this: Amery believed, from impressions gained
at the Imperial Conference, that the Irish had 'definite proposals' in mind, and as this
meeting progressed it become clea that Amery had knowledge that these 'proposals'
were likely to revolve around the return of the Treaty PortS.34 It is probably
significant that it was from the time of this December meeting that the War Office,
once it knew of the likely Irish agenda, first began to argue positively in support of
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this course. 
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But from taking to O'Higgins and Fitzgerald, albeit in the vaguest of terms, it was
also clear that the Dominions Office, at least, felt that it now had the measure of the
situation. Thus when the Admiralty worried as to whether these Irish proposals
would be 'immediate' or 'ultimate', Amery replied with confidence that, whatever
their ultimate aims might be, the financial plight of the Free State made it impossible
for the Irish to consider any radical step. Such was the overall mood of this
December meeting that when an Admiralty member suggested that it might be wise
to define and limit the term 'coasta defence', it was deemed not to be necessary as
the Irish had no ambitions for a sea-going navy.36 Whatever else O'Higgins may
have achieved at the Imperial Conference, he certnly seemed to have left the
impression that Irish coastal defence proposals would have little of substace or
determination behind them. Yet the real key to this confidence lay in the knowledge
that the Irish were seemingly waiting for London to dictate the next move; Amery
confided to his diar, after this Sub-Committee meeting, that they had agreed on a
'fishing letter' and would 'postpone action until we knew the answer. ,37
That the Irish had allowed the ball to be placed so firmly in their own court was not
difficult to account for. Apar from the long-term breakdown in communication
between O'Higgins and Defence, and the already noted distance between Defence and
External Affairs, the air of doubt and secrecy surrounding the Coastal Defence
Conference extended through the Army itself. In mid-December, C.O. Artilery
Corps wrote to the Chief of Staff, concerned for the current and unknown state of
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negotiations. Interestingly, it was known at this level that the policy intention was
to acquire and man the Treaty Ports, but the C.O.'s main concern was that the British
had never intended these defences to be par of an integral coasta defence scheme,
and that as such the Artilery Corps might be saddled with a system it could not
operate. 
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MacMahon dismissed this caution, although by then he was himself having difficulty
in keeping track of the technical and political demands of the situation.39 In
November he had sent a 'secret and personal' memorandum to O'Hegary, Secretary
to the Executive Council, in which he noted that while the concept of static defence
might be outdated, it would be 'invaluable' to obtan the British General Staff's
'Stading Instructions' for the operation of the Treaty Ports defences - the point being
to impress upon the British that in an emergency they would be 'able at very short
notice to tae measures for the protection of all such places.' It was reaised,
however, that as stading British orders probably included action against the Irish
themselves, it might be 'undesirable and rather awkward' to make a direct approach,
and he added that 'you may not think it advisable in view of our general relations
with the Deparments responsible for... the British Fighting Services to ask them for
any information or assistace.' Close to these doubts was the daunting figure of
Maurice Hankey, and MacMahon conceded that as such he was uncertin that 'a
suitable opportunity to casually raise the question wil arse.' The reply to these
concerns could have done little for the Chief of Staff's confidence: after informal
consultations with Cosgrave and other ministers there was agreement that the situation
was 'very awkward', but he was advised that if the chance came it would be taen,
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'perhaps, not exactly in a detaled form lest we might be giving too much indication
of the channel in which we were thinking. ,40
Of the several dismal indicators in this correspondence, perhaps the most importat
was the defence policy trap that the Executive Council and the Army had laid for
themselves. The agree policy allowed, in an emergency, for the active co-operation
with British forces in the Saorstat, yet MacMahon was stil allowed to presume that
Irish forces alone would control Port defences in wartime. The price of would-be
neutrality was certainly high: here was probably the best bargaining counter the Irish
had, but at what cost to the concept of an 'independent national force'? Nevertheless,
of more immediate concern was the dubious reasoning of ministers in wanting to keep
their basic Conference position a secret: there was a difference between secrecy as
a tactic and as a cover for pure, if understadable, vacilation.
That MacMahon suspected the latter was made obvious when, as expected, Ameri s
'fishing' dispatch arrived at the beginning of Januar, requesting 'some general
indications' and pre-Conference papers on their required share of coasta defence.41
The Chief of Staff had to remind the Executive Council that though it was well
understood that nothing should be given away prior to the assembly, the British
dispatch 'very definitely' questioned this decision. As if to bolster wavering resolve,
he added a further reminder on the 'binding influence' of any reply, arguing that
regardless of any possible legal separation of Articles 6 & 7, it would in practice be
impossible to discuss coasta defence measures without reference to both.42
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Almost a month after this (as yet unanswered) British inquiry, the Council finally
aranged for an inter-departmenta Committee (of Finance, External Affairs and
Defence) to prepare for the Conference on the basis that the Free State 'would be
prepared to tae over and maintan' the Treaty Ports. It was notable that the
government was intending a one-issue Conference position; there was no additional
or fall-back measure as to a 'share' of coasta patrol, and neither could there be if the
respective doctrines of limited finance and would-be neutrality were to hold.43 But
rather than steel a co-ordinated approach, this Committee appears to have been
something of a chimera; despite the dilgent work of the Defence Department, in
continuing to firm-up costing and establishment tables for the takeover of the Ports,
there is little evidence that it convened to any effect. Indee, in March the Minister
of Defence had to advise O.C. Army Air Corps, who was also aware of the need for
'strictest secrecy', that the Committee was 'not functioning'.44
The one thing, however, that this Committee did probably achieve, a draft dispatch
reply to London, was never sent. Undated, it cannot be known for how long the
Executive pondered its careful wording and possible results, but its main section is
worth recording:
While my Ministers wish to tae over progressive control of the entire
coasta defence of the Irish Free State, they reaise that the nature and
extent of the initial stages depend not only on financial, miltary and
other considerations of a purely internal character, but also on
considerations relating to the larger question of the general defence of
these islands. It seems to them that the two questions are intimately
connected and they do not think it possible to arve at any practical
conclusion without examining in common with His Majesty's
Government ... all the aspects of the larger problem and arriving at a
clear understading of the precise relations between the two. My
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Ministers therefore suggest that the March Conference should be
devoted to conversations aiming at a complete understading of the
existing general position.45
Had this draft been sent, then probably the C.LD. and the Cabinet would have
rejected its implicit message - but at a cost. The political consequences of rejection,
not least to the Treaty, would have neeed careful calculation, and Dublin might well
have stolen a moral initiative. Instead, London was able to maintan the complete
initiative with a proposal, in ealy Februar, inviting the Irish for preliminar and
informal taks with Admiralty technical experts. Though it was emphasised that these
taks would be 'unofficial and without prejudice' to the Conference proper, the
relieved and almost delighted response can, with the benefit of hindsight, be seen to
have been foolhardy. 46 While it may have been tempting for the Executive to believe
that it could now test its position without prejudice, it had in fact accepted the
direction and limitations that London desired.
But seen from Dublin's viewpoint, there may have been good reasons to suspect that
London was preparing to offer considerably more than their carefully worded
communications had so far suggested. To begin with, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Minister
for Air, had sent Cosgrave a personal copy of a secret memorandum on 'The Air
Arm in Coast Defence' in December, informing him that it might prove useful to his
Conference planning. Much as Defence was desperate for British technical
information, there is no suggestion that the President's Office had requested the same.
The reason for its dispatch becomes the more unclear when considering that Amery's
Sub-Committee had already dismissed the idea of Irish involvement in R.A.F. plans
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for the Treaty Ports, and yet Cosgrave was surely entitled to see this as a veiled
invitation to widen the scope of the Conference.47
There was one subject, however, where this invitation seemed more blatat than
veiled - the title dees that Britan stil held for all former and existing War Office
property in the Free State. As seen in an earlier chapter, the holding of these had
caused concern almost from the moment the Treaty had been signed, though it was
only in 1926, when Britain first mooted its own Conference requirements, that a
defence property settlement took on its own momentum. Unfortunately for Dublin,
it seems that the main Service motivation for a settlement was the need to modernise
and extend War Office and R.A.F. facilities at the Treaty Ports, and it was only when
the Law Officers confirmed that agreement was neeed to secure occupation rights
that the nee to strike a dea became urgent. Misguided reasoning had seemingly led
to the belief that the Irish would agree to all Port demands, and to the retention of
title, in return for the remainder of War Office deeds.48
Adding pressure for a solution was the Treasury (thwarted in its attempted settlement
of 1922-3) which, in turn, had been under renewed pressure from the Irish Finance
Department for clarfications on the title dees issue, this culminating in a pointed
letter from MacNeill's London office as late as November 1926. The signs that the
Irish would raise this question at the coming defence Conference, whether or not the
British intended to, were plain to read.49 By the end of Januar, the Treasury had
received confirmation (after inter-deparmenta consultation) that title dees could be
handed over, subject to the retention of those relating to coasta property and the
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non-prejudice to other Conference negotiations.50
When, however, the Treasury relayed this message to Finance Secretay Joseph
Brennan, it was doubtfully expressed in terms that no other relevant British
department, and certnly not the Admiralty, would have sanctioned: the key wording
noted that the dees to coast defence sites would not be handed over pending 'general
agreement between the two Governments on this subject (which as you know, is
already the subject of negotiation)' .51 The whole point was that no matter how self-
evident the connection might seem to the Treasury, or to the wider world, this was
not the subject of current negotiations and would not be so until the Irish had first
proved 'friendly'. This confusing signal was compounded by Dublin's understading
that the first batch of dees would shortly be handed over to the High Commissioner,
though in the event there is no evidence that this, or any later, transfer actually took
place. 
52 It can only be guessed that when the Conference was again postponed,
pending the results of the agree technical discussions, the British commitment, to
what the War Office, almost a yea later, was referrng to stil as a 'complicated'
issue, also waned. 
53 In the meantime, there was no reason for Dublin to guess the
real motives behind the transfer offer, and it could have been taen that this was a
positive gesture of British sympathy and future intent.
But if Dublin believed that one further push might indee secure an agreement on the
Treaty Ports, then they were very much mistaen. By mid-Februar, after Amery
had submitted his Sub-Committee's first interim report for C.LD. approval, the
Imperial position on future taks had been largely set and seaed. Churchil ensured,
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and Amery tamely agree, that there would be no margins for the Irish to explore:
the full Conference would be restricted to Britan's future requirements under Article
7, and the prior technical discussions to a limited interpretation of Article 6. When
Churchil warned that there could be no tak of removing the Treaty garsons for 'at
least' ten years, Amery was quick to confirm that the only proposals then awaited
from Dublin 'were purely naval, in connection with minesweeping, coasta patrol,
etc. ,54 Once the Irish had agree to prior Admiralty taks, this format fell all too
easily into place.
The Irish government, nevertheless, was not exactly being flexible or open-handed
in its own interpretation of the Treaty, and London could not have been expected to
read trouble into concurrent public statements by ministers. The combination of the
government's silence on the defence taks at the recent Imperial Conference, and its
equally mute response to the imminent coasta defence Conference, was creating a
deep suspicion among the Dail opposition; a situation only made worse by
Fitzgerald's belated attempt to quell the doubters. By stating that the government's
only stace had been, and would be, to listen and lear, and that it was 'entirely
desirable' to be kept informed of Imperial defence matters, he did little to allay the
(mistaken) fear that the government was being drawn towards a unified Imperial
defence system. It later took the combined efforts of Fitzgerald, Hughes and
O'Higgins to deny this, and to deflect a proposition that Ireland's only real security
lay in a declaration to the wider world that she would not be bound by any British
policy or bellgerent action. It was made known by Labour that the Treaty itself
posed the greatest threat to Ireland's peace, and more than one Deputy thought that
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Britan's rights under Article 7 were inconsistent with Ireland's signing of the
Covenant of the Legue of Nations.55
The occasion for this debate - the Defence Forces (Provisions) Bil- provided a stak
contrast to that of two years previous. Then the concern had been that the
government was trying to ignore external factors, but now it was thought to be too
involved. 
56 It was, moreover, significant that the currency of this later debate was
almost entirely that of neutrality: not the vague concept of it, but the degree to which
it could, and would, be applied. Fitzgerald and O'Higgins tried to remind Deputies
that a declared neutrality was only as useful as an enemy would allow, and yet in the
end the former was forced to qualify an earlier statement in which he had seemed to
suggest that a 'general attack' on their shared islands would be taen as an attack on
the Free State herself. Twisting himself into an ever tighter knot, Fitzgerald insisted
that this would be the case only if Britain AND Ireland were attacked; if Britain alone
suffered then the Dail would be consulted as to possible action. 
57 Whichever way
the government turned it could not escape (nor wished to) the mood of detachment,
yet even under this pressure it would not risk declaring its already agree policy for
the taking over of the Treaty Ports.
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It is not intended here to dwell on the detals of the preliminar technical conference
(held in London on the 26th April), but rather to emphasis that it was a calamity
waiting to happen, and to concentrate on the aftermath. Though neither side could
have pretended that a mere 'technical' meeting would be without its political dangers,
few could have been prepared for the almost bruta curtlment of debate, culminating
in a Cabinet decision, next day, to refuse any inquiry concerning the Treaty Ports.
It may have been crass for Diarmuid O'Hegarty to open the proceedings with a direct
reference to the Ports, but the problem was that Cosgrave's final instructions to his
negotiating team, of four days ealier, had allowed no leeway. There had been
genuine belief that the British would at least discuss the military and financial aspects
of manning these defences, and, at worst, it was thought that Britan might ask to stay
at the Ports at Ireland's financial expense - a scenario which Cosgrave found
unacceptable. 
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There was not the slightest hint in these instructions as to the position to be taen
should London reject the entire subject; when the Admiralty team queried
O'Hegary's claim that Articles 6 & 7 were 'very closely connected and could hardly
be dealt with separately', he could only wire Dublin for further instructions. 
59 The
same day reply allowed him to 'reserve' the Treaty Ports issue and continue the taks,
on the basis that the Executive Council did not wish to restrict his action 'to do what
may seem best on the spot.' In a further pathetic gesture, a copy of Hugh Kennedy's
1922 legal study (previously mentioned) was forwarded in the hope that 'It may help
should you wish to argue a connection between VI and VII. '60 But it was all too
late: once the Admiralty team had headed for political cover there would be no way
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back. The Irish had not been 'friendly'.
Much as it appeaed that Amery had at last connived in setting a rigid Article 6
'trap', he seems to have been genuinely shaken by the terminal events of the 26th,
and at the thought that his broader ambitions for Ireland might be in ruins. He
immediately prepared a memorandum for the Cabinet in which he argued that
information on the Ports should be given, without prejudice, noting that the only
alternative was that the preliminary meeting 'would come to an immediate end', with
the Irish again raising the question in full Conference at a future date. 
61 To his diar
Amery lamented that the Cabinet was 'dead against' his idea, and that he had
approached his colleagues 'a little half heaedly. '62
More in the manner of a post-mortem than a rescue mission, Norman Archer,
Assistat Secreta at the Dominions Office, visited O'Hegary at his London hotel
on the 26th & 27th, to tak over options and to relay the Cabinet's inevitable decision.
According to Archer's version of these taks, O'Hegarty understood the Cabinet's
view and realised there had been a 'genuine misunderstading' ,63 but this account did
not exactly taly with O'Hegarty's own confidential reports to Cosgrave of the same
dates. In these he claimed to have rounded on Archer as to the rejection of their
'very big and generous offer' , and in somewhat embittered tones he noted that he and
his party did not believe there had been a 'genuine' misunderstading on the British
part. He thought the Admiralty experts had been expecting something like his
proposals and that 'their instructions were framed accordingly.' In the same vein, he
continued:
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I gathered that what was expected here was that we would be able to
say we had £- to spend on coasta defence and they would advise us
how to spend it. But as I said before, I think they had a shrewd idea
of what we were going to say. 64
As has been seen, the British side may not have expected the Irish proposal in such
an abrupt form, but they certnly knew it was coming. The trail may well have led
back to O'Higgins's machinations at the Imperial Conference, but the truth was that
this gambit did not tae a dea of guessing - O'Hegary and his team had literally
been innocents abroad. 
65 While he admitted to Cosgrave that he had only 'affected
to be very surprised' at the Admiralty's taness regarding a 6 & 7 link, O'Hegary's
astonishment at the turn of events was otherwise complete. Indee, from his own
account he admitted that Archer had had difficulty in persuading him that the subject
was closed for good, and that it was not just being reserved for principals in full
Conference. 
66 But behind this reaction was the reaity that both sides had come to
the preliminar meeting with a prepared and fixed agenda, which neither could afford
to adjust lest they compromised their position in full Conference. As a result, the
chances of ever holding that Conference had been eroded before the preliminar
session had even begun. But if London believed that a shar rebuke was the best way
to bring the Irish to heel, and to make them more pliable, then they too were greatly
mistaen.
It is importt, moreover, to note that this was not just a case of suspicious minds
failing to meet, but rather of a continuing and fundamenta clash of ideologies. Some
of the events of these two days verged on the bizare, as when the Irish, awaiting the
Cabinet decision, agree to a non-committa heaing of Admiralty minesweeping
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proposals. Here was the chance, suggested the Admiralty, for the Irish to purchase
a 'deluxe Twin Screw Sweeper' that was so imposing that it could be used for
ceremonial occasions and as a yacht for the President. The Admiralty seemed quite
proud of the fact that several of the eastern Indian states had bought such a vessel for
just these reasons, though it is perhaps as well that Irish reactions to this example of
the evergreen imperial mind are not recorded. 
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After O'Hegarty's pary returned home, on the 28th, there appeared to be a restrained
effort, by both governments, to guard their respective interests. By giving the issue
little advance publicity, the Irish government had avoided raising expectations at the
cost of political or financial embarrassment, but it was stil necessar to stop Fianna
Fail gaining a propaganda march. There was a minor scare when the official
responses, playing down the significance of preliminar meeting, were challenged by
the Cork Examiner, quoting 'sources in connection with the British Government' ,68
but by mid-May calm had returned and Amery had been informed that the Irish
general election necessitited another indefinite postponement of the full Conference.
Not surprisingly, Amery concurred, suggesting that it was best left for Dublin to
resume contact. 69 That contact would never be made: the Executive Council did
order a confidential report on the preliminar London meeting, but apar from further
mention of British duplicity, its only firm recommendation upheld the consensus view
that in any future taks Articles 6 & 7 had to be considered together. 70
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With deadlock more than threatened, and with the Irish again engrossed in domestic
matters, it was London that had first to count the cost of the failed taks. During the
Summer of 1927, Amery's Sub-Committee wrestled with the problem of how to
convince Dublin that Articles 6 & 7 were meant to be separate. There was little
confidence in pressing the legal position, and it was thought that the Irish might
respond to some straight taking on the strategic reasons for the retention of the Ports,
even if this meant the divulgence of sensitive information. But the problem here was
that in post-Locamo world of the late 1920s, and in the bruised atmosphere of the
their failed taks with the Irish, even the Admiralty was beginning to find it difficult
to come up with convincing strategic reasons why all three Ports should be retaned.71
This much became apparent in November 1927 (after the two Irish elections of that
yea) when Amery's Committee twice deliberated on how best to get negotiations
restated. The central and recognised problem was that the Irish were unlikely to
respond unless London agreed, at least in principle, to hand over the defences; but
far from blocking ideas, it was the Admiralty that now paid the keenest attention to
a compromise solution. It was indeed the Admiralty members who became edgy at
the repeated use by others of the word 'essential', in relation to the Ports, with Capt.
Egerton, Director of Plans, remarking that its use, even in connection with
Berehaven, was an 'overstatement' and that there were viable alternatives - namely,
Milford Haven. This astonishing admission was, moreover, not the end of it:
discussion also ranged around 'giving up something' at each of the Ports, with the
Admiralty venturing that it was wiling to give up Lough Swily altogether if this
proved a more attractive idea to the Irish. It was decided that Swily should 'be kept
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up our sleeve', though there were concerns that any offer might be taken as a sign
of weakess.72 Put simply, the Admiralty had reached the end of its tether: having
tried, and failed, through the Summer of 1927, to persuade Dublin that goodwil fleet
visits would aid reconciliation, it evidently believed that compromise was the only
course left. 73
The point to be made here is that there is no evidence that the Admiralty was coming
under increased joint Service or political pressure to change its position. The War
Office had once again noted that it wanted out of the Free State, and that the Irish
could not indefinitely be kept in a differing situation to other Dominions, but it had
dropped (as a cost saving measure) its previously urgent nee to improve the Port
defences and offered no verdict on the Admiralty's new and radical suggestions.74
As has been seen, the War Office had seemingly given up on the idea of using title
deeds as a bait, and was weay of the whole subject.
As for political pressure to adjust, it was to become obvious that the very opposite
was true: indee by the time the Sub-Committee's final report had been submitted
for C.LD. scutiny, in February 1928, any positive suggestion of affordable
compromise had been removed, doubtless in order to give the more diehard members
of the latter what they wanted, and expected, to read. With some timidity the report
suggested that 'if any concession were possible with regard to anyone of the ports,
it is conceivable that the position (i.e. deadlock on full Conference) would be
changed', but this was lost amongst the otherwise bullsh rhetoric which again
promoted Berehaven as the indispensable 'Scapa Flow' of the Western Approaches.75
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No doubt recalling the recent embarrassments of foreign naval visits to Queenstown
(Cobh), Amery suggested at this C.LD. meeting that this Port could be handed back
as a goodwil gesture, but Churchil dismissed this with little or no regard for Irish
(and by implication foreign and D.S.) sensibilties. There would be no compromise.76
With this decision, the door to improving future relations with the Free State was
finally slammed shut. On one level it seemed a self-defeating, perhaps even negligent
decision; as there was no longer the wil nor the means to re-conquer Ireland, and
senior milta figures had insisted that the Ports were 'useless' against Irish hostilty,
then there was a self-interested duty to make an easily affordable compromise offer.
Even the Admiralty had come to this belated understading, and the indications were,
as evidenced previously, that Cosgrave would indee have settled for the return of
Cobh - the symbol of so much national prestige.77
But then both countries were interested in symbols, and on another level the finality
of the C.LD.'s decision was inevitable if Britan was to maintan an Imperial grip on
the Free State. A compromise was unacceptable in that it might have advertised that
the Treaty had run its course, at a time when it was stil impossible to contemplate
alternatives. There was, moreover, no evidence that Cosgrave would have granted
wider defence favours in return: this was likely to have been seen as an acceptable
first stage in the complete removal of the British. The reality, in terms of mutual
trust, was that in 1927-8 Cosgrave's Free State was no more a Dominion than de
Valera's Eire would be in 1937-8; the crucial difference, as regards decisions, would
be the international climate rather than the bi-lateral. As such, the fact that de
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Valera's star was again in the ascendancy, after the 1927 general elections, probably
had little cautionar effect on the C.LD.'s 1928 decision. Cosgrave and Cumann na
nGaedhea might have been viewed as the lesser evil, but perceived hostilty was a
matter of degree only. In the same way that in 1922 Churchil had been obliged to
admit that the reasons for the Army's stay in Dublin were political, rather than
miltay, so it was becoming increasingly the case with the Treaty Ports.
The immediate repercussions of this political intransigence could tae unexpected
form, and once again it fell to the Dominions Office, acting (as always) as both
poacher and gamekeeper, to try to prevent others from undermining an already
weakened stance on Articles 6 & 7. By the end of 1928, the War Office had
relegated coast defence concerns to the extent that territorials were manning most
mainland bases, and as such it sought approval from the C.LD.'s Home Defence
Sub-Committee for the application of this measure at Belfast (the fourth Treaty Port).
The Dominions Office intervened to remind the Committee that approval might
provide 'a handle' whereby the Free State could claim the right to raise a similar
force to man the other Irish defences; the current claim that regular troops had to stay
in the North for reasons of 'efficiency' would also suffer. Hankey, as Chairman,
showed his usual distaste for the South by declaring that Reserves in the North 'would
be just as much Imperial forces as troops raised in Sussex', and thought that it would
be 'extremely difficult' for the Free State to object. Even so, the War Office was
forced to note the 'political difficulties', and it was to be another year before the
scheme was finally accepted, albeit reluctatly, by the Dominions Office.78
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Try as they might, the British could not separate the Treaty Ports from other defence
issues, except when enforcing a Treaty that had been dictated almost ten years
previous. By the end of the 1920s the anomalous position of the Free State Ports,
both in terms of Home and Oversea Imperial defence, was very evident, and by the
time de Valera returned to power in the Spring of 1932 it was, if anything,
comparatively the more exaggerated. Although the Chiefs of Staff claimed, by force
of ever increasing financial stringency, that expenditure at the Ports had been 'pared
to the limit', this amounted to less than a quarter reduction in personnel from that in
place in the mid-1920's, and the removal of one destroyer only (in 1929) from the
three on Irish station.79 This was a long way stil from being a true 'care and
maintenance' operation, and enough men and ships remained to enforce the political
message that the Empire was prepared to defend its interests - not so much from
attack across the seas, as from the Irish at its back. 80
Cosgrave too found that there was no escape from the debacle of April 1927. In the
aftermath of the stalemate at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and the
controversy over international Bellgerent Rights, questions were again being asked
in Dublin of the 'postponed' coasta defence Conference; by the end of 1929 External
Affairs and the President's Office were finding it increasingly difficult to come up
with plausible excuses. Cosgrave made ministers aware that he would brook no
debate on the issue, though the unofficial position (interestingly deleted in a reply to
a written Dail question), was that the exchequer could not afford 'new commitments
in this direction. '81 This reasoning had always been there, but it was a moot point
as to the extent to which the economy was being used to cover a political dilemma.
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Had the British deigned to discuss the Ports then a cleaer picture of the Irish
government's commitment and financial abilty would have emerged, and yet the
knowledge that this had always been viewed, not least by the Finance Department,
as a cheaper option than maintaning a coasta navy should not detract from the fact
that this was also the only option that was politically viable. 
82 Cosgrave did not take
the meaing of his country's 'independent' defence policy lightly, even if the British
had made him impotent to give it clear internal, or external, effect.
But the embarrassed wish to cover this web of reasoning with silence was, over the
years, to cost Cosgrave dearly, and may even have contributed to his resignation of
the Fine Gael leadership in 1943. During most of the 1920s, when peace and
stabilty was all, the potential to conjure a public feeling of national assertion over the
Ports issue was always limited, but when de Valera managed to exploit this factor to
the full, in 1938, the former was soon called to account for his past 'failings'. His
entirely fabricated defence (on behalf of the then Fine Gael pary) was that he too had
been offered the Ports, back in 1927, and only the crippling expense had prevented
acceptance. Unfortunately for Cosgrave and his pary, Fianna Fail ministers had
perused (and no doubt leart from) the official files and were able to refute his
story. 
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To make matters worse, the same issue arose in the fetid atmosphere of the 1943
general election, when both paries, in part, played the defence and neutrality card
in an attempt to spoil a Labour revival. 
84 Once more Cosgrave claimed to have been
offered the Ports in 1927, and once more Fianna Fail claimed that the triumph was
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all theirs, and that, but for de Valera, Eire would have been dragged into the
European war because of Imperial 'shooting rights' at all three Treaty Ports. The
political damage incurred as Cosgrave faced the hustings accusations of acting 'in a
fit of childish pique and jeaousy', is hard to calculate, though it is certan that the
damning (and accurate) claims that the British had simply dismissed him did nothing
for his authority as pary leader. 
85 Nevertheless, by sticking to his fictional guns,
Cosgrave's version of events did achieve a respectabilty, to the point that one of
Ireland's most eminent historians has recently accepted the myth as fact.86
The irony is, that the facts of 'The Conference That Never Was' can be interpreted
to be far more flattering to Cosgrave and Cumann na nGaedheal than his own later
accounts could allow. The constitutional and political situation in the 1920s was a far
cry from that of the later 1930s; Cosgrave's 1927 stance on the Treaty Ports was
comparatively the more audacious, even if the implications had not been fully thought
through, and it has been seen that de Valera relied heavily on the achievements of
earlier defence battles. Had Cumann na nGaedheal been more experienced as a
political party, rather than as a pary of stable government, it might have been able
to exploit Imperial intransigence instead of merely succumbing to it.
But perhaps a last thought on the non-existent Conference should go to the man who,
above all, ensured its demise - Winston Churchil. While he never became reconciled
to the eventual loss of the Ports, or, for that matter, to the loss of Ireland from the
Empire, it is interesting that he had in part to invent an Irish defence sympathy of the
1920s in order to give weight to his damning opinion of de Valera's actions in the
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1930s and warime 1940s.87 But it has been seen throughout this thesis that in the
crucial area of defence relations, as epitomised by the April 1927 stace, that
supposed sympathy, on either side, was never there. The Dominions Office had tried
to foster the same and failed, for the simple reason that the Free State never was, nor
could be, a Dominion. The only thing that was there, as Churchil well knew, was
a Treaty that he had helped to dictate.
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DISCUSSION
Whatever else the Treaty achieved, its very existence has allowed many Irish and
Commonwealth historians to explore value changes without continuing, central,
reference to Anglo-Irish relations. By title and content this thesis has questioned this
omission, and in so doing it has also questioned the positive, if often unwitting,
judgements that these same historians have made for the Treaty itself. Further, this
thesis has premised defence issues as central, and not separate, to an assessment of
the Treaty, Dominion status and the bi-lateral relationship; defence, even in its
stakest strategic form, can be no more divorced from prejudice and politics than are
economic and social matters. Indee, defence so often defines the realpolitik of a
country's motives in external relations.
Beginning with the contentious nature of the Treaty defence n~gotiations, and the
sheer complexity of the British involvement in the events of 1922, certn Irish
defence concerns have been followed through to the later Cosgrave years, and by
implication beyond. Whether assessing the new situation in terms of personnel or
property, or in rakng over the legacy of the 1916-21 conflct, Dublin could not
escape the politics and on-ground consequences of Britain's defence requirements.
If it was difficult to accept the existence of an invented Border and the pure
symbolism of the Oath, then it was just as hard to accept the British uniform and
Union Jack continuing to roam where they wil, sail where they might, extract
benefits as right, all on the 'detached' basis of strategic need. It can be argued that
some of these practices were exaggerated by the concern to deny republican sympathy
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or possible attack, but how often did strategic claim and anti-republican display
disguise a blind belief in the visible continuity of Imperial rule? What, for example,
was the flaunting of the Irish Flag Station at Cobh (note that London never accepted
the changed names for Queenstown and Kingstown) supposed to signify?
Even from 1922, and certanly after the Cobh incidents of 1924, can be detected a
consistent Irish approach to these problems: one which ilustrates how a small
aspiring nation, though still at odds as to a definition of freeom, could nonetheless
move with a degree of common purpose around basic principles. The first objective
was to surround and contan the level of British intrusion, and only when this had
been achieved, post 1925, could attention turn to its complete removaL. Much of this
process was hesitat, some of it badly handled, but it was always there.
Significantly, thoughts of accommodation with London, in terms of the Free State's
own sea-defence interests, were contemplated only as an afterthought to this process
of removal. A contradiction? Certnly, yet it can be argued that the development
of neutrality, in dee and concept, was linked directly with the visible and potential
effects of Treaty defence demands, on land and coasta waters, in the South - the
problem with the North was largely irrelevant in this context. And much as it might
seem that the Cosgrave administrations, especially the ealy ones, were pressured in
this overall direction by the more overtly republican dictates of the Army and
Defence Deparment, this was seldom the case. Of course the Army tried to
browbeat, but neither before nor after the 1924 mutiny does the archive evidence
suggest that government was held to ransom on its reactions to Britan. On the
contrary, the degree of resignation in the senior Army ranks to democratic control
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was remarkable in such a young and troubled country. By the same token it is
difficult to detect, in its defence relations with Britan, the internal trend that Irish
historians have noted for the later Cosgrave years: that is a more aggressive attitude
to match the rise of Fianna FaiL. Levels of suspicion about British defence designs
were constat during this period.
It is equally importat to equate the significance of these defence concerns with
perceptions in London. It has been seen that from the moment of signing there were
misgivings, in several departments, that defence was the Achiles heel of the Treaty
- the one factor that threatened humiliation, made a parody of alleged status, and
which legally and practically threw doubt on the credibilty of the Treaty as a whole.
Defence exposed, as no other topic could, the impotence of the Colonial/Dominions
Office, especially under the influence of Leo Amery, to pursue the 'ideaist' view of
Imperial unity against the moral pragmatism of Churchilian Imperialism. But the
fact that the Dominions Office too had so often to hide behind the Treaty spoke of the
fundamenta sterility of relations and the utter implausibilty of Amery's hopes.
Above all others, Churchil realised that without the full rigour of the Treaty there
was a void in which authority might become indistinguishable from the capricious use
of naked power - anathema to the imperial mind. The Treaty Ports exemplified this
crossover between objective strategic requirement and political wil. By the
mid- 1920s the utilty of the Ports was already in question, and Britan certnly did
not nee to hold all of them, but the reaity was that they were as much symbols of
Imperial authority as, say, the Oath of Allegiance, and they could not be
compromised in part without threat to the Treaty as a whole. Strategic claim is, like
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politics, the ar of the possible (as 1938 was to prove), and it seems that historians
have paid too much respect to the supposed objectivity of the situation in the 1920s.
The more light that is shed on the Cosgrave years, the more the continuity and calibre
of the Anglo- Irish antagonism becomes apparent, and the more the Treaty itself is
brought into focus. Whereas the conjoined Border and financial settlement was
necessar in order to give the Free State basic definition, possible defence
settlements, as both Dublin and London reaised, pointed to the quality of that
definition. That quality, on the evidence of this thesis, was not high, and as such two
contrasting arguments concerning the Treaty and Dominion status can be compared
with its findings. The first, centres on the idea that the Free State was a Dominion
excepting the matter of defence - somehow a thing apar. This is the equivalent of
arguing that post-1945 East-West relations were adequate excepting the small matter
of the cold war and the nuclea arms race. Defence went to the heart of the Free
State's identity, in that the projection of the Treaty limitations on sea and coasta
matters affected, by stages, every level of internal defence policy, or the lack of it.
Similarly, the mirror image of this argument, which claims that the 1922
Constitution, following the spirit of the Treaty, was 'essentially republican', appears
somewhat hollow. This 1930s observation by the constitutional historian Leo Kohn
stil has currency, and though it can be queried simply on the basis that the primacy
of Treaty overrode the Constitution, the evidence of this thesis would suggest that it
was an odd form of republican licence that, in effect, gave London sanction over
sensitive internal, let alone external, developments. 
1 Defence could be treated as a
separate entity only if all other things were equal; this was never the case with
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Ireland, and the Treaty and the negotiations which preceded it testified to this.
The extent to which the image of the Cosgrave years has coloured an image of the
Treaty itself is difficult to assess, yet for all the internal trauma that came in its wake,
Irish historians have mostly viewed the Treaty in a positive light. The consensus
view would seem to echo Nicholas Mansergh, in that it was a 'bold experiment', a
challenge to both sides with futuristic ambitions.2 How so? Criticism of this view
must go deeper than to elaborate the fact that the Free State was an unnatural and
unwillng Dominion, importt though this point is, and must look more closely at
the British side of the equation. Not only did Britan invoke a formula meant for the
Canadian situation of the l860s, but if the Imperial historian Max Beloff is correct
then, even by 1921, there was more belief in the indefinite status quo than in any
positive idea of Empire development. 3 The Treaty was thus born in this post-war
void, during a period when the Empire was having to be held to reason by the gun,
and the evidence of this thesis, concerning senior British attitudes, would tend to
confirm that the prime objective in the 1920s was to hold the line while bowing to the
notion of change. Thus the benefit to Irish ambitions of the later constitutional
definitions was largely accidenta; progress toward 'freeom', however it might be
defined, was not inherent in the Treaty. As late as 1930, some British politicians
were insisting that Ireland be frozen at the 'safe' level of 1921 Dominion practice.4
In the summer of 1921 Lloyd George did not float Irish Dominion status as a radical
measure to spite the diehards: rather that status was the product of their prior
majority consent. The bitterness at the 'abandonment' of Southern Unionists was
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amply compensated, not least in terms of the Treaty defence measures, which were
explained to Parliament as being far more calculating than simple strategic nee might
dictate. In all, given that the inevitable extension beyond Home Rule was easily
contanable, within elastic constitutional formula, the question is as much about what
Britan actually surrendered, as of the status gained by the Free State.
It is, then, suggested that the Treaty was more reactionary in character than is
supposed, and that there was more to its origins and implementation than London's
desire to hope for the best while preparng for the worst. Indee, the Free State's
'best' might be irrelevant to the question: looking at Beloff's theories, seemingly
supported by the historian Brian Bond, it is possible to place the evidence of this
thesis in the wider context of Britan's shift from 'open' to 'conceaed' Imperialism,
the result of increasing economic and milita weakness from the turn of the century
- it seems that in 1921, Lloyd George tempted Egypt's Adli Pasha with the glories
of Commonwealth membership in much the same way as he tempted the Irish Treaty
delegates a few months later. Was it the same difference to the imperial mind -
maintaning permanent, if disguised, strategic control at a less troublesome and costly
distace?5
This argument places a question mark against Paul Canning's momentous idea of the
Treaty, which notes it as the first visible example of Britan's post-war appeasement
policy, and puts greater emphasis on theories such as those of John Darin, who also
believes that British Imperialism did not change in essentials during the inter-war
period. 
6 Hyam and Martin do not explore this line in relation to the Free State,
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though there may be a connection, in terms of the success of 'concealment', in their
analysis that the Empire was not an Olympian association 'but a bundle of individual
bilateral relationships between Britan and a host of weaer units.,7 If so, then far
from being 'bold', the Treaty was a new extension to a well rehearsed routine, one
which never threatened the stabilty of the other Dominions or Empire at large.
Appearance over reaity: a forced bi-lateral agreement masking as something more
embracing and ambitious. It is tellng that in their entirely sceptical evaluation of the
Free State as a Dominion, Hyam and Marin note the Treaty as no more than a 'fresh
shift' from the domestic to Imperial sphere, but then again this 'shift', either way,
had been a constat feature of Anglo-Irish relations. 
8
As such, research of the post-Treaty period has invarably placed the Empire car
before the bi-lateral/domestic horse, as could be expected when the Treaty has so
often been taken at face value and so little genuine Anglo-Irish study undertaen.
The tellng subject of this thesis would suggest that both countries were indee
circumspect as to the amount of 'shift' that had actually taen place. It has been seen
that even the most ardent Treaty man, Kevin O'Higgins, could not help viewing
Imperial defence in an Anglo-Irish context, and this same basic attitude was just as
prevalent in the British departments and committees that poured scorn on Dominion
Office propriety. The subject happened to be defence, but the attitude was often
general. Given the above, it was entirely possible for Ireland to be interchangeable
with, say, a recalcitrant Egypt or India in the one moment, and of bi-lateral
imperative the next; the lasting, if sometimes unconscious, genius of the British
imperial mind was in being able to identify the unique par within the whole.
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Irish historians have long noted that the force of Irish nationalism rejected both
domestic and Imperial domination, the one being par of the other, but arguably the
tendency for them to demote Britan's direct influence in the internal affairs of the
Free State after 1922 is as disturbing as it is understandable. The more so because
this self-contemplation of the post-Treaty period has been harsh in the extreme, to the
point where it might be assumed that modern Irish history is the product of a deep
perversion in the Irish-Catholic soul for blood sacrifice and suffering. But rather than
indulge J.J. Le's damning criticism of 'native genius', and his unkind comparsons
with contemporar Finnish and Hungaran nationalist efforts,9 it might be more
rewarding to place the effects of Irish revolutionary nationalism in an extended
twentieth century context of rebellon against imperialist powers in general and British
Imperialism in paricular. It may yet be seen that there was nothing extraordinar
about Ireland other than that its dramas were comparatively early and 'white'; if
anything was extraordinar then it was in the Imperial power's conjuring abilties, and
not in the schisms endemic to revolutions.
The point here in not to re-examine old Irish wounds regarding the Treaty and the
civil war, but to highlight that in any event the influences affecting self-determination
were far more subtle and pervasive than historians of either the left or right have
credited. Instead of the right's over-excitement at the internal struggle between
democracy and the, supposedly, dark forces of dictatorship, there is a case for
re-examining the factors that united Irish endeavours and which were eventually to
produce a greater continuity and coherence to Irish resistace in the 1920s and 30s
than has so far been acknowledged. In turn, the left might wish to note that when de
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Valera finally declared Irish neutrality in 1939 it was the end of a process that began
with the Treaty defence negotiations of 1921 and continued through Collns and
Cosgrave - the 'unfinished business' being finally resolved. Perhaps the obvious
discomfort of Irish and Imperial historians with the 'Dominion' years wil soon pass,
but in the meatime the 'restless' idea of the 1960s and 70s would no longer seem
adequate, nor the idea that the trappings of any given status represent the truth of it.
Given that the imperial mind of the early 1920s knew better than to try and define
Dominion status, it now seems increasingly strange that Irish 'performance' should
have been analysed, however sympathetically, on the basis of a document which was
anyway signed at metaphorical gunpoint. In the final analysis, it is milta forces
that define and maintan empires, and in being forced to sign the Treaty, the South
had then either to accept or oppose the continuing intrusion that represented the most
potent symbol of British Imperialism. Sensing the awkwardness of this question, in
terms of British intentions and the equity of Dominion status, liberal historians have
long had to assume a level of ealy Free State acquiescence and/or indifference to
defence matters that was never there. As such, the thought that Irish history
continued to reflect the nature of the Imperial beast that confronted it, poses ever
deeper questions.
AR
TI
CL
ES
 O
F 
AG
RE
EM
EN
T 
FO
R 
A 
TR
EA
TY
B
ET
W
EE
N
 G
RE
A
T 
BR
IT
A
IN
 A
N
D
 IR
EL
A
N
D
,
D
EC
EM
BE
R 
6,
 1
92
1
i.
 I
re
la
nd
 s
ha
ll
 h
av
e 
th
e 
sa
me
 C
on
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
st
at
us
 i
n 
th
e
co
m
m
u
n
ity
 o
f N
at
io
ns
 k
no
wn
 a
s 
th
e 
Br
itis
h 
Em
pi
re
 a
s 
th
e
D
om
in
io
n 
of
 C
an
ad
a,
 th
e 
Co
m
m
on
we
al
th
 o
f A
us
tra
lia
, t
he
D
om
in
io
n 
of
 N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
, a
nd
 th
e 
Un
io
n 
of
 S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
,
w
ith
 a
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t h
av
in
g 
po
w
er
s t
o 
m
ak
e 
la
w
s f
or
 th
e 
pe
ac
e,
o
rd
er
, a
nd
 g
oo
d 
go
ve
rn
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
, a
nd
 a
n 
Ex
ec
ut
ive
re
sp
on
sib
le
 to
 th
at
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t, 
an
d 
sh
al
l b
e 
sty
le
d 
an
d 
kn
ow
n
a
s
 
t
he
 I
ri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e.
2.
 S
ub
je
ct
 t
o 
th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 s
et
 o
ut
, 
th
e 
po
si
ti
on
o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
Im
pe
ria
l P
ar
lia
m
en
t
an
d 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 o
th
er
w
ise
 sh
al
l b
e 
th
at
 o
f t
he
 D
om
in
io
n
o
f C
an
ad
a,
 a
nd
 th
e 
la
w,
 p
ra
ct
ice
, a
nd
 C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l u
sa
ge
go
ve
rn
in
g 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
of
 th
e 
Cr
ow
n 
or
 th
e 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e
o
f t
he
 C
ro
wn
 a
nd
 o
f t
he
 Im
pe
ria
l P
ar
lia
m
en
t t
o 
th
e 
Do
m
in
io
n
o
f C
an
ad
a 
sh
al
l g
ov
er
n 
th
ei
r r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
to
 th
e 
Iri
sh
 F
re
e
St
at
e. 3.
 T
he
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
of
 th
e 
Cr
ow
n 
in
 Ir
el
an
d 
sh
al
l b
e
ap
po
in
te
d 
in
 li
ke
 m
an
ne
r a
s t
he
 G
ov
er
no
r-G
en
er
al
 o
f C
an
ad
a,
an
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
ak
in
g
o
f s
uc
h 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts.
4.
 T
he
 O
at
h 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
by
 m
e:
rb
er
s 
of
 th
e 
Pa
rli
am
en
t o
f
t
he
 I
ri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
sh
al
l 
be
 i
n 
th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
fo
rm
 :
-
I
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
do
 s
ol
em
nl
y 
sw
ea
r 
tr
ue
 f
ai
th
 a
nd
 a
ll
eg
ia
nc
e 
to
 t
he
C
o
n
s
t
it
ut
io
n 
of
 t
he
 I
ri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
as
 b
y 
la
w 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d,
an
d 
th
at
 I 
w
il 
be
 fa
ith
fu
l t
o 
H
.M
. K
in
g 
G
eo
rg
e 
V
, h
is 
he
irs
an
d 
su
cc
es
so
rs
 b
y 
la
w
, i
n 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p
o
f I
re
la
nd
 w
ith
 G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n 
an
d 
he
r a
dh
er
en
ce
 to
 a
nd
m
e
m
be
rs
hi
p 
of
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
of
 n
at
io
ns
 fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
Br
itis
h
Co
m
m
on
we
al
th
 o
f N
at
io
ns
.
5.
 T
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e S
ta
te
 sh
al
l å
ss
um
e l
ia
bi
lty
 fo
r t
he
 se
rv
ic
e
o
f t
he
 P
ub
lic
 D
eb
t o
f t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 a
s e
xi
sti
ng
 a
t t
he
da
te
 h
er
eo
f 
an
d 
to
wa
rd
s 
th
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
of
 W
ar
 P
en
si
on
s 
as
e
xi
st
in
g 
at
 th
at
 d
at
e 
in
 s
uc
h 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
as
 m
ay
 b
e 
fa
ir 
an
d
e
q
u
it
ab
le
, 
ha
vi
ng
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 a
ny
 j
us
t 
cl
ai
m 
on
 t
he
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
Ir
el
an
d 
by
 w
ay
 o
f s
et
-o
ff 
or
 c
ou
nt
er
-c
la
im
, t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f
su
ch
 su
m
s b
ei
ng
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 in
 d
ef
au
lt 
of
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t b
y 
th
e
ar
bi
tra
tio
n 
of
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t p
er
so
ns
 b
ei
ng
 c
iti
ze
ns
o
f t
he
 B
rit
ish
 E
m
pi
re
.
6.
 U
nt
il
 a
n 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 m
ad
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e
B
rit
ish
 a
nd
 Ir
ish
 G
ov
er
nm
en
ts 
w
he
re
by
 th
e 
Iri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e
u
n
de
rta
ke
s h
er
 o
w
n 
co
as
ta
l d
ef
en
ce
, t
he
 d
ef
en
ce
 b
y 
se
a 
of
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n 
an
d 
Ire
la
nd
 s
ha
ll b
e 
un
de
rta
ke
n 
by
 H
is 
M
aje
sty
's
I
m
p
e
r
ia
l 
Fo
rc
es
, 
bu
t 
th
is
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
 p
re
ve
nt
 t
he
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
o
r 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 b
y 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e
o
f s
uc
h 
ve
ss
el
s a
s a
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r t
he
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e
R
ev
en
ue
 o
r t
he
 F
is
he
rie
s.
 T
he
 fo
re
go
in
g 
pr
ov
isi
on
s 
of
 th
is
A
r
t
ic
le
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
re
vi
ew
ed
 a
t 
a 
co
nf
er
en
ce
 o
f 
Re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
s
o
f t
he
 B
rit
ish
 a
nd
 Ir
ish
 G
ov
er
nm
en
ts,
 to
 b
e 
he
ld
 a
t t
he
ex
pi
ra
tio
n 
of
 fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
 fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 h
er
eo
f w
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 to
th
e 
un
de
rta
ki
ng
 b
y 
Ire
la
nd
 o
f a
 sh
ar
e 
in
 h
er
 o
w
n 
co
as
ta
l
de
fe
nc
e.
7.
 T
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
sh
al
l a
ffo
rd
 to
H
is
 M
aj
es
ty
's
 I
mp
er
ia
l 
Fo
rc
es
(a)
 In
 tim
e o
f p
ea
ce
 su
ch
. h
arb
ou
r a
nd
 ot
he
r f
ac
ilit
ies
 as
ar
e 
in
di
ca
te
d 
in
 th
e.
 A
nn
ex
 h
er
et
o,
 o
r s
uc
h 
ot
he
r
fa
ci
lti
es
 a
s m
ay
 fr
om
 ti
m
e 
to
 ti
m
e 
be
 a
gr
ee
d 
be
tw
ee
n
th
e 
Br
iti
sh
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
Iri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e;
 a
nd
(b
) 
In
 t
im
e 
of
 w
ar
 o
r 
of
 s
tr
ai
ne
d 
re
la
ti
on
s 
wi
th
 a
 F
or
ei
gn
Po
w
er
 s
uc
h 
ha
rb
ou
r a
nd
 o
th
er
 fa
cil
itie
s 
as
 th
e 
Br
itis
h
G
ov
er
nm
en
t m
ay
 re
qu
ire
 fo
r t
he
 p
ur
po
se
s o
f s
uc
h
de
fe
nc
e 
as
 a
fo
re
sa
id
.
8.
 W
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 to
 se
cu
rin
g 
th
e 
ob
se
rv
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 p
rin
ci
pl
e
o
f i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l l
im
ita
tio
n 
of
 a
rm
am
en
ts,
 if
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
es
 a
nd
 m
ai
nt
ai
ns
 a
 m
ili
ta
ry
de
fe
nc
e 
fo
rc
e,
 th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
ts 
th
er
eo
f s
ha
ll 
no
t e
xc
ee
d 
in
siz
e 
su
ch
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f t
he
 m
ili
ta
ry
 e
sta
bl
ish
m
en
ts 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d
in
 G
re
at
 B
ri
ta
in
 a
s 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
of
 I
re
la
nd
be
ar
s t
o 
th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
of
 G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n.
9.
 T
he
 p
or
ts 
of
 G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n 
an
d 
th
e I
ris
h 
Fr
ee
 S
ta
te
 sh
al
l
be
 fr
ee
ly 
op
en
 to
 th
e 
sh
ip
s 
of
 th
e 
Qt
he
r c
ou
nt
ry
 o
n 
pa
ym
en
t
o
f t
he
 c
us
to
m
ar
y 
po
rt 
an
d 
ot
he
r d
ut
ie
s.
10
. T
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f. 
th
e 
Iri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
ag
re
es
 to
pa
y 
fa
ir 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
on
 te
rm
s n
ot
 le
ss
 fa
vo
ur
ab
le
 th
an
 th
os
e
ac
co
rd
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
A
ct
 o
f 1
92
0 
to
 ju
dg
es,
 of
fci
als
, m
em
be
rs
o
f P
ol
ic
e 
Fo
rc
es
, a
nd
 o
th
er
 P
ub
lic
 S
er
va
nt
s w
ho
 a
re
 d
isc
ha
rg
ed
by
 it
 o
r w
ho
 re
tir
e 
in
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t
ef
fe
ct
ed
 in
 p
ur
su
an
ce
 h
er
eo
f. 
Pr
ov
id
ed
 th
at
 th
is 
ag
re
em
en
t
sh
al
l n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 to
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 A
ux
ili
ar
y 
Po
lic
e 
Fo
rc
e 
or
:; Hi rr rD l- t" o :: lQ H
i
o r; 0.
:; 'i 'i t: Z t: H :
:
 
N m
I
-
 
w
to
 p
er
so
ns
 re
cr
ut
ed
 in
 G
re
a.
 B
rit
ai
n 
fo
t' t
he
 R
QY
al 
Iri
sh
C
o
n
s
t
a
bu
la
ry
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
tw
o 
ye
ar
ii
 n
~t
 p
re
ce
di
ng
 t
he
 d
at
e
he
re
of
. T
he
 B
rit
ish
 G
ov
er
m
:n
en
t w
il a
$u
me
 re
ipQ
Jli
bi.
ity
fo
r s
uc
h 
co
m
pe
ns
a.
tio
n 
or
 p
er
ui
Qp
.s 
M
 m
ay
 be
 pa
ya
ble
 to
 an
y
o
f t
he
se
 e
xc
ep
te
d 
pe
no
ns
.
Il.
 U
nt
il 
th
e 
ex
pi
ra
tio
n 
of
 o
ne
 m
on
th
 fr
om
 th
e 
pa
ss
in
g
o
f 
th
e 
Ac
t 
of
 P
ar
li
am
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
ra
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
th
 i
ns
tr
en
t,
th
e 
po
we
rs
 o
f t
he
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
G
ov
er
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
ex
er
ci
iia
bl
e 
il 
re
sp
ec
ts 
N
or
th
er
n
Ire
la
nd
, a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
s 
of
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
Ac
t, 
19
20
, s
ha
ll, 
so
 fa
r a
s 
th
ey
 re
la
te
 to
 N
or
th
er
n-
Ire
la
nd
,
re
m
ai
n 
in
 fu
ll 
fo
rc
e 
an
d 
ef
ec
t, 
an
d 
no
 e
le
ct
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
he
ld
fo
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
f 
me
mb
er
s 
to
 s
er
ve
 i
n 
th
e 
Pa
rl
ie
nt
 o
f 
th
e
Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
fo
r c
on
sti
tu
en
ci
es
 in
 N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
, u
nl
es
s
a
 
r
e
s
o
lu
ti
on
 i
s 
pa
se
d 
by
 b
ot
h 
Ho
us
es
 o
f 
P
a
r
li
am
en
t 
of
 
N
or
th
er
n
I
r
e
la
nd
 i
n 
fa
vo
ur
 o
f 
ho
ld
in
g 
of
 s
uc
h 
el
ec
ti
on
s 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 e
nd
o
f t
he
 sa
id
 m
on
th
.
12
. I
f, 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ex
pi
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
sa
id
 m
on
th
, a
n 
ad
dr
es
s
is 
pr
es
en
te
d 
to
 H
is 
M
aje
sty
 by
 bo
th 
Ho
use
s o
f P
arl
iam
en
t
o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 to
 th
at
 e
ffe
ct
, t
he
 p
ow
er
s o
f t
he
 P
ar
lia
-
m
e
n
t a
nd
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 'o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
sh
al
l n
o
lo
ng
er
 e
xt
en
d 
to
 N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
, a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ov
iio
ns
 o
f t
he
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
 A
ct
, 1
92
0 
(in
clu
din
g t
ho
se 
rel
ati
ng
 to
t
he
 C
ou
nc
il
 o
f 
Ir
el
an
d)
 s
ha
ll
 s
o 
fa
r 
as
 th
ey
 re
la
te
 to
 N
or
th
er
n
I
r
e
la
nd
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
to
 b
e 
of
 f
ul
l 
fo
rc
e 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
, 
an
d 
th
is
 i
ns
tr
-
m
e
n
t s
ha
ll 
ha
ve
 e
ffe
ct
 s
ub
jec
t to
 th
e n
ec
es
sa
ry 
mo
dif
ica
tio
ns
.
Pr
ov
id
ed
 th
at
 if
 su
ch
 a
n 
ad
dr
es
s i
s s
o 
pr
es
en
te
d 
a 
Co
m
-
m
is
si
on
 c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 th
re
e 
pe
rs
on
s,
 o
ne
 to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
th
e 
G
ov
er
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 Ir
ih
 F
re
e 
St
at
e,
 o
ne
 to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d
by
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
, a
nd
 o
ne
 w
ho
 sh
al
l
be
 C
ha
ir
ma
n 
to
 b
e 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 t
he
 B
ri
ti
h 
Go
ve
rn
me
nt
s
ha
ll
 d
et
er
mi
ne
 i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
th
e 
wi
sh
es
 o
f 
th
e 
in
hb
i-
ta
nt
s,
 s
o 
fa
r a
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
co
m
pa
tib
le
 w
ith
 e
co
no
m
ic 
an
d
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
 c
on
di
tio
ns
, t
he
 b
ou
nd
ar
ie
s b
et
w
ee
n 
N
or
th
er
n
I
r
e
la
nd
 a
nd
 t
he
 r
es
t 
of
 I
re
la
nd
, 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f 
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
 A
ct
, 1
92
0,
 an
d 
of
 th
is 
in
str
m
en
t,
th
e 
bo
un
da
ry
 o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 sh
al
l b
e 
su
ch
 a
s m
ay
 b
e
de
te
rm
ie
d 
by
 su
ch
 C
om
m
io
n.
13
. F
or
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 th
e 
la
st 
fo
re
go
in
g 
ar
tc
le
, t
he
 p
ow
er
s
o
f t
he
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t o
f S
ou
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
o
f I
re
la
nd
 A
ct
, i
 9
20
, t
o 
el
ec
t m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 C
ou
nc
il 
of
Ir
el
an
d 
sh
al
l a
fte
r t
he
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ih
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
is
co
n
st
itu
te
d 
be
 e
xe
rc
ise
d 
by
 th
at
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t.
14
. 
Mt
er
 t
he
 e
xp
ir
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ai
d 
mo
nt
h,
 i
f 
no
 s
uc
h
ad
dr
es
 a
s i
s m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 A
rti
cl
e 
i 2
 h
er
eo
f i
s p
re
se
nt
ed
, t
he
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
nd
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 sh
al
l c
on
-
tin
ue
 to
 e
xe
rc
ie
 a
s 
,re
sp
ec
ts
 N
or
th
er
 Ir
el
an
d'
 th
e 
po
we
rs
co
n
fe
rre
d 
on
 th
em
 b
y 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
 A
ct
, 1
92
0,
bu
t t
he
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t a
nd
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e
sh
al
l i
n 
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 h
av
e 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 m
at
te
rs
 in
re
sp
ec
t o
f w
hi
ch
 th
e 
Pa
rli
am
en
t o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 h
as
 n
ot
po
w
er
 to
 m
ak
e 
la
.w
s u
nd
er
 th
at
 A
ct
 (i
nc
lud
ing
 m
att
ers
 w
hic
h
u
n
de
r t
he
 ia
id
 A
ct
 a
re
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
jur
isd
ict
ion
 of
 th
e C
ou
nc
il ,
o
f I
re
la
nd
) t
he
 sa
me
 po
we
rs 
as 
in 
the
 re
st 
of 
Ire
lan
d, 
su
bje
ct
to
 s
uc
h 
ot
he
r p
ro
vi
io
ns
 a
s m
ay
 b
e 
ag
re
ed
 in
 m
an
ne
r h
er
ei
na
fte
r
ap
pe
ar
in
g.
15
. A
t a
ny
 ti
m
e a
fte
r t
he
 d
at
e h
er
eo
f t
he
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
al
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f S
ou
th
er
n
Ir
el
an
d 
he
re
in
af
te
r c
on
sti
tu
te
d 
m
ay
 m
ee
t f
or
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
di
sc
us
si
ng
 t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 l
as
t 
fo
re
go
in
g
ar
tic
le
 is
 to
 o
pe
ra
te
 in
 th
e 
ev
en
t o
f n
o 
su
ch
 a
dd
re
ss
 a
s i
s
th
er
ei
n 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
be
in
g 
pr
es
en
te
d 
an
d 
th
os
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
s
m
a
y
 
in
cl
ud
e:
-
(a
) 
Sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 w
it
h 
re
ga
rd
 t
o 
pa
tr
on
ag
e 
in
 N
or
th
er
n
Ir
el
an
d;
(b)
 Sa
feg
ua
rds
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd 
to 
the
 co
lle
cti
on
 of
 re
ve
nu
e i
n
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
;
(c)
 Sa
feg
ua
rds
 w
ith
 re
ga
i:d
 to
 im
po
rt 
an
d e
xp
ort
 du
tie
s
af
fe
ct
in
g 
th
e 
tra
de
 o
r i
nd
us
try
 o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
;
(d)
 Sa
feg
ua
rds
 fo
r m
ino
rit
ies
 in
 N
ort
he
rn 
Ire
lan
d;
(e
) 
Th
e 
se
tt
le
me
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
re
la
ti
on
s 
be
tw
ee
n
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 a
nd
 th
e 
Iri
sh
 F
re
e 
St
at
e;
(j)
 Th
e e
sta
bli
shm
en
t a
nd
 po
we
rs 
of 
a l
oc
al 
mi
liti
a i
n
N
o
r
t
he
rn
 I
re
la
nd
 a
nd
 t
he
 r
el
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 D
ef
en
ce
Fp
rc
es
 o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
an
d 
of
 N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
an
d 
if 
at
 a
ny
 su
ch
 m
ee
tin
g 
pr
ov
isi
on
s a
re
 a
gr
ee
d 
to
, t
he
 sa
m
e
sh
al
l h
av
e 
ef
fe
ct
 a
s i
f t
he
y 
w
er
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 a
m
on
gs
t t
he
 p
ro
-
vi
si
on
s 
su
bje
ct 
to 
wh
ich
 th
e p
ow
ers
 of
 th
e P
arl
iam
en
t a
nd
 th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
ar
e 
to
 b
e 
ex
er
cis
ab
le
 in
N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 u
nt
le
r A
rti
cl
e 
14
 h
er
eo
f.
16
. N
ei
th
er
 th
e P
ar
lia
m
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e S
ta
te
 n
or
 th
e
Pa
rli
am
en
t o
f N
or
th
er
n 
Ire
la
nd
 sh
al
l m
ak
e 
an
y 
la
w
 so
 a
s
ei
th
er
 d
ire
ct
ly
 o
r i
nd
ire
ct
ly
 to
 e
nd
ow
 a
ny
 re
lig
io
n 
or
 p
ro
hi
bi
t
o
r 
re
st
ric
t t
he
 fr
ee
 e
xe
rc
ise
 th
er
eo
f o
r g
iv
en
 a
ny
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
or
im
po
se
 a
ny
 d
isa
bi
lty
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f t
he
 re
lig
io
us
 b
el
ie
f o
r
re
lig
io
us
 st
at
us
 o
r a
ffe
ct
 p
re
jud
ici
all
y t
he
 rig
ht 
of 
an
y c
hil
d t
o
at
te
nd
 a
 sc
ho
ol
 re
ce
iv
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
 m
on
ey
 w
ith
ou
t a
tte
nd
in
g 
th
e
re
lig
io
us
 in
st
ru
ct
io
n 
at
 th
e 
sc
ho
ol
 o
r m
ak
e 
an
y 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n
as
 r
es
pe
ct
s S
ta
te
 a
id
 b
et
w
ee
n 
sc
ho
ol
s u
nd
er
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
o
f d
iff
er
en
t r
el
ig
io
us
 d
en
om
in
at
io
ns
 o
r d
iv
er
t f
ro
m
 a
ny
re
lig
io
us
 d
en
om
in
at
io
n 
or
 a
ny
 e
du
ca
tio
na
l in
st
itu
tio
n 
an
y
:J
"
0
"
0 ro :: p. 1-. X f-
N 0' ,r
O
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 th
e 
Br
itis
h
D
e
le
ga
ti
on
 :
..
D
.
 
L
L
O
Y
D
 
G
E
O
R
G
E
.
Au
sT
EN
 C
HA
BE
RL
AI
N.
B
IR
K
N
H
EA
D
.
W
IN
ST
O
N 
S.
 C
HU
RC
ID
LL
.
L
.
 
W
O
R
T
I
D
N
G
T
O
N
 
E
V
A
N
S.
H
A
 
G
R
E
E
N
W
O
O
D
.
G
O
RD
O
N 
HE
W
AR
T.
BE
LF
AS
T 
LO
UG
H.
(c)
 H
arb
ou
r d
efe
nc
es 
to 
rem
ain
 in
 ch
arg
e o
f B
rit
ish
 ca
re
a
n
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
ar
tie
s.
LO
UG
H 
SW
lL
LY
.
(d)
 H
arb
ou
r d
efe
nc
es 
to 
rem
ain
 in
 ch
arg
e o
f B
rit
ish
 ca
re
a
n
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
ar
tie
s.
A
V
IA
TI
O
N
.
(e)
 Fa
cil
itie
s i
n t
he
 ne
igh
bo
urh
oo
d o
f t
he
 ab
ov
e p
ort
s f
or
co
as
ta
l d
ef
en
ce
 b
y 
ai
r.
O
I
L
 
F
U
E
L
 
ST
OR
AG
E.
(f)
 H
au
lbo
wl
ine
, R
ath
mu
lle
n-T
o b
e o
ffe
red
 fo
r s
ale
 to
.
Co
m
m
er
cia
l C
om
pa
ni
es
 u
nd
er
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 th
at
 p
ur
-
ch
as
er
s s
ha
ll 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
a 
ce
rta
in
 m
in
im
um
 st
oc
k 
fo
r
A
dm
ira
lty
 p
ur
po
se
s.
2.
 A
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
m
ad
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
Br
itis
h
G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
to
gi
ve
 e
ffe
ct
 to
 th
e 
fo
llo
wi
ng
 c
on
di
tio
ns
:-
(a)
 T
ha
t s
ub
ma
rin
e c
ab
les
 sh
all
 no
t b
e l
an
de
d o
r w
ire
les
s,
st
at
io
ns
 fo
r c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 p
la
ce
s o
ut
sid
e 
Ire
la
nd
be
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
ex
ce
pt
 b
y 
ag
re
em
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
Br
itis
h
G
ov
er
nm
en
t; 
th
at
 th
e 
ex
ist
in
g 
ca
bl
e 
la
nd
in
g 
rig
ht
s
an
d 
w
ire
le
ss
 c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
w
ith
dr
aw
n 
ex
ce
pt
by
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
Br
iti
sh
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t; 
an
d 
th
at
th
e 
Br
iti
sh
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ha
ll b
e 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 la
nd
a
dd
itio
na
l s
ub
m
ar
in
e 
ca
bl
es
 o
r e
st
ab
lis
h 
ad
di
tio
na
l
st
at
io
ns
 fo
r c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 p
la
ce
s o
ut
sid
e 
Ire
la
nd
.
(b)
 T
ha
t li
gh
tho
us
es,
 bu
oy
s, 
be
ac
on
s, 
an
d a
ny
 na
vig
ati
on
al
m
ar
ks
 o
r n
av
ig
at
io
na
l a
id
s s
ha
ll 
be
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
as
 a
t t
he
 d
at
e 
he
re
of
an
d 
sh
al
l n
ot
 b
e 
re
m
ov
ed
 o
r a
dd
ed
 to
 e
xc
ep
t b
y 
ag
re
e-
m
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
Br
iti
sh
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t.
(c)
 T
ha
t w
ar 
sig
na
l s
tat
ion
s s
ha
ll b
e c
los
ed
 do
wn
 an
d l
eft
in
 c
ha
rg
e 
of
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 p
ar
tie
s,
 th
e 
G
ov
er
n-
m
en
t o
f t
he
 Ir
ish
 F
re
e 
St
at
e 
be
in
g 
of
fe
re
d 
th
e 
op
tio
n
óf
 tã
ld
ng
 th
em
. o
Vl
Jr
 â
nd
 w
or
kin
g 
th
em
 fo
r c
om
m
er
cia
l
pu
rp
os
es
 su
bje
ct 
to 
Ad
mi
ral
ty 
im
pe
cti
on
 an
d g
ua
ran
-
te
ei
ng
 th
e 
up
ke
ep
 o
f e
xi
sti
ng
 te
le
gr
ãp
hi
c 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
th
er
ew
ith
.
3.
 A
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
sh
al
l b
e 
m
ad
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
G
ov
er
n-
m
en
ts
 fo
r t
he
 re
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 C
iv
il 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
by
 A
ir.
o
f i
ts 
pr
op
er
ty
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 p
ub
lic
 u
til
ity
 p
ur
po
se
s a
nd
 o
n
pa
ym
en
t o
f c
om
pe
na
tio
n.
17
. B
y 
wa
y 
of
 p
ro
Vi
io
na
l a
rra
ng
em
en
t f
or
 th
e 
ad
xn
tra
-
t
io
n 
of
 S
ou
th
er
 I
re
la
nd
 d
ur
ng
 t
he
 i
nt
er
va
l 
wl
uc
h 
mu
st
e
la
ps
e 
be
tw
ee
n.
 t
he
 d
at
e 
he
re
of
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
of
 a
P
a
r
li
am
en
t 
an
d 
Go
ve
rn
en
t 
of
 t
he
 I
ri
h 
Fr
ee
 S
ta
te
 i
n
a
c
c
o
r
da
nc
e 
th
er
ew
it
h,
 s
te
ps
 s
ha
l 
be
 t
ak
en
 f
or
th
wi
th
 f
or
su
m
m
o
n
in
g 
a 
m
ee
tin
g 
of
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f P
ar
lia
m
en
t e
le
ct
ed
 fo
r
c
o
n
s
t
it
ue
nc
ie
s 
in
 S
ou
th
er
n 
Ir
el
an
d 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
pa
si
ng
 o
f 
th
e
G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
f I
re
la
nd
 A
ct
, 1
92
0,
 an
d 
fo
r c
on
sti
tu
tin
g 
a
p
r
o
v
is
io
na
l 
Go
ve
rn
en
t,
 a
nd
 t
he
 B
ri
ti
h 
Go
ve
rn
me
nt
 s
ha
ll
ta
ke
 th
e 
st
ep
s 
ne
ce
sa
r t
o 
trn
sf
er
 to
 s
uc
h 
Pr
ov
isi
on
al
 G
ov
ei
:n
-
m
e
n
t t
he
 p
ow
er
s 
an
d 
m
ac
lu
ne
ry
 re
qu
isi
te
 fo
r t
he
 d
isc
ha
rg
e 
of
its
 d
ut
ie
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
at
 e
ve
ry
 m
em
be
r o
f s
uc
h 
pr
ov
isi
on
al
G
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ha
ll 
ha
ve
 si
gn
ifi
ed
 in
 w
rit
in
g 
hi
 o
r h
er
 a
cc
ep
t-
a
n
c
e
 
o
f 
th
is
 i
ns
tr
um
en
t.
 B
ut
 t
hs
 a
rr
an
ge
me
nt
 s
ha
ll
 n
ot
c
o
n
t
in
ue
 i
n 
fo
rc
e 
be
yo
nd
 t
he
 e
xp
ir
at
io
n 
of
 t
we
lv
e 
mo
nt
hs
fro
m
 th
e 
da
te
 h
er
eo
f.
18
. 
Th
i 
in
st
re
nt
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
su
bm
it
te
d 
fo
rt
hw
it
h 
by
 l
us
M
aje
sty
's 
Go
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Source: Public General Statutes
1922 Geo.V. 12-13
se HE DU LE.
CONSTI Acn.
DAI EmRA sittin as a Constituent Asmbly in "",
Prviional Parliament, acknowled that aJ lawfu authoia'
comes from God..o the people and in the confdence that't .
National life and unity .of Ireland shall thus be retore, he~~,
prolaims the establishment of The Irh Free State (oth . '.,'
caJled Saorst Eirnn) and in the exercise of undoubte ri:J.
decre and enacts as follows :- . . :
1. The Constitution set forth in the First SchedÚle he ,
anexed shall be the Constitution of The Irih Free S~d(Saorst Eiann). ::.\:~i-
. 2. The said Constitution shall be construed with refereno " ~~~.
the Aricles of Agment for a Traty between Gret BritáIJ
and Ireland set forth in the Seond Schedule hereto annèX~
(hereinafter referr to as cc the Scheduled Treaty") which;~
hereby given the force of law, and if any provision of the sa~
Constitution or of a.ny amendment thereof or of any law mad~
thereunder is in any respect repugnant to any of the proviionsj
of the Scheduled Trety, it shall,. to the extent only of suc~
repugnancy, be absolutely void and inoperative and the Par~1
liament and the Executive Council of the Irish Free State
(Saorstát Eirnn) shal respectively pas such .further legislation:
and do all such other this as may be necessary to im:pleme~~ithe Scheduled Traty..'
3. This Act may be cite for all purposes as the Constitution
of The Irih Free State (Saorstát Eirann) Act, 1922. '."
FIRST SCHEDUL ABOVE REFERRED TO.
i
~ !j
'J
.:iC~:lArticle 1. . ~1
The Irish Free State (otherwise hereinafter called or sometimes'
called Saorstát Eireann) is a co-equal member of the Community,
of Nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations. . .'
CONSTITUON OF THE IRISH FREE STATE.
(SAORSTÁT EIRE~.)
.1
Article 2.
All powers of governent and all authorit.y legislative, execu';'
tive, and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people' of
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Ireland and the same shall bè exeris in the Irih Fr ,State
,(Sarstát Einn) through the orgnistions eàtablished .byør,
under, and in acord with, this Conaitution. . '.
Article 3.
Every person, without distinction of sex, domiciled in the are
'of the jurction of the Irh Fr State (Saorstát Errnn).
at the time of the' oomig into operation of thi CoMtitution'
who was born in Irland or either of whose pàrents was born in
. Irland or who has been ordinariy 'resident in the area of the
. juridiction of the Irih Fr State (Sarstát Eirann) for not less
. than seven years, is a citizn of the Irh Fre StaM (Saorstát
Eirann) 'and shall withi the lits of the jurisdiction of the
'lrhFr State (Saorstát Eirann) enjoy the privieges and be
subject tò the obliations of such oitizenship: Provided that
any such peon bein a citizen of another State may elect not to
'accept the citizenship hereby conferrèd; and the conditions
'govern the future acquisition and termination of citizenship
. in the Irh Fr State (Sarstát Eirann) shall be determed bylaw. .
Article 4.
The National language of the Irih Fre State (Saorstát
Eira.nn) is the Irih langage, but the Englih language. shall be
. equally recoged as an offcial langage. Nothing in this Ariole
. shall prevent spia proviions being made by the Parliament of
the Irh Fr State (otherwe oalled and herein generaly referred
to as the cc Oiachtas ") for distriots or a.reas in whioh only one
language is in general use.
Article 5.
No title of honoUr in respect of any servces rendere in or in
relation to the Irih Free State (Saorstát Eireann) may be con-
ferred on any oitizen of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann)
except with the approval or upon the advice of the Executive
. Council of the State.
Articl 6.
The liberty of the person is inviolable, and no person shall
be deprived of hi liberty exoept in accordance with law. Upon
. complaint made by or on behalf of any person that he is being
. unawfuly detained, the High Court and any and every judge
theref shal forthwith enqui into the same and may make
, an order reui the person in whose oustody suoh person
shal be detained to produce the body of the person so detained
! before such Court or judge without delay and to oertify in wrting
I as to the cause of the, detention and suoh Court or judge shall '
L thereupon order the 
'release of such person unless satisfied that he
i is being detained in àocordance with the law:
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.;;
" Provided, however, that 'notbimths Aricle èontaù:
sha be invOked to prohibit contrl or interfere withanY:,ll1t~
of the miita foroes of .the Irh Fr.8tate (Saorstát ,Eiann)i
duri the exitenoe of a state of war or armed rebellon. . ;f~
;;.;;~
;,;/j.Article 7. . , -~.
The dwellg of each oitizn is inviolable a.nd shal not,',..
f~rcibly en~re,cl eX~'pt in, ~ooordance with law. , .~l~;;;.
, " ". ." . '." ArliCle 8. ' , ,- ~Îiio
.: , .".. . '.' " 'l"\"r;-'t~
. Freedom of oonsoi~nce and the fr profession and praotl~
otreligion ar, subject to publio order and morality, gun.~:.,.'.;.'. ¡
to every oitien, a~d no law may be made either diclli:'d i
inditly to endow any religion, or prohibit or retr~t' ,ïAè
~ exerois thereof or give any preference, or im'p~ A". ¡
di~1,Uity on accoun. of ,religious belief or relious $tet~~~' ~
à.ff~~~; ~ prejlidi~.ia.llN th?: ~ght ,of any. ohild to . a~te~ a.' ~¡:
receivi publio money without attending the religious intr'l)~9
at the school, or make any dicriirnation as respects Stâ~:: .
between schools under the management of dierent reliV.,
denominations, or divert from any religious denomiation or å'hß
eduoational intitution any of its property except for the puroo
of rods. ra.ilways, lighti, water or draige' works or:..thel'
works of publio. utilty, iand on payment of oompensation. ,i'¡W~
. :.. ;f",~Article 9. :¡.j~flii
The right of free expression of opinon as well as th~ '~~.g¡d;
to asmble peacably and without arms, and to form asooiatio
or unions is guaranted for purposs not opposd to' pü'bli ;
morality. Laws reguating the manner in which the riht' of!
forming asociations and the right of fre assembly may be
exercisd shall :contain no political, religious or èlas distiti?~.~
Article 10." 11j
. Al citins of the 1rih Free State (Sao.rstá.t Eirann) hav~~~:'~..¡
nght to fre elementary eduoation. \ 'i~
.' . ~,
Article 11, ',i
:1
All the la.nds ah.d'waters, mines and minerals, withintii
terrtory of. the, Irish; Free State (Saorstát Eirann) :hith&1'
vested in the State, or any department thereof, or held' ,for ~t.
publi use or benefiti and also all the natural resòuroes :0£ :tli\
same terrtory'(ino~~ding the air an~ all f~~s of potenti.alenCllgs)l
and also alroyalities and. franohises withi .that ternton shll!
from and after the date of theooming into' operation of i (tbil
Con8titution, belong to the Irish Fre State (Saorstát iEirM)l!
iubject to any trusts, granta, leases or oonoesSions then e~~!
in respeot thereof. or anv valid DFivate interest therein.; and,
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j
.1lhá ~'~ '~ntiied'&.nd 'âd.ær6:"by the '~h't11: in
i\rdn~ with '8uohieMåon and' .proviions as; shMl \ ~
frm tie to tie approved by legilation, but the same iltill
: not, nor sha any part t1leref, 'be alienated, but may in the
. publio, interet be frnm tie to tie grante by way of lea or
'.lcence 'to'oowotked'or enjoye under'the'authonty an.d.~siibjeot
to the conÙ'I of the Oira.hta: Prvided that 'nò suöh,'leas
'0licenoe'may:oo"indtdor a term exoodi ,nietypnie years, i
tbe frn:i'the'date-iherof, an 'no' BÙOO ;leae Îorr licence
. 
may 'be renéwableby the-term.thérf~, '. I:'
:l' Arlic 12.
. . A'Legiture is hereby óreted to be known as the Oiraohta.
: It shal oonSt òf' the Kig and two Houss, the Chamber of
~ 'Deputi :(otherwse öaIled and here generally' referrd to as
.... Dá.iE'ii ") !arid'the Senaiè '(otheiwe oàned àrld "lièreIô
generaY"terid to 'as cc Seiiad'Eiraiiii'''~. . 'lhëøöle"l'hd
exclusve power of mak laW' for the peace, order and good
governent of the Irih Fr State. (Saorstát Eirann) is vested in
. ,the Oirachta. '.,!-
Arlic 13.
.' . . The O~hta shåll ~t~ 0i: '~~l the ci~y of ?~b~ ':q~ .;in
. such other place as from tie to tfe it may determe. .'" .". I .-. . .
Art 14.
All citins of the Irish Fr State (Saorstát Eirann) without
. 'distinotion,of sex, who have rehed the ageof.twenty-oIl years
. ,and ,who.,comply with the proviions of the prevail ,e~ootoal
, la we, shall have tne, right to vote for mem.l~eT8" of :Qái Xirl\nD
, and to tae part in the Referendum and Initiative. Al oitins
, of the Irh Free State (Saorstát Einn) without ditinotion
, of sex who have reaohed the age of thirty years and who oomply
~ with the proviions of the prevaitgeleotoral laws, shal) ..tave
"the right to vote for members of, Seanad Eirann, NI? trQ~
'. 'may exeroise more than one vote at an election to eitlier ÎIòùse
and the' 'Votin shall be by secret baÍlo.t..,' The' mode 'an~ place of
exercising this nght shall be determned by law, ' '
Article 15.
Every citizen who has reached the age of twenty-oD4~ .year"
'and who' is not placed under disabilty or inoapacity by ~e
:' -Constitution or by law shall be eligible to becoine a membè~ ,Jf¡ Dáil Eirann. i .' ,,:1
Articl.e 16.
, 'No person majr be at the same time a i'mmberboih of,Dátl
'Eil'ann anÙ of Seonad 'Eirann, and if any person who is alrady
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~ a member of either Hous is elected to ~ a member of the oth~
Hous, he shal forthwith be deei: to have vacated hi ~.
~~ . ~
Artic 17.
. . .: .', ~:i-The oath to be taen by members of the OirachtashaU¡ ..
ID th followig form :~ . . .' "T.
i .................................... do solemny swear .tr~1
faith and alegiance to the Constitution of the Irsh ~
State as by law establie:hed, and that I wi be faitli
to HM. Ki George V., hi heir and successors by law
in vie of the common citinship of Irland with Grea~
Brita and her adrence to and membership of the gr~. .
of nations form the British Commonwealth of Natio¡:'
Such oath shall be taen and subscrbed by every memW.
of the Oirhta before takig hi seat therein beforeili~
Reprentative of the Crown or some persn authorid by hi~
Article 18.
Every member of the Oirachta shall, except in case of
treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privieged from arrt
in going to and returg from, and whie withi the precinots
of either Hous, and 'shall not, in respet of any utterance in either
Hous, be amenable to any action or procdig in any Cour
other than the Hous itslf.
Article 19.
Al offcial reports and publications of the Oireachtas or of
either House thereof shall be privieged and utterances made in
either Hous wherever published shall be privileged.
Article 20.
Each House shall make its own Rules and Standing Orders,
with power to attach .penalties for their inringement and shall
have power to ensure ireom of debate, to protet its offoial
documents and the private papers of its\members, and to protet
itself and its members against any persÒl or persons interferi
with, molesting or attempting to corrpt its members in the
exercise of their duties.
A "ticle 2 1.
Each House shall elect its own Chairman and Deputy
Chairan and shal prescribe their powers, duties, remunera
tion, and terms of offce.
Article 22.
All matters in each House shaH, save as otherwise provided
by this Constitution, be determined by a majority of the' vote
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:pf the m~inbers prent other than the Chairan or preidpg
:member, 'who shall have and exercis a casin vote in tpe .ças
of an equalty of vote. The number of members necesry
to constitute a meetin of either House for the exercis of its
,/powers sh, be . determed by its Standi Orders.
, Art~:23.
The Oihta shall make proviion for the payment of its i
member and may in addition provide them with free travel..
, lig facilties in any part of Irland~
Artic 24.
The Oiachtas I!halI hold at leat one seSsion eaeh year;t The Oirhtas shall be sumoned and diolved by the Repre-
; sentative of the Crown in the name of the Ki a.nd subject
, as afored Dáil Eir shall fi the date of re-assembly of
. the Oirachta and the date of the conclusion of the session
of eah House: Provided that the seions of Seanad Eirann
. shall not be concluded without its own consent.
.¡"
Article 25.
Sittings of each House of the Oirachtas shall be public.
, In cass of spial emergency either House may hold a private
'sitting with the asnt of two-thi of the members present.
Article 26.
Dáil Eirann shall be compose of members who represent
, constituencies determined by law. The number of members
, shall be fixed from time to time by the Oireachtas, but the total
.,' number of membere of Dáil Eirann (exclusive of members for
the Universities) shaJl not be fixed at less than one member for
, each thiy thousand of the population, or at more than one
, member for eah twenty thousand of the population: Provided
: that the proportion between the number of members to be
¡ electe at any time for each constituenoy and the population
'. of each constituenoy, as ascertained a.t the last preced census,
: 'shaH, so far as possible, be identical throughout the country.
. The members shal be elected upon priciples of Proportional
Representation. The Oirachtas shall revise the constituencies
at least once in every ten years, with due regard to changes ip
ditribution of the population, but any alterations in the con-
stituencies shal not take effect durg the ile of Dáil Eireann
sitting when suoh reviion is made. .
Article 27.
Eacli University in the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann)'
which was in exitence at the date of the comig into operation
of thi Constitution. shall be entitled to elect three representat.ives
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. to DlW'Eirn ÙpOÙB frc4is aIÌd fu a'fuarierto.~'p~ .
bylaw. .,' '.' . d .,.. :.'::. .::r....:~.:'~r~.:..
Article 28., . '"
At a Geern Election for Dil :Eiann thepol.l:(exól. . :~
of thoae for members for the l,niversities) shall be held ont d
same day thrughout the country, and that day shal be a ~.
not late ,than thy dayåafter the. dat. of .the dilutiôI ...~ l
shall be prol&ied a publo holiday. .Dá. Eirannsh,ni~
withi one month of such d8N,and shH .unes earlier di~
continue for four years from the date of its fit meeting, and,
not longer. Dáil Errann may "not. at any time be diolv~
except on the advice of the Executive Council. . . .;;:l.j
. ;:;¡~1i1
Article 29 . . . .: '.";rt~
; In cas of death, reignation or diqualcation of a. membe:t~
Dái Eirann, the vacanoy shall be fied by election in ma~
to be determed by ,law. '. ;¡ ~j
Article 30. ' : ¡hì~~
Seanad Eiann shaH be compos of citizns who shalL~
proposed on the grounds that they have' done honour toth~
Nati~n by ~o?- of ~seful ;public servce or .that, ~aÜ&.rr~.:'
speia qualcations or attainents, they represent. impo~
aspets of the Nation's lie. "1
Article 31. . .
The number of members of Seanad Eirannshall be sixty. ,Ai
citizen to be eligble'for membership of Seanad Eirann must;~¡(l
persn eligible to beome a member of Dáil Eireann, and mi.... - .
have reached the age of thiry-five years. Subject to',' 'd '.' -
proviion for the oonsitution of the first Seanad Eirann the .~"l;l
of offoe of a member of Seanad Eirann shaH be twelve ye -,1f
,;'
Article 32. . . .,' . ,t¡.'
One-fourth of' the members of SOÌiad Eirnn' 'shà.~':,
electe every thtee years from a pa.nel OQnstituted as hei:ein~
mention~ . at . ~n. election at whic~ the &rea óf the juiòMt'¡
of the Irh Fr State (Saorstát Eireann) shall form one ,elec:t .
~' arid ~h~ eJ~~iors ,shàll be hel~ ~npri~iples of Propo¥~~C'preenta:tion. .,. ¡. ..... ., '. "I,. d~.
. '. Article. 33. . .' . ¡¡~~
Before each election of meIrbers 'of Seanad'Eireann a'pt .;.',
shall be formed oonsisting of ;- !
(a) The times a~i'nanyqùalied persons as ther ar
members' -tò be eleCte, of whom t,,ò-thids. shal. be-
nomñ:ate by"Dáil' Eireann votingacco!ring to :pi'iih~&
of Proportonal Representation and one-thi sha.ll. Bè
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'i¡;;~. ;;nóimtø bySenad;E~:voti iwco~ to p~~iples
'i,: '.: nf: P,rtipnal Relltation;' and' '.:1" ;,iit i; ¡
- ,,' ,,;((f¡)-°Such persons whohave-at any tie beme~bers,at
'.'; - ,SeEir (includi members about to.reir)¡,a
;~;')''i ;.~(1?y notica in w,tÚl ~~ to.; the ~ii~
~,,_ .",,¡Qf¡ the_;EiiecutiveCounoil.th,ei desir to be inllK"Ìn
. : the ,pal. . 0 " - r
: 0 . 'i!. Diethod of propal andælection 'for .nomitiii,sha1
be. i,ecdØ(l byDá Eírnn and Senad.Eirann iespetiv.ely,
mth--.spià reference'to the nooity ¡for arrngi lor'the
'd repre&mtation of importnt intere and, irtitutions in the
: country: 'Prvided that -each 'prol shall be in wrin' and
" shal state the qualications of the person proposed and that no
perso:n shaJ be propose without his own consnt. As soon
',' ås the panel has ben formed a-llit of ,the names 'of the nietibers
of, the, panel arange.in alphaibetical'order with -thei -qualiorr
tioDS '~han .~ publi~ed., ' " .,., . '"
'"-I"-tl
Article ,34.
o In càø -of ¡the death,' regnation' or diqualifcation .of à
member of the Seanad Eirann hi place shall be fied by a vote
, of Se Eiann. Any member of Seanad EireaIi so ohosen
, shall reti from offee~t ihe;~onelul!OÍl' óf the tbiee yé&fl'period
~, then ru and ,thevaoanoy th-us oreate Bhall be llditiohlil
r: to the -places 'to be filed under Aricle 32 of this Constitution.
The term of offce of the members chosen at theeleotion Mter
the fit fiften elected sha)) oonclude at the end of the period
or period at whicli the member or members of Seanad Eirann,
by' whòs death 01' Withdrwal the vacanoy or vacancies was or
were oriallY' oreate, woùld 'be due to retir: Provided ,that
'thè sinth mem'&t shall be 'deemed to have filed the'vacanoy
fit oreäte in oroero~ time 'aììdso 'on.' : ,-" ... . i .
,-
Artice 35.
-Dáil 'Eireann shall in relation to the 8ubject matter of Money
Bills as hereinaftr defined have legilative authority 'exolusiveof Sead Eirann. ' .
A Money Bil means a Bil which contain .only'proionS
'deag with aU or any of the followisubjects, namely, the
impostion, repeal, remIsion"alteration. or reguation ofitxation';
the imposition 'for the .payment. of. debt or other fianoial pures
i of .oharges on publio',moneys or'the varition 'or repeal of any
such ,oharges ; supply ;' 'the : appropriation, reeipt, outoy,
isue ¡or' audit of acoounts of publio money; the-raising fi guar-
ante ,of 'any loan or the 'repaymt thei'f ~ 8ubordatematters
,inoidental to ,those subjects or :aný of them. In this defition
the'expl'~ion".-taxation," - "publi9 'money." and:" loan" ,
respetively do not include any ;taxation, money or loan' rais
by local authorities or bodies ¡or localpurpQses.
.. : 'i
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in hi opinon is a Money Bil to be a Money Bil, but, if! ",,' ,
t.hr daysa.r a Bil hss been pa by Dáil Eir, ': ' '
fifths of thê members of either House by notice inWr '._'
addrss to the Chairan of the House of which they.',
members so requi, the question whether the Bil is or is no:,',
Money Bil shal be referr to a Committe of PrVi"
consisting of thr members eleète by each House with a, ' , '
man who shal be the senior judge of the Supreme Cour'iØ: '
and wiing to act, and who, in the ca of an equality ofv",
but not otherw, shall be entitled to vote. The dooisonl
the Committ on' the questio~ shall be final and conclusiV~t7.íi
Article 36. ' ,:"i~
Dáil Eir shall ss son 8. poible after the commencemel~
of eah financial year consider the Estimate of receipts ¡a.Q.
expnditure of the Irh Fre State (Saorstát Eireann) for 1i't
year, and, save in so far ss may be provided by specifc enactmen.~
in eah ~ase, the legislation requi to give efl~ot. to the FinanO~,',','l','
Reolutions of each year shall be enacte withi that y~ar. ;'t
. '1ÆArtic 37. ' ")!1
, Money shall not be appropriated by vote, reolution or J8.;.~
unless the purose of the appropriation has in the same sesio.n.:
been recommended by a mesage from the Representative9f'
the Crown acting on the advice of the Executive Council. ljf
-'.lL~: ~Article 38. , 'i..:.i
Every Bil intiate in and pasd by Dáil Eirann shall:
be sent to Seanad Eirann and may, unless it be a Money Bil,:
be amended in Seanad Eiann and Dáil Eireann shall consider:
any such amendment; but a Bil pased by Dáil Eireami ,and
considered by Seanad Eirann shall, not later than two hundr
and seventy days after it shall have been fit sent to Seanad
Eirann, or such longer period as may be agree upon by the,
two Houses, be deemed to be pased by ,both Houses in the form;
in which it W8. last pasd by Dáil Eir~: Provided that every ,
Money Bil shall be sent to Seanad Eiran for its recommendatio1l)
and at a period not longer than twenty-one days after it shall Ihave been sent to Seanad Eireann, it shall be retured to Dái¡
Eireann which may pas it, accepting or rejecting all or any ,0(1
the recommendations of Seanad Eira., and 8. so passed or. if.,1
not returned withi such period of twenty-one days shal be:;
deemed to have been passe by both House. When a Billlj
other than a Money Bil hss been sent to Seanad Eirann a Joint ~
Sitting of the Members of both House may on a reolution
passed by Seanad Eirann be convened for the purpose of .
debating, but not of voting upon, the propoèals of the Bil, or
any amendment of the same.
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Artick 39.
A Bil may be initite in Se Eireann and if pat by
Einn shal be intruoed into Dái Ei. ß
amended by Dáil Eir the Bil shall be considere as a :Bil
. 'tiate in Dáil Eirnn. If rejeced by Dáil Eirnn it shaJJ
not be intruced again in the sae sesion, but Dái Eirann
;may reonser it on its own motion.
Arlic 40.
A Bil pas by either Rouse and accepte by the other Hou.
shal be deeed to be pas by boh Houses.
:i..
Article 41.
So soon as any Bil shall have ben passed or deemed to have
ben pas by both Houses, the Executive Council shall present
"the same to the Represntative of the Crown for the signioation
by him, in the Kig's name, of the Kig's assent, and suoh Repre-
sentative may withhold the Kig's asent or reserve the Bil
for the sigcation of the King's pleasure: Provided that the
'Reprentative of the Crown shal in the withholdi of suoh
. aSsent to or the rervation of any Bil, act in accordance with the
law, practice, and constitutionaJ usae governig ~he lie with.
'holdi' of asnt or rervation in the Domini~m of Canada.
A Bil reserved for the sigcation of the King's Pleaure
shall not have any force unles and until within one year from
the day on which it was presente to the Represntative of the
Crown for the Ki's Assent, the Representative of the Crown
signies by sph or message to each of the Houses of the
Oireahta, or by proclamation, that it has received the Assent
, Of the Ki in Council.
An entry of every such speh, message or proclamation shal
be made in the Journal of each House and a duplicate thereof
duly atteste shall be delivere to the proper offcer to be kept
'among the Reords of the Irih. Fr State (Saorstát Eireann).
Article 42.
As soon as may be after any law has received the Ki's asent;
,the clerk, or such offcer as' Dáil Eiann may appoint for the
; purpose, shal cause two fair copies of such law to be made, one
. being in the Irh language and the other in the Englih langage
(one of whioh copies shall be siged by the Representative of
the Crown to be enrlled for record in the offce of such offcer
,of the Supreme Court as Dáil Eiran may determine), and suoh
copies shal be conclusive evidence as to the proviions of every
such law, and in c'~ of confct between the two copies so'
deposit¡, that signe, by the Representative of the Crown shal
'Vrevail. . ' ., , , . . . i
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Artic 45. ' ,¡ ,
_ ' I ,'" ' ",,1 11
The Oichtas may provide for the establihment ' "
Functional or Vòcational Council representin branches of- th~
social and economio lie of the Nation. A law establihi anY'
auoh, Council shall ,cetArmê'its powers, rihts, and 'duti~,i ~
ira relation to the governent of the Irh Fr Statè: (&t 'Ekeann). "" " , ",' " ;;itJ', -Artic 46. " ',H'H
The Oirhtá has the exolusive riht 00 reate the, " "
and maintag: of ,such ared' forc i as are mentionedi;jni
Sceduled 'Trty in the terroory of the Irh Fr Stata. (Sa
Eirann) and every ll'Oh force shall be subject 00 th"oontrQ1the Oirhta.. .,,: . - . ¡ .' .. ,:LA .'y
Article 47.
. . if
Any Bil pasd or decmed 00 have ben passed nY,_ i
Hous may be suspendèd for a period of iunety day'~. ~.,l.
wrtten Clemand.,of two~fihs of the inei:bers of Dáil R.'
or of a majority ôf the members of Senan Eirann: p,:"
00 the Prsident of the Executive Council not la~r tfu*'
days from the day on which such Bil,shall have b6e:r só P-
or deemed 00 have ben pad. Suoh a';Bil shall, in aööt? '
with regu~tions tó' be made by the Oirachtas be submit -
Referendum to the 'déóision of the peple if demanded i
the expirtion of the niety days either by a :rsolution of:
Eirann assented 00 by thr-fiths 0\ the members of
Eirann, or by a petition sied by no\.less than one- twen
of the vote tJenon th. regiter of votrs, and ¡ the deQ' ~'
th people by'amajoii~'of the votes reorded'onsU(h,Re~. .
sha be conclusve;: These 
' provions shal not apply.,tQ1 ,
Bil or 00: suob..Bil as shall be decld by. both. Ho~t'
necessry for the imente preservation of the publioi, dhealth or saety." ;;'(,
Article 48. " ',r ¡i-, ',,;i)
The Oirchta may provide for the Initiation by th~;
'of proposa for laws or oonstitutional,amendments. S~" id
Oirachta fail 00 make such proviion withi two years, '~I" '.
on the petition of not less than seventy-five thousnd vote:~
Article 43.
The Oihta shall haV'e no power, 00 declare ai1k,4/L '
inements of the law which were not so at the date o~iil1conion. - ,I ' ,'" - ,-:;;A~.i .. !ö¥~-
Artice, 44.; :)l~
The Oirhta may crete 'auborde.te legia~Witi
powers as may be decided by law.
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:the reter, of whom not more than fiten thousnd shall/be
oters in anyone constituenoy; 'either make suoh proviions or
wbmit ,th-quetin.to.th peple-fordeoien in. a.ördanoo
fWtJ~e-ordry Jregutions govemig 1(he' Reerendum:. Any
legtion. pad by too Oirhta pr:rdi forsùoh Irtition
by the peple sha provide (l)tht' suoh proposls may' be
'intited on a petition of fity thoU8nd voters on the regiter,
(2) that if the Oihta rejè~, a propo so intiated it shall be i
8ubmitte~ . to the peple for decison. in. aooordanoe with the
;f.~diry~ reti~~ ,governg .th Re!e~nd~; ,and. (;3) .tht
if.~e Qirehta ~naotsa propQSl 80 intiated, suoh enatment
.shè. be"~ubjec~ t. the provisions~poting ordiary legition
)'1- an~iid:ènta of the Constit:utiori à. the oas may be. .'
..:. ..; . . Arliclt49~ i .
',",: :Sây~'!~ ti~)oa of aotual invasion, the Irh Fr . State
ß.rs~t~in) shll not .be cottd to aoive partioipation
, 'any war without the asnt of th Oiraohta. . .
" . .:r i 1 " .
';.\'
.. -: i:"; '".., '. Arlic 50. .,.. " i.... .. ..,:; ,,; ¡"
1(,'.. Amendmts. .0£' thi Constitio.a withi \the;iwiis'.'ol ì thê
&heduled Trty'may:be,made by.th:'Oieoohta, bu no 8uèh
,amendmnt, .pad ,by bothHouøof. too omaohtii'a.r'17e
expirtIn ofa peri~¡of eight.years.fioi;.,the date oftheòomi
into operation of thi Constitution, shall beoome la;wr uness the
same shall, after it has ben paed or deemed to have ben
pas by the said two Houss of' the Oiraohta, have ben
Øibmitte :t a Referendum of the. peple. and unss .. majority
nf the :voters on .the regiter. shaJ: have recorded their vote on
l,uch Referendum, ,and either the V'tes ofa iwjonty of the voterS
,i, the rete. or, two-thds of. the :,vote. recorded, . shall . have
. . ,C8t ID favour of suob :aiendient.; . Any, suoh amendent
'y. be, iue. withi. the said,perid Qf.,~ht years by i way of
. rdiary legila.ion and às.suoh shal. be subject to the 'proviions
of Aricle 47 hereof. ..'
Artic SI.
The Exeoutive Authority of the Irh Fr State (Saorstát
llIi) is hereby, deolare to bë vèsted: in.. the. Ki; and: shall
'. exeroble, in,' '&ooordanowiith i tle.iaw~ pràti j -and ()n.
titutional ..usage goverg' the" exeto:iof. the 'Exeoutive'
Authoty; m the oaøe of. the Domion of"Canad,' by. the Repre-
tentative .-of' the Crown. There sha.h. be a . Council to. a.id' ánd
àd vi in the governent of the' Irih Fr' '8t8te (Saorstàt
Eia.nn) to be styled the Exeoutive Counoil. The Executive
Counoil shall be responsible to the Dáil Eira.nn, and shall oomdst
of' not xnore than seven nor less than five Mits appointed by
'th Reprèntotive \of. the' Crown. on', . the: nòmination" of 'the
resident of the Exeoutive Council.
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Artic 53.
The Prident of the CÒuncil shall be appointèd 'l)J .n.
nomiation of Dáil Eirann. He sha nomiate a Vice-PrsÌ'dn: .
of the Council. who shall act for all puross in the pla ,òtJli.
Prdent. if the President shall die. resig or' be pe:rê!l~
incapacitate. until a new Prident of the Council shall'~l~
ben elected. The Vice-Prident shall als act in the P~6~,-
the President dur hi temporary absnce. The other Mite""
who are to hold offce as members of the Exeoutive Council:
be appointe on the nomia.tion of the President. with the' a.seii.t
of Dáil Eirean, and he and the Miters nominated by hi; ,
retir from offce should he ceas to retain the support olâ.
majority in Dái Eirann. but the Prsident and suoh Mitera
shall continue to carr on their duties until their succeso~
shall have ben appointed: Prvided. however, that A."
Oiachta'shall not be diolved on the advice of an Exeoutive:
Council which has ceased to retain the support of a majorityr:..:dDáil Eireann. . ,.JtjL"
,.",..;;
Article 54.:..:;"1
. . - ~
The Executive Council shall be collectively reponsible fori
all matters concerng the Departments of State admintèred byj
Members of the Executive CounciL The Exeoutive COunoil!
shall prepare Estimate of the reoeipts and expnditur of the)
Irh Free State (Saorstát Eirann) for each financial year. andi
shall present them to Dái Eirann before the olose of the previo\1:~
financial. year. T~e Executive Council shall meet and a.t~.;i
a oollective authonty. . .'. /"
Arlic 52. . ; ; 1j'I'
Thos Miters who form the Executive Council sh
be members of Dái Eir and sha include the Prside
the Council. the Vice-Prdent of th Counoil and the
in oharge of the Department of Fi&n..
Articl 55. \ .
Miniters who shall not be members of the Executive Counoit
may be appointed by the Representative of the Ci'own and shal
oomply with the provisions of Article 17 of this ConstitutioI)..i
Every suoh Miter shall be nominated by Dá. Eireann 0,'
the recommendation of a Committee of Dáil EiraGI chos .
by a method to be determned by Dái Eireann, so as to.' .' ¡
impartially representative of Dáil Eireann. Should a 1'om'
mendation not be acceptable to Dáil Eireann. the Comm. '.,
may continue to recoinmend names unti one is found acceptabl ,.
The total number of Miters. includig the Ministers, of . .
Executive Counoil. shall not exced twelve. i . . ;'i~:..
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," Every Miter who is not a m'epiber' of the' E~ebü:tiv:e i
Council shall be the rensble be of the Deparment or'
,Deparments 'under hi char, and shaH be individually
ren8Ïple.'~ DáU Ei alone for. the a.tratio:r of the
'Dep~.ent or Departents of whiè~he is the hea ~' ' P.óv'ded
'that shoUld a.ments for Functíonal or :Voc~tional Cbuncils(
be made by the Oirhtas. thes Ministrd' or any 'of' them i
iray, should,the Oieachta80 deCide,' be members of~ aId"b~'
reoi:ended to Dáil Eirann by, such CoUncil. Thë term: of'
offce of any Mister, not a member of the Executive Council,
shall be the term of Dáil Eirann exitig at the time of hi appoint-
ment, but he shall continue in offce until hi successor shall have
'benappoinie, and no such :Mter 8hall'be reoved from offce
dur hi'te otherw than by DáU Eitann itêel,and by'
,them for 8tated ref\on8, and aftr the' propos to remov~ hi
,has ben submitte to a Committe,' choirn by a method to~
'determinèd by Dáil Eirann, so as t.( be impartially reprentative
or Dáil Eirn, and the Committe has reported thereon.
Article 57.
Every Mister shall have the rißht to attend and be heard
'in Senad Eirann. ' " .'~ . k
. Artic 58.
'" The, appointment of a ,member of Dáil Eirann to be"a:
Mi-er shall not entail upon hi any obligation to regn hi
seat or to submit hiself for re-election.
(G1i. 'l~);
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for the purp of the Ir. Fr State (Sarstát Eir) in the
maner and subject to the chares a.d liabilties impoedbyjlaw. Artice 62. . '.:~t.
rc"
. Dáil Ei shall appoint a Comptroller a.d Audir~
Generl to act on behalf of the Irh Fr State (Saorstá.t Einn).,1
He shall contrl al diburments and shall audit all a.countø~i
of moneys adtere by or under the authority of the Oi.h~~
a.d shall report to Dáil Einn at stte periods to be determed¡by law.' ¡Artick 63. '.' .';.'~
The Comptroller and Auditor-Genera shal not be remov~~
except for stte misbehaviour or incapacity on reolutiónøj
pa by Ds. Eiann and Seanad Eireann. Subject tothilprovion the term and conditions of his tenure of offce shiM
be fixed by law. He shal not be a member of the Oir~hta
nor shall he hold any other offce or position of emolument. ';~
'.1Artick 64.1\
The judicial power of the Irh Fr State (Saorstát Eianli'
shall be exercis and justce adintere in the publio Court
established by the Oirachtas by judges appointed in maner\
hereinafter provided. These Court shal comprie Cour of!
Fi Instance and a Cour of Final Appeal to be caled' thej
Supreme Cour. The Courts of Fir Instance shaJ include ;:&1
Hih Cour, invested with full origial juridiction in and power!
to determine al matters and questions w)iether of law or fat~!
oivi or criminal, and also Court of local and limited jurdiotionj
with a riht of appe as determined by law. . :~.'I
. ;1:
Artic~ 65.
The judicial power of the High Court shall extend to th~
question of the validity of any law having regard to the provisio~
of the Constitution. In all cases in whicfisuch matters shal com&
into question, the Hih Court' alone shaJI exercis origial ju . "di ti . .~'!Artick 66.:1'"-'':
The Supreme Court of the Irish Free State (Saorstá.t Eir .
shl, with 8noh exoeptioDB (not inoJndi 0.. whih invol,
questions as to the validity of any law) and subject to such regu"i
lations as may be preribe by law, have appellate juridiotioii
from all decisions of the High Court. The decision of the Suprem~
Court shal in all oas be fial and oonclusiV'e, and shall not ~
re,:iewed or oapab!e of being reviewed by ¡ any other Co~
Trbunal or Authonty whatsoever: .:.:l
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Artick 67.
The number of judges, the constitution and organition of , 1
and ditnbution of busies and juridiotion among, the said
Court and judges, and all matters of procedur shall be as pre-
scnbe by the laws for the time bein in force and the reguations
made thereunder.
Artic 68.
The judges of the Supreme Cour and of the Hih Cour and
of al other Court established in puruanoe of thi Constitution
. shal be appointe. by the Reprentative of the Crown on the
'advice of the Executive Council. The judges of the Supreme
, Court and of the High Cour shal not be removed except for stated
misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only by resolutions passed
by both Dáil Eirann and Seanad Eirnn. The age of retirment,
. and the remuneration and the penson of suoh judges on retir-
ment and the declarations to be taen by them on appointment
shal be presonbe by law. Suoh remuneration 'may not be
dihed durig their continuanoe in offoe. The terms of
,appointment of the judges of suoh other courts'as may be created
,shall be precnbed by law.
Artick 69.
All judges shall, be independent in the exercise of their
'fuctions, and subject only to the Constitution and the law. A
,judge shall not be eligble to sit in the Oirachtas, and shall not
hold any other offce or position of emolument.
Article 70.
,No one shal be tned save in due course of law and extra-
.ordary oourt shall not be established, save only suoh Miitary
Tnbunals as may be authori by, law for dealing with milta
. ffenders against miltary law. The juridiotion of Mitary
'bunais shal not be extended to or exercised over the oivi
pulation save in time of war, or armed rebellon, and for aots
committed in time of war or armed rebellon, and in acoordanoe
With the regulations to be prescnbe by law. Such jundiotion
_hall not ~ exercised in any' area in which all oivi oourt are
open or capablo of being held, and no person shall be removed'
, m one area to another for the purpose of oreating such juri-
. tion.'
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Artic 71.
A member of the armed førces of the Irh Free State (Saoràtái
Eirann) not on the active servce shaU not be tried by any Court
:Martial or other Mitary Trbunal for an offence cognable 'by
the Civil Courts, unless such oEence shal have been brought
exprely within the jurdiction of Courts, Martial or othe~
Miitary Tribunal by any code of Jaws or regulations for" tii
enforcement of. mnitary diipline wluch may be here~"fte,',~,",',,'1
approved by the Oirachtas. , . :.i;;
Article 72. ',;i;¡~
,;,r;ri
No persn shall be tried on any criminal charge without a
jury save in the case of charges in respect of minor offenc~
triable by law before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction and in
the case of charges for offences against miltary law triable b:v
Cour Martial or other Mitary TribunaL. " ",i
. '1-'
C13 GEO~ 5;J(CH. 1.)
.; fh
TRANSIORY PROVISIONS. :':~¡"/
. (",inArtic16 73. '.' ,,! '(;
Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which;t~eî
are not inconsistent therewith, the laws in force in the lri~b:
Fre State (Saorstát Eirann) at the date of the coming. futQ
operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of ful foroë
and effect until the' same or any of them shall have been rep~~léa
or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas. .d",
Article 74.
Nothing in thi Constitution shall affcct any liability to pay;
any tax or du~y payable in respect of the fianciàl year current!
at the date of the coming into operation of this ConstitutioR
or any precedig fiancial year, or in respect of any period endi
on or before the last day of the said currnt financial year, or
payable on any occasion happenig with'in that or any precedig:
year, or the amount of such liabilty; andduring the said current!
fiancial. year all taxes and duties and aM-ears theref shaJ
continue to be assessd, levied and collected in like manner', in
all respects as immedately before tils Constitution came into
operation, subject to the like adjustments of the proceeds 001'11
lected as were theretofore applicable; and for that purpose ,the,
Executive Council shall have t,he like. powers and be subjeoÍl,i
to the like liabilties as the Provisional Government.. " 'I,
,Goods transport during the' said current financial yea.:!
from or to the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eirann) to or fro:m
any part of Great Britain or the Isle of Mai¡ shall not, except;
so far as the Executive Council may otherwise direct, in respet¡
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of the form to be use and the inormation to be fuIied,
be trte as goos export or importd as the case may 1?.
:ior the purpe of this Aricle, the eXpression "finå.ncial
year" means, as repets income tax (including super-tax), the
year of asment, and as respects other taxes and duties, the
year endig on the thiy-first day of March. '
Article 75.
Until Courts have ben establihed for the Irish ~ 'State
(Saorstá.t Einn) in accordancè, with this-, CònstitutioIi,thè
Supreme 'Court of,Judic~ture, County, Courts, Cour of Quartr
SessoÍi .and Courts 9£ SUlary Jurisdiction, as at present
exiing, .sha for the time being continue to exercise the same
,juriction as heretofore, and any judge or justice, being a
,inember of any such Cour, holding offce at the time when thi
Consitution comes into operation; shall for the time being
oContinue to 1)6 a member thereof and hold offce by the lie
tenur and upon the like terms 8. heretofore; UiùesS, in the
oCase of a judge of the said Supreme Court or of a County Court,
he siges to the Reprentative of th,e, Crown.hi desir tOl'ign.
:Ay vacncies in any of the said Cours so continued 
may' be
;6led by appointment made in lie manner as appointment,
to judgeships in the Courts established under this Constitution:
Provided that the provisions of Aricle 66 of this Constitution
as to the decisions of 'the Supreme Court established under this
Constitution shall apply to decisions of the Court of Appeal
-continued by thi Aricle.
i Article 76.¡ i If any judge ~f the said Supreme Court 
of Judicature ör óf
1 any of the said County Court on thè establihment of Cour
under this Constitution, is not with ,hisoonsent. appointed. to, be
.a judge of any such Court, he shall, for the purpose of Aricle
10 of the Scheduled Treaty, be trooted,as if, he had..reti.in
consequence of the change of Governent effected in pursuance
of the said Trty, but the .nght,s so conferred shall be without
'prejudice to any rights or claims that he may have againt the
British Governent..),' - . I ' . '. :. i
Every existing offcer of the Proviional Government. at 1;he
-date of tho coming into operation of this Constitution (not 
bein
;án offcer whose services have been lent' by the British.',Go~ern
:ment to the Provisional Government) shaH. on thai diite ,be
¡ .transferr toii.d be.come an off()er of the Irish Free' State
f .(Saqtát¡Eireann),and shall hold offce by a'tènure,correepondig
r to his previous tenure. . "
Article 77/.. ' , ;
, ,
. .tt !-t:il
. , l I ;..~
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Every euch emt. .::-w:: -. tranfer rrm,j
British Governent by viue of any transfer òf servces toth.~
Prviional Government shal be entied to the benefit of Artcl~10 of the Scheduled Trty.J~
,:"j
, , Artice 79. ,"
The transfer of the admitration of any public servce, the.
adstration of which was not before the date of the comig
into operation of thi Consitution trnsferr to the Prviorií!î.
Government, shall be deferred until the 31st day of March, 192'3~
or such earlier date as may, after one month's previous notiCe!
in the Offcial Gazette, be fied by the Executive Council; àn~
such of the offcers engag in the admintration of those serH
vices at the date of transfer, as may be determined in the manet
hereinafter appearig, shall be transer to and become offcera:
of the Irish Fr State (Saorstát Eian); and Arcle 77 of!
this Constitution shal apply as if such offcers were existin
offcers of the Proviional Governent who had been transferr
to that Governent from the British Governent. The offcers
to be so transferr in respt of any servces shall be determinéd,
in lie manner as if the adinistration of the servces had before!
the coming into operation of the Constituiton ~een transferr tc)lthe Provisional Governent. ,:
:':.1
j¡
Article 80. t_!
,¡
As respects departmental property, assets, rihts imd Jia":
bilties, the Government of the Irih Fr State (Saorstát EÍieann)
shall be regarded as the successors of the Proviional Governent,:
and, to the extent to whih functions of any department of th.:
Britih Governent become functions of the Governent of~l
Irh Free State (Saorstát Eireann), as the successors of sue ,"deparment of the British Governent. "1'\ ,:~1¡'¡;:~
ü'f'Artic 81.
After the date on which thi constitution comes into operatiÓ¡
the House of the Parliament elected in pursuance of the Irih . .
State (Agrment) Act, 1922 (being the constituent assemblý;'
for the settlement of this Constitution), may, for a period n9,ll,
exceeg one year from that date, but subject to comp~
by the Members thereof with the proviions of, Aricle 17 of, t d
Constitution, exercis ~ll the powers and authorities confe~
on Dái Eian by thi Constitution, and the first election;1 ' "
Dái Eirann under Aricles 26, 27 and 28 heref shall take plaêi
as soon as posible after the expiration of such period. . . ¡~~~1
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Appendix 2
(13 GBO. 5.) Irih Free Sta OonstitutioAct, 1922. (Sesio 2.)
Art 82.
(CH., 1.)
;
I
Notwithstadig anythig oontaed in Arioles 14 and 33
hereof, the fit Seanad Eirann shal be constituted imedtely
afr the comig into operation of thi Constitution in the manner
followi, that is to say :-.
(a) The :ft Seanad Eirea.nn shal consist of sixty members,
of whom thiy shall be electe and thiy shall be ino iate. '
(b) The thiy nomiated members of Seana. Eirann
shal be nomiate by the Prsident of the Executive"
Council who shall, in maki such nominations, have
speial ~gard to the providi of representation for
groups or parties not then adequately represented inDái Eirann.
(c) The thiy electe members of Seanad Eireann shall be
electe by Dáil Eirnn votin on priciples of
Proportional Representation.
(d) Of the thity nomiate members, fiten to be selected
by lot, shall hold offce for the ful period of twelve
years, the remaing fiten shal hold offce for the
period of six years. .
(e) Of the thiy elected members the first fiten electe
shal hold offce for the period of nie years, the
remaig fiten shall hold offce for the period of
thr years.
(f) At the teriintion of the period of offce of any
such members, members shal be elected in their place
in maner"',provided by Aricle 32 of thi Constitution.
(g) Casual vacancies shall be fied, in manner provided by
Aricle 34 óf this Constitution.
Article 83.
The passing and adoption of this Constitution by the Con-
stituent Assembly and the British Parliament shall be announced
8. soon as may be, and not later than the sixh day of Deember,
nineten hundrd and twenty-two, by Proclamation of His
Majesty, and this Constitution shall come into operation on the
issue of such Proclamation.
~o
~
~
LU
.'...
.~
\\
.
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APPENDIX 3
British Anny Battalions Servine in Southern Ireland Throudiout 1922.
Battalion Brigade & Division Date of Evac.
1st Northants Rgt 14th (Ex 18th-6th Div ) 15-12-22
1 st Cameronians .. (Ex 14th-5th ) 9-11-221st Leicester .. (Ex 13th-5th ) 14-12-222nd Loyal .. (Ex Kerr-6th . . ) 15-12-222nd Royal Welch Fus (Ex 18th-6th ) 15-12-22
+ 1st Manchester Rgt 24th (Dub Dist - Ex 6th) 16-12-22
1 st Lancs Fus ( .. ) ?17-12-22
1st Wilts Rgt ( .. ) 17-12-222nd Worcester .. ( .. ) 17-12-22
2nd Border .. ( .. -Ex 5th) 17-12-22
1st Kings Own .. 25th ( .. ) 14-12-22
2nd Kings Shrop L.I. ( .. -Ex 5th) 14-12-22
2nd Welch Rgt ( .. ) 14-12-22
2nd Royal Berks .. ( .. ) 14-12-22
* 2nd Hampshire .. ? (Ex 17th-6th Div) 717-12-22
* 2nd Green Howards ? (Ex 18th-6th Div) 717-12-22
Other Units.
14th Battery - Royal Fus Artilery
16th
17th . . Royal Garson Artery
19th ..
5th Armoured Car Coy - Tank Corps
16-12-22
16-12-22
16-12-22
16-12-22
(To Belfast) 17-12-22
Key: + The 1st Manchester had served in the South since at least June 1920, and
was definitely in Dublin in the latter par of 1922. It was not, however,
listed as serving in Ireland in March 1922.
* The only confirmation of these ex-Cork battaions serving in Dublin in
1922, comes from re-location lists subsequent to the main evacuation dates
in December. Both were known to be serving in the South in March
1922.
Sources: Infantry Battaion Lists C.O.739/11 P.R.O. Dublin District H.Q. War
Diar for 1922. W.O. 35/92 P.R.O. Battaion evacuation and re-location
lists: The Times of 15th, 16th, 18th and 27th of December 1922. All
background locations taken from Townshend 'British Campaign' pp 144
& 216-219.
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APPENDIX 4
Admiralty List of Ships in Irh Waters - 25.7.1922.
Atlantic Fleet Light Cruisers .................... Caledon, Carysfon.
Reserve Light Cruiser .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . Cleopatra.
Atlantic Fleet Destroyers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wallace, Vancouver, Velox,
Vonigem, Walker, Warwick,
Watchman, Whirlwind.
. . Seawolf Tauru, Tilbury.
Badminton, Burslem, Mistley
Newark, Truro.
Auxiliar Patrol Trawlers ............... Cherwell, Dee, Doon, Ettrick.
Irsh Water Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Auxilar Patrol 1vIinesweepers . . . . . . . . . . .
British Troops Quartered in the Irish Fre State - 24.4.1924.
Bere Island :- Two Coast Batteries, plus RE. and RA.S.C. detals.
Tota - 8 Officers, 211 Other Ranks.
One Coast Battery, plus RE. detals.
Tota - 12 Officers, 167 Other Ranks.
Four Coast Batteries, one Forts Comp, R.E. and R.A.S.C.
and medical detals.
Tota - 39 Officers, 509 Other Ranks.
Lough Swily :-
Cork Harbour :-
Or¡:aniation/Chain of Command of British Forces - .Iuly 1925.
Hd. Qrs. South Irsh Coast Defences -Spike Island
Fort Carlisle
(40t H.Batt)
Fort Camden
(33rd Co. RE)
Templebreedy Bty.
(l7th H .Batt)
O.C. Bere Is.
(22nd H.Batt)
(26th H .Batt)
Det
RASC
(Spike Is)
24th H.Batt
(Spike Is)
32nd Batt
SI Sig Sect
(Spike Is)
DETROAC
(Spike Is)
Det 33rd Co RE
(Lough Swily)
Det.33rd
Co.RE
(Bre Is)
Sources: - (from top) ADM 118652/253 PRO. CO.739/26 PRO
WO. 32/5315 PRO.
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Source:
ADM1/8632/173 Appendix 5
- -.- -- ~--_.- -
Enclosure No.l to ~DAHAl'st. Report of Pr-oæedings dated 14th
June 1922. No. D. 751/527 to. the R. A. C. , 1st r:~.~. ' '.
.. .. .... --.. .. .. ..
COP Y
I H.949.
Haul bowline Defence Orderso Sheet 4.
ORDERS FOR. SU IN MAN-F-WAR ANCHOgAqE.'. . .. -
On Alarm being given ship raises steam, and heaves short or
gets under weigh - as circumstances dictate.
If the attack is on Haulbowline, ship closes if tide is
sui table, gets landing party ready, but awaits instructions from
Tower before sending them ashore. If the tide is flooding, ship
gets landing parr! ready and sends them at onoo to ship at No.6 Buoy. . .
, The landing party in any case will disembark at Colleen,
and proceed "bl Citatdel by the path behind the Oil Tanks.
In all cases enough men are to be kept on board to man 2guns, and searchlights. .
It should be borne in mind that an attack on Uaulbowline
is likely to be a feint to draw off Naval assistance from
Templebreedy or one of the other forts.
Should an attack develop on any of these, the ship is to
close the attacked fort, get into signal touch~ and open fire asdire~ted by the fort, using fort; s spotting corrections.
spotting signals and squared chart will be provided as soon
as received from the Military.
The Forts' alarm Signal is a Sound Rocket. The following
signals have also been -arranged :_-
One Rocket. - means "All men return to Barracks".
Three Red Lights ) -
Very or Rockets ) "Post Attacked".
Four&mud Rockets. "Re-inforceinents requiredlt.
The headquarters of the' S.I.C.D. and 2 coast batteries will
be at S,ike Island, and out-forts "(Camden, Carlisle, and Templ~
breedy) will be garrisoned by a detàchment of not less than 60 me
each. ,Defence schemes have been prepared for local defence by tb
garrison on the spot. , "
The military request that the guardship vdll throw search-
lights on the area ot attack, as this will materially assist thedefenders. '
The Military have Wireless (C. W. and $park) in operation at
Spike Island. Ball Signs:- Spike Island -aCT.
wave length:- '600 metres.
"..
(sd) H. G. C. Somerville.
Senior Naval Officer, I
-Haulbowline. 6th June 1922. ;
---- n
Source:
Kennedy Papers
P4/493(2) 290
IvIEiOl':JimrrM Appendix 6
IRISH F:EE STATE
-~---------------~
------ ----------- ---- - --- -- ----------- -----------
Quest ions for discussi ons with General Mulcahy.
l. Aàmiral ty Es tablisbments òn shore in t iffe of War.
A~~iral ty will need to establish offices at
Irish Ports for ofîicers appointe d to give routes
. to Merchant Vessels and various other officers.
Admiralty may also require, to establish store
depots, etc., 'for patrol ciaft.
2. Small craft.
'30 ' Organisa tiOD of Examination~ervices. ~"t~,'i .
The Admiralty will need to establish in time 'of
war an organisation .to exa~ine Merchant Vessels befor
they are allowed to enter defended porta. Details wi
require to be diacussed with the Harbour Authorities
in question.
.4" War Signal Statíons.
Present: coridi tion; Admiralty. re quiremants,
arrangements ,for maintenance, pr3.sent condition for, "
te legraph communications, arrangements for inspection
in peacé and .installation of naval personnel in war.
~
5. Organisation of Coast-wat ching Service.
.. ".! ~.. .~.. .! L... - .~ .r- ..... ~",.... ;..- '.. .- ~l ,.. 'y ...... ,_. 'J ..". ~ .. -0". -:"1 .'.. ~-' ~, -, .: ~.
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l6. Colle c ti on of in tell igence. Appendix 6
In the Dni ted Kingdom arrangements are wBde
whereby the Customs Officers forward reports in time
of war to the Admiralty of movements of Merchant
Vessels etç. .
· Sugge st irish Free state make similar arrangements
. .in consul tat ion 'wi th Admiralty.
7. 'Censorship.
Arrangements will be necessary in til1e of war ~~.
. Free
for Irish/State cables and WIT stations to.be_
included ,~n the Uni ted Kingdom organisation for
control of all cable and wireless com~unications.' .
, .
8. proposed Convention respecting cables "and Wireless.
Clause 2 (aY of Annex to Treaty.
9. Proposed Conventi on as to Lights, buoys, beacons, etc.
Clawe 2 of Annex to Treaty.
..
Whether Irish Free state Revenue Ships could be turned
.over to impe rial Navy in time of war.
la.
11. Co~munication of information as to stocks of oil fuel
etc. which would be available in t~üe of war.
12. Contraband List.
Propose to ask irish Free state in due course to
accept thè Govennment List as well as other Dominions
13~ Accommodation on shore required for services (1),
(3), (5) (7)..
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(London) Times of 22 Feb. 1922 noted the unease in Parliament following the
killing of two British soldiers nea Dublin.
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record has been found of an Irish incident forcing an adjournment and division
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Notes to Chapter 4 : THE CASUALTIES OF WAR
1. Letter; Mr. J. McCarthy of Ovens, Cork to O.C. British Forces, Spike Island,
18 Sept. 1924. D/T S.4113 NA. The letter was passed to the President's
Office.
2. Dispatch; Thomas to Governor-General, 29 Feb. 1924. D/T S.3644 N.A.
The dispatch refers to the tota missing and specifically notes 'British
soldiers', although it is possible that RIC figures are included. None of the
many statistic tables in Townshend, British Campaign, refer to British or RIC
missing. Dispatch; Devonshire to Governor-General, 27 Apr. 1923. D/T
S.3024 NA, refers to the Campaign tactics adopted. The estimate of those
missing having Irish connections, is a personal appraisal based on limited
sampling of several 'Deserter' files, notably D/T S.3143 and D/T S.4684 NA.
3. Letter; Cope to O'Hegarty, 14 Feb. 1922. Cope had written two earlier notes
to O'Hegarty on the same subject; 27 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1922. D/T S.3827 NA.
4. Memorandum; O'Hegarty to Cope, 16 Feb. 1922. Ibid.
5. London did maintan some enquiries during the Civil War; memoranda;
Loughnane to Colonial Office, 16 Nov. 1922 and Whiskard to Loughnane, 18
Jun. 1923 (CO 739/23 PRO) refer. Dispatch; Devonshire to Governor-
General, 28 Jun. 1923 (D/T S.3143 NA) is notable in that it assumes that
deserters had been/would be handed over. Also note that an official deserter
agreement of October 1923 (see text to note 10) was a qualified confirmation
of existing practice. The Indemnity (British Militay) Act 1923 (No. 2 of
1923), had become law at the end of February 1923, though there were
concerns, in both the Dail and Defence Deparment, that the Proclamation
issued from Dublin Castle on 12 Jan. 1922 was insufficient to protect former
IRA members from prosecution (U.C.D. arch; Kennedy Papers;
correspondence in P4/656 refers).
6. National Archive S. File indices suggest that individual files were kept for the
majority of cases, even though Colonial Office notifications were often
collective. Some of the more importt group and general fies inspected
were: D/T S.3024; D/T S.3143; D/T S.3644; D/T S.4280; and D/T S.4684
NA.
7. Memorandum; Mjr. T. Killeen, Dept. Director 2nd Bureau, to J.B. Carr, 11
Feb. 1926. D/T S.3827 NA. By Februar 1926, the Bureau stil had at least
nine missing soldiers on its files.
8. Dispatches; Devonshire to Governor-General, 27 Apr. 1923; (draft) Governor-
General to Colonial Secretay, Jan. (no date) 1924. D/T S.3024 NA.
9. Dispatch; Thomas to Governor-General, 29 Feb. 1924. D/T S.3644 NA.
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10. Memorandum; O'Connor, Defence, to Sect., Executive Council, 2 Nov. 1923.
D/T S.3644 NA. The London meeting was held on 19 Oct. 1923.
11. The court case was reported in the Evening Telegraph (Belfast) on 29 Oct.
1923, only ten days after the London deserter agreement (note 10).
Loughnane, in Dublin, reported the situation to the Colonial Office (telegram;
Loughnane to Freeston, 30 Oct. 1923), and Antrobus hand minuted the
implications (file C.O. 52693) on 31 October 1923. All CO 739/19 PRO.
12. Memorandum; Sect., External Affairs to High Commissioner, London, 14
Oct. 1926. D/T S.3644 NA. It was noted that instructions had been passed
to the Civic Guard, stopping all further arrests of suspected deserters. It was
also noted that, prior to this particular case, 'a number of British deserters
have been thus detained and no diffculty was encountered'.
13. The association between the Free State handing deserter 'prisoners' back to
the British N.r. authorities, and the fate of its own detanees in the North, is
an obvious one. Following the final release of British held detanees in Feb.
1924 (see note 48), Cosgrave brought intense pressure on London to assist
with the release of Northern nationalist prisoners; pressure which involved
Baldwin personally and which affected the financial settlement negotiations at
the end of 1925. Cosgrave was not impressed with the urgency of British
efforts, which succeeded only in mid-1926. Cambridge University Library;
Baldwin Papers, voL.99, Whiskard to Waterhouse, 9 Jan. 1926, Baldwin to
Craig 21 Jan. 1926, Craig to Baldwin 22 Jan. 1926; voL. 101, Baldwin to
Craig 19 Dec. 1923 and 14 Jan. 1924, Craig to Baldwin 27 Dec. 1923. See
also Farrell, M., Arming the Protestants: The Formation of the Ulster Special
Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1920-27 (London, 1983;
paperback ed. (1983) cited in notes), pp.248-51.
14. Memorandum; McNeil to Sect., External Affairs, 10ct. 1926. D/T S.3644
NA. McNeil noted that the War Office believed that the October 1923
agreement had been 'brpken' by the Free State.
15. Dispatch; Amery to Minister for External Affairs, 6 Feb. 1929. Ibid. (Note
that from late 1927 communications went direct between London and
Dominion departments).
16. Dispatches; Devonshire to Governor-General, 10 Jan., 12 Feb., 16 Feb. and
19 Mar. 1923; memorandum, Barnes (Defence) to Sect., Finance, 3 Apr.
1923. D/T S.2067 NA.
17. Memorandum; Barnes (Defence) to Sect., Finance, 3 Apr. 1923. Ibid.
18. Dispatches; Amery to Governor-General, 18 Mar. 1925, Governor-General
to Amery, 14 Apr. 1925. Ibid.
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19. Memoranda; Loughnane to Mulcahy, 27 Jul. 1923, Mulcahy to Loughnane,
120ct. 1923. D/T S.3827 NA.
20. Executive Council Minutes; G2/3, C2/112 of 26 Jun. 1924. NA.
21. See Chapter 2, text to notes 15-19.
22. ParI. Deb. Commons, VoL.165, coL.1593 of 12 Jul. 1923. After this
comment, Capt. Foxcroft M.P. notified the Colonial Office that the bodies had
been reburied in a churchyard near Clonaklty. Loughnane was contacted and
asked to investigate; memorandum Sturgis to Loughnane 27 Jul. 1923. D/T
S.3827 NA.
23. Report; Macroom Civil Guard Stn., Cork, 12 Jul. 1923. D/T S.3827 NA.
Interestingly, The (London) Times reported the finding of bodies only on 12
Dec. 1923, the day before the same were escorted back to England. See also
note 24.
24. Dispatch; Devonshire to Governor-General, 1 Jan. 1924, plus letter enclosure
from father of the late Lt. G.R. Dove. D/T S.3827 NA. The Escort and
militay funerals at Aldershot were given full coverage in The (London)
Times, 13-14 Dec. 1923.
25. The (London) Times, 23 Jan. 1924.
26. See Bar, T., Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin, 1949), pp.34-36. Tom
Barry was the IRA Column Leder who led the ambush attack. For the wider
context, see Kee, R., The Green Flag, Volume 3: Ourselves Alone (London,
1972; paperback edn. (1989) cited in notes) pp. 120- 1.
27. The officer in question was the late Lt. C.J. Guthrie (Auxilar Division
Cadet). The correspondence, mainly between Whiskad, Colonial Office, and
McDunphy, Asst. Sect., Dept. of the President, covered the period July 1925
to Januar 1927. Though the frustrations were mutual, the debiltating effect
on general relations was evident; at one point Whiskard exclaimed that certn
identification evidence 'might put an end to this interminable correspondence'
(memorandum; 29 Dec. 1925). D/T S.3827 NA. The Irish Independent, 4
Nov. 1926 and Daily Mail, 15 Nov. 1926, both took up the more sensational
aspects of the story.
28. This meeting of the Southern Committee of the County of Cork, Board of
Heath, was held on 3 Nov. 1926, and reported in the Irish Independent, 4
Nov. 1926.
29. The firing of Cork city centre, a few days later, may have been directly
connected.
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30. Executive Council Minutes; G2/4; C2/157 of 30 Dec. 1924; C2/200 of 15
Jun. 1925 and C21206 of 13 Jul. 1925. NA.
31. Quoted in Hartley, S., The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign
Policy, 1914-18 (London, 1987), p.27.
32. See Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland Since the Famine (London, 1971; paperback edn.
(1987) cited in notes), p.396. For the wider background to the Irish Brigade
and the 'German Plot', see Hartley, Irish Question, pp.26-29 and 181-4.
33. A memorandum (draft) giving the history of the Dowling case, was prepared
by the Colonial Office for the incoming Prime Minister, dated Jan. (no date)
1924. C0739126 PRO. It seems that historians have not queried why
Dowling's death sentence was commuted, though it may have been assumed
that the general tensions of 1918 were reason enough.
34. For details of the 1920 mutiny, in part the result of news of British actions in
Southern Ireland, see Kee, Green Flag, voL.3, p.104. A general distinction
has to be made between British held detanees, and those held by, or at the
behest of, the Belfast government, the last of whom were not released until
1926. See also note 13, this chapter.
35. See Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, p.215. Lawlor is correct in her assessments;
letters and memoranda between Bonar Law and Lord Derby, and between
Law and Cosgrave (period, 12-20 Dec. 1922), together with Colonial Office
correspondence of Jan. 1923, note the early situation, especially in relation to
the Rangers. House of Lords Librar; Andrew Bonar Law Papers, 114/1/7,
114/1/10-12, ancl 114/1/14. Later Colonial Office correspondence
(memorandum; Curtis to Masterton-Smith, 12 Jul. 1923) also alludes to the
political manoeuvring. CO 739/23 PRO.
36. See Lawlor, Britain and Ireland, p.215. Although Lawlor only touches on
events in 1923, her inference is that the release was settled, finally, by mid-
1923. This is incorrect, though it seems that Lawlor is the only historian to
have explored the significance of the Dowling issue beyond the 1918 context.
37. Memorandum; Curtis to Masterton-Smith, 12 Jul. 1923. CO 739123 PRO.
The emphasis here was on the need to mount pressure on government
ministers, though, in turn, ministers had to note Lord Derby's ealier concern
for Army discipline and morale should such releases be made. Letters; Derby
to Bonar Law, 12 and 20 Dec. 1922; House of Lords Library; Andrew Bonar
Law Papers, 114/1/7, 114/1/12.
38. This much was included in a draft history of the Dowling case, which the
Colonial Office prepared for the incoming Prime Minister; dated Jan. 1924.
CO 739/26 PRO.
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39. Memorandum; Loughnane to Curtis, 10 Jan. 1924. Ibid.
40. As per note 38. Ibid. This was a confusing period for the Colonial Office
administration; the draft reflected the political turmoiL. In the event, Baldwin
failed to hold office beyond 21 Jan. 1924, and MacDonald formed a
government, with Liberal support, on 24 Jan. 1924.
41. Colonial Office minute, signed by Curtis, 5 Jan. 1924. Ibid. It notes the
decision given by Baldwin to the (stil) Colonial Secreta, the Duke of
Devonshire.
42. For detals of the Belleek situation, in May-June 1922, see Hopkinson, Green
Against Green, p.86.
43. Memoranda; War Office to Under Sect., Colonial Office, 19 Sept. 1923;
Whiskard to Loughnane, 24 Sept. 1923. It was clear that, at this date, the
Colonial Office view was to support the War Office on this command change.
A Colonial Office minute (fie C.O. 5931) of February 1924 (unsigned)
recounts the history of the Swily command problem, and is specific that
Mulcahy was heading the Irish refusal. CO 739/26 PRO.
44. For further reference to the party's concern on Northern prisoners, see
Farrell, Arming Protestants, p.283. For a succinct account of the party's, and
in particular MacDonalds and Thomas's, attitudes to the South, see Canning,
British Policy, pp.87-100.
45. Cambridge University Library; Baldwin Papers, voL.101; Baldwin to Craig
19 Dec. 1923, Craig to Baldwin 27 Dec. 1923, Baldwin to Craig 14(?)
Jan.1924 (re text quotes). Of interest is the contrast between Baldwin's
constantly suppliant attitude to Craig, and that of the Colonial Office. A draft
Colonial Office memorandum to Craig (unsigned), prepared in Baldwin's
absence on 1 Jan. 1924 (typed in error, 1923), was forceful to the point of
hostility on the North's position on prisoners. It was not sent. Ibid.
46. The meeting was held on 1-2 February 1924. See also Canning, British
Policy, pp. 89-90; Jones, Diary, vol.3, pp.225-6; Mansergh, Unresolved
Question, pp.232-3.
47. See Canning, British Policy, p.90. He notes: 'The situation was allowed to
drift through the Spring'. The self-evident intention here is to balance and
qualify such 'big policy' studies.
48. The Irish Times, 8 Feb. 1924, gave brief detals of the previous day's
statement by the Press Association. The weekly Sinn Fein, 16 Feb. 1924,
claimed that a campaign by the Republican Director of Propaganda had
secured Dowling's release; its editorial noted: 'Dowling has been released
immediately following this Republican effort. We congratulate him upon his
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M., Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London, 1975), p.99, confirms that
Cahir Healy was released in Februar, but does not associate this with
Dowling. No British archive material, on the actual process of release, has
been traced; various cryptic minutes of Feb./Mar. 1924 (fie C. O. 5526) give
only a general indicator of events. CO 739/26 PRO.
49. Memorandum, plus covering minute; Curtis to Sect. of State, 12 Feb. 1924.
CO 739/26 PRO. An unsigned Colonial Office minute of Februar 1924 (file
C.O. 5931), probably in Curtis's hand, gives the expected date of Mulcahy's
return visit. CO 739/23 PRO.
50. See Valiulis, M.G., Almost a Rebellion: The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924
(Cork, 1985), for the most extensive appraisal of the mutiny. She does not,
however, refer to external related matters. See also text to note 3, Chapter
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hand), Februar 1924. (C.O. file 5931). CO 739/23 PRO.
52. Executive Council Minutes; G2/4; C2/164 of 27 Jan. 1925. NA. The
Council Secreta had met in interview with Sir Maurice Hankey, as Sect. of
the CID, on 17 Jun. 1924. No further detals are known, although the
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Admiralty claims on Irish facilties in warime, none of which had been settled
by the time Cosgrave left office in 1932. See text to notes 25-26, Chapter 5,
and notes 57-58, Chapter 7. Also Appendix 6.
53. Dispatch; Devonshire to Governor-General, 4 Aug. 1923. ADM 1/8701/137
PRO.
54. Post-Treaty, the British government acted quickly on this matter. The
(London) Times, 2 Jan., 4 Jan., 8 Feb., and 11 Feb., 1922, gave detaled
information on the fate of Irish regiments and altered recruiting conditions.
55. The history, and current legal position, of reservists in Ireland, was detaled
by the Free State's Attorney-General's office to the Dept. of Defence in a
report of 19 Nov. 1923. DFA D.3238 NA.
56. A War Office memorandum of 21 Dec. 1921, which raised many different
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18th meeting of the P.G.!. Committee on 11 Aug. 1922. CAB 21/246 PRO.
57. Reports, re 'Transfer of responsibilities in Southern Ireland to the Government
of the Irish Free State, other than those affecting Lands and Buildings', of
Technical sub-Committee (of P.G.!. Committee) meetings of 6 Mar. and 14
Mar. 1922. CO 739111 PRO.
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58. Memorandum; Milnave (Viceregal Lodge) to Freeston, 25 Nov. 1922. CO
739/3 PRO.
59. Colonial Office minute (unsigned) of 18 Dec. 1922, headed 'Position of Naval
Reservists'. Ibid.
60. Memorandum; Creedy to Under Sect., Colonial Office, 15 Jan. 1923. CO
739/23 PRO.
61. Ibid., the same statistics were also noted in a dispatch; Devonshire to
Governor-General, 4 Aug. 1923. ADM 1187011137 PRO. The Treasury was,
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62. Memorandum; Loughnane to Freeston, 5 Feb. 1923. CO 739/23 PRO.
63. Dispatch; Devonshire to Governor-General, 4 Aug. 1923. ADM 1187011137
PRO.
64. Dispatches; Devonshire to Governor-General, 27 Nov. 1923; Thomas to
Governor-General, 2 May 1924. DFA D.3238 NA.
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67. Executive Council Minutes; G2/3; C2/16 of 3 Nov. 1923, C2/66 of 15 Mar.
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1. The (London) Times, 17 Feb. 1925, reporting a speech on constitutional status
made by Blythe the previous day.
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biographers of the period. For a textual guide to Irish perceptions, see Lee,
Ireland, pp. 141-150, and for British policy see Canning, British Policy,
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deliberations, see Hand, G.J., (ed.) Report of the Irish Boundary Commission
1925 (Shannon, 1969).
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Middlemas (Jones, Diary, vol.3, p.226, note 1) on 'dissident Free State
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1924, U.C.D. Arch; Kennedy Papers, P4/579. MacSwiney and David Kent
sent joint telegrams to several organs, including the Cork Weekly Examiner 29
Mar. 1924, (re quote). Their response was also noted in The (London) Times,
24 Mar. 1924.
6. Letter; MacDonald to Cosgrave, 26 Mar. 1924. D/T S.3693 NA.
7. Letter; Thomas to Cosgrave, 26 Mar. 1924, Ibid. Quote taken from
Thomas's statement to the House on the incident; Parl. Deb. Commons,
voL.171, coL.943 of 24 Mar. 1924.
8. MacEvily, 'Sean MacBride', p.51 (n) is specific that there was no retaliation.
9. Inquiry Report; signing officer, A.W.H. Heywood, Lt. CoL. R.A., South Irish
Coast Defences, 28 Mar. 1924. D/T S.3693 NA. This Inquiry was not
extensive, consisting largely of shore party statements. It is not clear how,
or when, the President's Office received a copy.
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11. Memorandum; President's Office to Sect., Dept. of Finance, prob. 14 Jun.
1924. DIT S.3693 NA. O'Duffy's report was quoted or paraphrased, with
explicit approval, for the information of Finance.
12. This much is known from a letter reply, Curtis to McNeil (undated, but
between 28 March and beginning of June, 1924). Ibid. It is solely concerned
with the second incident. See also note 14.
13. The (London) Times, 17 Feb. 1925, quoting a previous day speech by Ernest
Blythe on the effects of the Cobh incident.
14. Letter, Curtis to McNeil (undated, but between 28 March and the beginning
of June, 1924). DIT S.3693 NA. It is possibly significant that the letter is
undated: if later than 2 April then Curtis would have had personal knowledge
that the Inquiry evidence was probably fabricated. The thesis text allows for
the necessary benefit of doubt (see text to note 16).
15. Memorandum; President's Office to Sect., Deparment of Finance, prob. 14
Jun. 1924. Ibid.
16. Memoranda; Curtis to Loughnane, 31 Mar. 1924; Loughnane to Curtis, 2
Apr. 1924. CO 739/26 PRO.
17. Parl. Deb. Commons, vol.l71, cols.942-945 of 24 Mar. 1924.
18. Memorandum; Admiralty to Whiskad, Colonial Office, 25 Mar. 1924. CO
739/26 PRO. It is stated that this was in connection with Davison's questions.
19. See Canning, British Policy, pp.178-9.
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21. See Canning, British Policy, pp.87-89. Canning encapsulates the overall
negativity towards the South.
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conservatism or his 'genuine sympathy for the Irish people' (Canning, British
Policy, p.88). Lionel Curtis became upset that Thomas was 'under Craig's
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Diary, vo1.3, p.231).
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Apr. 1924, and cols.892-894 of 12 May 1924. The (London) Times noted
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25. Parl. Deb. Commons, vo1.171, cols.2427-8 of 3 Apr. 1924. The Talbot
Committee did report in August 1924 (Cmd. 2278), though its main
recommendation, of repea of the Act, was not acted upon (see also Chapter
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26. Executive Council Minutes; G2/3; C2/55 of 26 Feb. 1924. NA.
27. The (London) Times, 23 Jan. 1925.
28. Memoranda; G.O.C. Army to President, 11 and 22 Apr. 1924. D/T S.3693
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29. The (London) Times, 29 Oct. 1924, noted the arrest of seven men, though
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and their fate.
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that there was no advantage, electoral or otherwise, in bringing this to public
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